[tonyrey]

You seem to suppose that where there is causality there is determinism (or necessitation). But, at the same time, you clearly wish to see mental events and states as causes of behavior. So do you imagine that mental causes necessitate the behaviors to which they give rise?

Mental events and states are not causes but effects and cannot be regarded as responsible for anything. Neither can the brain because it has no control-centre. If responsibility exists it must be attributed to the intangible entity we call the mind. To compare mental causality with physical causality presupposes they are comparable but they are not. The mind transcends the body with its power of hindsight, insight and foresight whereas the brain is not even aware it exists. The mind is the director whereas the body is the servant. Responsibility exists only when there is self-control and self-determinism that transcend the determinism and indeterminism of the physical world.

[ordinaryguy]

Are you implying that there is no difference between the way animals and humans regard each other? That animals can distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong? That both we and they reason and behave in fundamentally the same way?

No. The fact that there are similarities doesn't mean that there are no differences.

You may cringe but you haven't explained how you define "freedom" and "determinism", nor how there is scope for choice if all mental events have biochemical causes.

I'm not sure what you mean by "mental event", but if you mean "thoughts" I don't think I can agree with your premise that they "all have biochemical causes". I do agree that the capacity for thought arises out of the brain/body system. The ability to think (which is "determined" by our biochemical apparatus) is different than the process of thinking particular thoughts in a particular sequence (which is the realm where "freedom" can operate). So no, I still don't see the huge contradiction that you are so exercised about.

If our spiritual/religious dimension consists solely of a desire to transcend the bounds of conscious existence within this physical world it is no more than a futile illusion doomed to bring us misery and frustration.

I don't think the fullness of spiritual life consists "solely" of a desire to transcend the limitations of material existence, but I do think this desire usually arises near the beginning of the spiritual journey. Are you suggesting that the spiritual impulse has to arise in some other way to avoid being "a futile illusion doomed to bring us misery and frustration"?

[Akoue]

Mental events and states are not causes but effects and cannot be regarded as responsible for anything.

You have just committed yourself to the wildly implausible view that beliefs and desires are not causes of behavior.

Neither can the brain because it has no control-centre.

So the brain, like the mind, is causally inert? How then do you account for behavior.

How do you account for the fact that manipulation of the brain alters behavior? This would seem to fly in the face of your claim that the brain is not a cause of anything.

If responsibility exists it must be attributed to the intangible entity we call the mind.

But you have just said that mental events and states (events and states of the mind) are not causally efficaceous. You've also said that the mind (mental events and states) "cannot be regarded as responsible for anything".

You have contradicted yourself.

The mind transcends the body

This begs the question.

The mind is the director whereas the body is the servant.

But you've already committed yourself to the claim that mental states and events like belief and desire are not causes of behavior, that they are epiphenomenal. You are therefore not entitled to the claim that the mind directs the body.

Responsibility exists only when there is self-control and self-determinism that transcend the determinism and indeterminism of the physical world.

The physical world is deterministic and indeterministic?

Human beings are part of the physical world, yes? I exercise my agency by moving my body and interacting with other physical objects, yes? My mind had better be in intimate causal commerce with the physical world if my mind is to have anything at all to do.

I don't know what "self-determinism" means.

[tonyrey]

The objective processes ("biochemical events") are the same for you and for me, but the results ("conscious self") are subjective, your experience different from mine. My neurotransmitters flow between my synapses (determinism), and I think to myself, "I want to eat a banana" (free will). Your neurotransmitters flow between your synapses (determinism), and you think to yourself, "I want to eat a mango" (free will).

The biochemical events in our brains are not the same. Every brain has a different history. The fact that people think differently does not mean they are free to choose what to think. Freedom implies the ability to control our thoughts. Where is the control-centre in the brain?

[tonyrey]

QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]You have just committed yourself to the wildly implausible view that beliefs and desires are not causes of behavior.
[/QUOTE]

:eek: You are distorting my views by taking one sentence out of its context:

"Mental events and states are not causes but effects and cannot be regarded as responsible for anything. Neither can the brain because it has no control-centre. If responsibility exists it must be attributed to the intangible entity we call the mind."

Do you regard mental events and states as responsible for what happens? It is our mind that is responsible for the way we behave.

QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]
So the brain, like the mind, is causally inert? How then do you account for behavior.
How do you account for the fact that manipulation of the brain alters behavior? This would seem to fly in the face of your claim that the brain is not a cause of anything.
[/QUOTE]

Complete and utter nonsense. Where have I suggested that the brain is causally inert ? I have stated that the brain is not aware than it exists and that it is not responsible for what we do. Obviously it produces activity. Otherwise the body would be inert.
QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]
But you have just said that mental events and states (events and states of the mind) are not causally efficaceous. You've also said that the mind (mental events and states) "cannot be regarded as responsible for anything".
You have contradicted yourself.
[/QUOTE]

Not at all. Once again you have distorted the meaning of my statement by equating mental events and states with the mind. You may have an atomistic view of the mind but I regard it as an entity. It is the mind that is responsible, not mental events and states. ;)
QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]
But you've already committed yourself to the claim that mental states and events like belief and desire are not causes of behavior, that they are epiphenomenal. You are therefore not entitled to the claim that the mind directs the body.
[/QUOTE]
Another distortion. Where have I used the term "epiphenomenal"? :p

QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]
The physical world is deterministic and indeterministic?
[/QUOTE]
If you doubt this consult any physics textbook... :D
QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]
Human beings are part of the physical world, yes? I exercise my agency by moving my body and interacting with other physical objects, yes? My mind had better be in intimate causal commerce with the physical world if my mind is to have anything at all to do.
[/QUOTE]
Who denied that it is?
QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]
I don't know what "self-determinism" means.[/QUOTE]
QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]Then why not consult a dictionary? Perhaps you don't want to know... :rolleyes:.[/QUOTE]

[Akoue]

QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]You have just committed yourself to the wildly implausible view that beliefs and desires are not causes of behavior.


:eek: You are distorting my views by taking one sentence out of its context:

"Mental events and states are not causes but effects and cannot be regarded as responsible for anything. Neither can the brain because it has no control-centre. If responsibility exists it must be attributed to the intangible entity we call the mind."

Do you regard mental events and states as responsible for what happens? It is our mind that is responsible for the way we behave.

And mental states and events are states and events of the mind. When you say

Mental events and states are not causes but effects and cannot be regarded as responsible for anything.

You commit yourself to the claim that, say, my desire to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich does not cause me to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich nor is is part of the causal etiology of my act of eating a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. You commit yourself, in other words, to the denial of what philosophers call the "belief-desire" thesis. This holds that the explanation (or what is often called the "rationalization) of, say, my eating a peanut butter and jelly sandwich includes (1) my desire to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich and (2) my belief that eating a peanut butter and jelly sandwich will satisfy that desire. If you mean to reject the belief-desire thesis you have given no grounds which might justify its rejection.

QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]
So the brain, like the mind, is causally inert? How then do you account for behavior.
How do you account for the fact that manipulation of the brain alters behavior? This would seem to fly in the face of your claim that the brain is not a cause of anything.


Complete and utter nonsense. Where have I suggested that the brain is causally inert ? I have stated that the brain is not aware than it exists and that it is not responsible for what we do. Obviously it produces activity. Otherwise the body would be inert.

You suggested it here:

Neither can the brain

If the brain cannot be a cause, then it is causally inert.

QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]
But you have just said that mental events and states (events and states of the mind) are not causally efficaceous. You've also said that the mind (mental events and states) "cannot be regarded as responsible for anything".
You have contradicted yourself.

Not at all. Once again you have distorted the meaning of my statement by equating mental events and states with the mind. You may have an atomistic view of the mind but I regard it as an entity. It is the mind that is responsible, not mental events and states. ;)

Well, let's see. What are mental events and states events and states of? The mind, right? This comports perfectly with the idea that the brain is an entity--and isn't at all tantamount to holding an atomistic view of the mind. Now, it isn't entirely clear what you mean by an "atomistic" view of the mind, but if you are thinking of the sort of view that Blackburn holds, or Hume, then I reject atomism.

Moreover, if you really wanted to reject atomism I would have expected you to say not that it is the mind that is responsible but the person (a la Hornsby).

QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]
But you've already committed yourself to the claim that mental states and events like belief and desire are not causes of behavior, that they are epiphenomenal. You are therefore not entitled to the claim that the mind directs the body.

Another distortion. Where have I used the term "epiphenomenal"? :p

QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]
The physical world is deterministic and indeterministic?

If you doubt this consult any physics textbook... :D

I have. They teach us that physical laws are probabilistic, not deterministic.

You might want to acquaint yourself with Hilary Putnam's notion of a probabilistic automaton.

As for the term "epiphenomenal": No, you have not used the term. But you have embraced the epiphenomenalism of the mental by committing yourself to the claim that mental states and events are not causes of behavior. Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental states and events are not causes of behavior. An even stronger form of epiphenomenalism would hold that mental states and events are causes neither of behavior nor of other mental states and events. You have so far committed yourself to the first, weaker, form of epiphenomenalism.

QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]
Human beings are part of the physical world, yes? I exercise my agency by moving my body and interacting with other physical objects, yes? My mind had better be in intimate causal commerce with the physical world if my mind is to have anything at all to do.

Who denied that it is?

You did, when you wrote:

Mental events and states are not causes but effects and cannot be regarded as responsible for anything.

QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]
I don't know what "self-determinism" means.
QUOTE=Akoue;1673101]Then why not consult a dictionary? Perhaps you don't want to know... :rolleyes:.

[/QUOTE]

Well, it isn't in my Oxford English Dictionary. Neither is it a term in common philosophical usage. Did you mean to say "self-determination"? Or do you have something else in mind? If the latter, then please don't keep it a secret.

[tonyrey]

Did you mean to say "self-determination"? Or do you have something else in mind? If the latter, then please don't keep it a secret.

It may help you to understand my viewpoint if I point out that the present stage of the discussion is concerned with freedom and responsibility. Obviously many of our thoughts, feelings, states and actions are not under our control, we do not cause them and are not responsible for them. We are responsible only for those caused by decisions we make consciously, rationally and deliberately. The explanation of eating a sandwich certainly includes a desire and a belief but the cause of eating the sandwich is the decision to do so - if mens rea exists. Self-control implies an intangible entity we call the "self". The brain is not responsible because it has no control-centre. Nor are the states and events that occur in the brain.

Why are we responsible for what we did in the past, given that our physical states have changed? It can only be because we have a continuous identity that is not located in the body. In this context the mind is the director whereas the body is the servant. That is why I referred to self-determinism. (The term can be found in Google, Merriam-Webster and many other sources). The self determines itself by transcending the determinism and indeterminism of the physical world. That is why the buck rests with us. We decide what we want out of life and, within limits, shape ourselves and our destiny. A more poetic view is implied in the words of John Keats that this world is "a vale of soul-making" ( although he was unorthodox in his belief that we create our soul!)

It is the first time I have ever been described as an epiphenomenalist :) The original meaning of the term is that mental states and events are mere epiphenomena, i.e. side-effects or by-products of physiological states and events in the brain. The exact opposite is true. I believe the mind or self is responsible for its rational activity, not the brain, beliefs, desires or whatever else you care to name.

Your view of the mind seems atomistic in the sense that you seem to regard it as a sequence of states and events. I may be mistaken but you apparently dispense with the idea of the self and attribute the causes of behavior to individual events and states. Yet how can individual events and states of the mind be responsible for their activity? And if they are not responsible what is?

[tonyrey]

capacity[/I] for thought arises out of the brain/body system. The ability to think (which is "determined" by our biochemical apparatus) is different than the process of thinking particular thoughts in a particular sequence (which is the realm where "freedom" can operate). So no, I still don't see the huge contradiction that you are so exercised about.

I don't think the fullness of spiritual life consists "solely" of a desire to transcend the limitations of material existence, but I do think this desire usually arises near the beginning of the spiritual journey. Are you suggesting that the spiritual impulse has to arise in some other way to avoid being "a futile illusion doomed to bring us misery and frustration"?

Your idea of freedom is that it consists of rearranging thoughts in a particular sequence. I hope I'm not misinterpreting you :) The question arises as to what it is that rearranges thoughts... because that must be where the responsibility lies...

A similar problem occurs with the spiritual journey. When does it begin and, more importantly, when does it end? If it ends at death it is doomed to bring us misery and frustration...

[Akoue]

It may help you to understand my viewpoint if I point out that the present stage of the discussion is concerned with freedom and responsibility.

It is, yes, for the reason that you introduced it as a test that physicalism (of the sort that had been advocated by asking) cannot pass.

Obviously many of our thoughts, feelings, states and actions are not under our control, we do not cause them and are not responsible for them. We are responsible only for those caused by decisions we make consciously, rationally and deliberately. The explanation of eating a sandwich certainly includes a desire and a belief but the cause of eating the sandwich is the decision to do so - if mens rea exists. Self-control implies an intangible entity we call the "self". The brain is not responsible because it has no control-centre. Nor are the states and events that occur in the brain.

It isn't at all obvious to me that "self-control implies an intangible entity" of any sort. I am not an eliminativist, and I have my own issues with physicalism, but there is no good reason to suppose that what you call "self-control" requires the existence of an immaterial self or mind (it appears that by "intangible" you mean "immaterial" or "non-physical"). On the contrary, this is precisely where the sort of dualism you appear to advocate gets into trouble: The problem of interaction. If the mind or self is itself non-physical, then the dualist (you) needs to explain how an immaterial substance (the mind) can interact causally with a physical substance (the body). This is a problem as old as Cartesian dualism itself, since the objection was raised already by Arnauld (among others). If the mind causes behavior, and behavior involves the movement of the body, then you owe us some account of the means by which the mind can enter into causal commerce with the body.

Why are we responsible for what we did in the past, given that our physical states have changed? It can only be because we have a continuous identity that is not located in the body.

How about relations of psychological continuity? This doesn't imply the existence of an immaterial mind or self. Many philosophers favor the psychological continuity theory of personal identity, according to which personal identity is vouchsafed by the identity and similarity relations among different temporal stages of a given self.

In this context the mind is the director whereas the body is the servant. That is why I referred to self-determinism. (The term can be found in Google, Merriam-Webster and many other sources). The self determines itself by transcending the determinism and indeterminism of the physical world. That is why the buck rests with us. We decide what we want out of life and, within limits, shape ourselves and our destiny. A more poetic view is implied in the words of John Keats that this world is "a vale of soul-making" ( although he was unorthodox in his belief that we create our soul!)

The business about the mind as director and the body as servant is picturesque but doesn't appear to me to pay any real explanatory dividends. If the mind is, after all, the body, then there is no dualism between the two and so the metaphor collapses. I still find the notion of "self-determinism" with which you are operating to be intolerably vague. No one denies that the self is capable of self-determination (also often referred to as autonomy), but from this is does not follow that the mind is an immaterial substance. This is perfectly consistent with all the versions of physicalism with which I am aware. In fact, given the interaction problem faced by dualism, there are reasons to suppose that taking mental causation seriously strongly recommends physicalism.

It is the first time I have ever been described as an epiphenomenalist :) The original meaning of the term is that mental states and events are mere epiphenomena, i.e. side-effects or by-products of physiological states and events in the brain. The exact opposite is true. I believe the mind or self is responsible for its rational activity, not the brain, beliefs, desires or whatever else you care to name.

There's a first time for everything, I suppose. Given the causal closure of the physical world (all physical events have physical causes), it has often been pointed out (most notably by Jaegwon Kim) that the sort of dualism to which you have committed yourself does not provide for the mental to have any causal work to do, most especially in the production of behavior, linguistic or otherwise. This is, of course, a not-too-distant cousin of the interaction problem for mind-body dualism. Now you could, of course, reject the principle of causal closure. That's not an avenue many people are inclined to pursue, however. Instead, most philosophers have opted for non-reductionistic physicalism or the view that the mind and body are identical but that mental properties cannot be reduced to physical properties. This doesn't appear to be the option you have chosen for yourself. You seem to embrace a pretty full-blooded dualism, and this leaves you saddled with the problem of interaction--a problem which, unaddressed, leaves you open (given things you have said) to the charge of epiphenomenalism.

Your view of the mind seems atomistic in the sense that you seem to regard it as a sequence of states and events. I may be mistaken but you apparently dispense with the idea of the self and attribute the causes of behavior to individual events and states.

I don't, in fact, regard the mind as just a sequence of states and events. I find that view indefensible, although it isn't obviously false and so you would need to provide some argument to show that your charges of atomism are anything more than reflections of your own philosophical tastes. And I very definitely am not a reductionist or eliminativist about the self. Nevertheless, we do act on particular desires and under particular beliefs.

Yet how can individual events and states of the mind be responsible for their activity? And if they are not responsible what is?

Given the dualism you favor, how can anything mental be responsible for anything at all? At this point, the sort of emergence view offered by asking earlier in the thread seems far more plausible.

[ordinaryguy]

Your idea of freedom is that it consists of rearranging thoughts in a particular sequence. I hope I'm not misinterpreting you :)

Well, I think you are misinterpreting me, but frankly, I don't have the patience that Akoue has to try to straighten you out. I find your logic contorted, your terminology sloppy and your objections unconvincing.

[tonyrey]

Well, I think you are misinterpreting me, but frankly, I don't have the patience that Akoue has to try to straighten you out. I find your logic contorted, your terminology sloppy and your objections unconvincing.

Since you have failed miserably to answer my questions and refute the points I have made it would be equally facile and evasive to describe your logic contorted, your terminology sloppy and your objections unconvincing...

[ordinaryguy]

Since you have failed miserably...

Failure, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder, I guess.

[tonyrey]

Failure, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder, I guess.

Not at all. One has either answered questions or failed to answer them...

[tonyrey]

If the mind or self is itself non-physical, then the dualist (you) needs to explain how an immaterial substance (the mind) can interact causally with a physical substance (the body). This is a problem as old as Cartesian dualism itself, since the objection was raised already by Arnauld (among others). If the mind causes behavior, and behavior involves the movement of the body, then you owe us some account of the means by which the mind can enter into causal commerce with the body.

I am not a dualist in the original sense of the term - that ultimate reality is composed of mind and matter. I am a monist, believing that both our minds and bodies owe their existence to a Supreme Mind. So they are intimately related by virtue of their origin and not so disparate as physicalists contend. I don't claim to understand all the ways in which the mind functions but who does? Kim admits physicalism is defective in at least one respect, i.e. qualia. Bertrand Russell was no fool and he sought refuge in neutral monism precisely because of the formidable difficulties in physicalism, emergent or otherwise.

How were conscious, rational, purposeful and autonomous persons produced by random combinations of atomic particles? This is a problem as old as the monism of Leucippus and Democritus. If the mind has emerged from the activity of the brain you owe us some account of the means by which the brain is aware of itself and controls itself.

If you find the notion of self-determinism intolerably vague I find your notion of the self intolerably nebulous :) What is it exactly? If it has a physical basis where is it located?
In daily life we do not regard other people as biological robots.As I pointed out to Asking, emergent physicalism does not correspond to the belief that persons have the right to life, liberty and happiness. A mechanistic interpretation of reality does not account for the existence of purpose and values. When a theory conflicts with the fundamental tenets of civilised human beings one is entitled to be sceptical.

Since our thoughts, emotions and decisions are intangible they are explained more readily in terms of an intangible entity than a physical brain. Since truth, goodness, freedom, equality and justice are intangible they too correspond more closely to an intangible self than to an observable organ. The relation of the mind to the body is mysterious but the mind directs the body in the literal sense of the term - it introduces direction and purpose into what would otherwise be a purposeless process. Inanimate matter has no goal or end.

We have direct, personal experience of the power of our mind.It is putting the cart before the horse to explain mind in terms of matter. Without a mind we wouldn't even know matter exists. Our starting point is our stream of consciousness with its thoughts, sensations, feelings and decisions. We have direct knowledge of ourselves whereas our knowledge of physical reality is inferred from the evidence of our senses. Epistemological precedence does not necessarily entail ontological precedence but it indicates that the presumption that matter has emerged from mind is more likely than mind from matter.

The basic flaw in materialism is that it equates temporal priority with ontological priority. To all appearances only matter existed at the Big Bang but since mind cannot be observed there is no evidence that it did not exist. On the contrary, the origin and evolution of life are not adequately explained by a series of fortuitous events. The effect would not be proportionate to the cause.

The increase of complexity and the emergence of organization are characteristic of rational activity.The significance of a process should not be assessed solely by its apparent origin but by its development and outcome. To regard conscious, rational and purposeful persons as the product of purposeless particles is to seek refuge in absurdity and devalue everything we consider precious...

.

[Akoue]

I am not a dualist in the original sense of the term - that ultimate reality is composed of mind and matter. I am a monist, believing that both our minds and bodies owe their existence to a Supreme Mind.

Believing in a Supreme Mind doesn't save you from dualism unless you deny the existence of either mind or matter. Now you appear to affirm the existence of bodies. If you hold that bodies are physical and that the mind is non-physical, then you are a dualist despite your belief that they have the origin of their existence in a Supreme Mind. Most Christians, for instance, believe as you do and are dualists. Descartes comes to mind. Or do you mean to avoid dualism by mentalizing the material a la Berkeley?

So they are intimately related by virtue of their origin and not so disparate as physicalists contend.

How does their common source in a Supreme Mind solve the problem of interaction? You still don't apear to have any way to account for mental causation.

I don't claim to understand all the ways in which the mind functions but who does? Kim admits physicalism is defective in at least one respect, i.e. qualia. Bertrand Russell was no fool and he sought refuge in neutral monism precisely because of the formidable difficulties in physicalism, emergent or otherwise.

Kim thinks that consciousness presents the most pressing challenge for physicalism, but he certainly hasn't abandoned physicalism. Far from it. Notice that I have nowhere said that physicalism is unproblematic. (I am not a shill for physicalism as I do not regard myself as a physicalist. Nevertheless, one must respond to it in a way that is intellectually honest.) What I have done is to point out that the sort of dualism you have been advocating appears to have insuperable difficulties. Dualism does considerably worse as a response to the action-theoretic objections you have raised to physicalism than does physicalism itself. That really ought to give you some pause.

How were conscious, rational, purposeful and autonomous persons produced by random combinations of atomic particles? This is a problem as old as the monism of Leucippus and Democritus. If the mind has emerged from the activity of the brain you owe us some account of the means by which the brain is aware of itself and controls itself.

Why do you suppose that the brain has to be reflectively aware of itself? Why, moreover, do you suppose that physicalism requires an account of the origin of consciousness, et al. After all, the laws of planetary motion don't require an account of the origin of the universe in order to be true.

If you find the notion of self-determinism intolerably vague I find your notion of the self intolerably nebulous :) What is it exactly? If it has a physical basis where is it located?
In daily life we do not regard other people as biological robots.As I pointed out to Asking, emergent physicalism does not correspond to the belief that persons have the right to life, liberty and happiness. A mechanistic interpretation of reality does not account for the existence of purpose and values. When a theory conflicts with the fundamental tenets of civilised human beings one is entitled to be sceptical.

I haven't offered any notion of the self. I have so far merely been responding to your claims.

I don't see that asking committed herself to the view that we are biological robots. But even if she had, how would that commit her to a mechanistic view of reality? Science hasn't been mechanistic for quite some time. You need to get your picture of science out of the seventeenth century. On the whole, your objections to physicalism have had a strawman quality about them.

Since our thoughts, emotions and decisions are intangible they are explained more readily in terms of an intangible entity than a physical brain.

You can continue to insist upon this all you like, though you are, of course, begging the question. And if by "intangible entity" you mean "immaterial entity" that's exactly what you're doing.

Since truth, goodness, freedom, equality and justice are intangible they too correspond more closely to an intangible self than to an observable organ. The relation of the mind to the body is mysterious but the mind directs the body in the literal sense of the term - it introduces direction and purpose into what would otherwise be a purposeless process. Inanimate matter has no goal or end.

We have direct, personal experience of the power of our mind.It is putting the cart before the horse to explain mind in terms of matter.

The things you mention are non-physical. I don't agree that this renders them intangible.
Now when you say that the relation of mind and body is mysterious, is this your conceding that you have absolutely no idea how to deal with the problem of interaction? 'Cause that's how it looks.

We have direct introspective awareness of certain mental properties or states or events (call them what you will). It doesn't at all follow that this is awareness of an immaterial thing or entity. Most physicalists regard mental properties or states or events to be higher-order functional properties of lower-order physical properties (this is what asking argued for earlier in the thread).

Without a mind we wouldn't even know matter exists.

Okay. So long as you realize that it doesn't follow from this that the mind is itself immaterial. It would be a mistake to attempt to read off from the surface contours of our mental life the deep metaphysical structure of the world. There is no facile inferential path leading from the introspectible features of our mental life to the ontological nature of those states themselves. Now Descartes and others--and perhaps you--were more than happy to take it for granted that the mind is panoptical with regard to itself, that the mind knows not only what it is thinking but what kind of thing that it is. But, of course, the panopticism of the mind has been just absolutely vitiated. I can see no good reason to suppose that from the fact that I do not experience my mental states as physical states of my body I can therefore take it for granted that they are not physical states of my body.

it indicates that the presumption that matter has emerged from mind is more likely than mind from matter.

How on earth to you get that? This doesn't even have a toe-hold on the canons of logical reasoning.

The basic flaw in materialism is that it equates temporal priority with ontological priority. To all appearances only matter existed at the Big Bang but since mind cannot be observed there is no evidence that it did not exist. On the contrary, the origin and evolution of life are not adequately explained by a series of fortuitous events. The effect would not be proportionate to the cause.

The increase of complexity and the emergence of organization are characteristic of rational activity.The significance of a process should not be assessed solely by its apparent origin but by its development and outcome.

What you say here gives the impression that you haven't the vaguest notion what materialism's commitments are. Again, a strawman. In particular, materialism isn't committed to the equation of temporal with ontological priority. You have conjured this out of thin air.

To regard conscious, rational and purposeful persons as the product of purposeless particles is to seek refuge in absurdity and devalue everything we consider precious...

Your appeal to sentiment is, of course, an informal fallacy. Moreover, you have insisted emphatically that physicalism poses a threat to these things, but you have provided no rationally compelling argument. Yet again, you give evidence of having only a very remote and casual acquaintance with physicalism. This might--might--be a problem for reductionists. But most physicalists are not reductionists (as you must know since you've read Kim): they do not take the view that higher-order functional properties can be reduced to, or eliminated in favor of, their lower-order supervenience bases. This is as much as to point out, once again, that you have elected to take aim at a strawman.

But, leaving that aside for a moment, why suppose that our prephilosophical commonsense commitments are unrevisable? Our regarding certain things as precious does not guarantee that they aren't fictive.

[tonyrey]

Believing in a Supreme Mind doesn't save you from dualism unless you deny the existence of either mind or matter.

You do not seem to understand that belief in a Supreme Being is monistic. If mind and matter are both created they must have something in common - their origin and their contingency. They are both subsidiary aspects of reality. To regard them as entirely disparate and incapable of interaction is to restrict reality to human categories - an absurd view. It amounts to imposing limits on the power of the Creator.

You suggest I have absolutely no idea how to deal with the problem of interaction, apparently forgetting or dismissing my statement that the mind directs the body by introducing direction and purpose into what would otherwise be a purposeless process.

"Why do you suppose that the brain has to be reflectively aware of itself?"

I don't but if the brain is not aware of itself what is self-awareness? It must be either an illusion or an attribute of an entity which does not enter into your scheme of things. If you cannot specify what the self is, or are unwilling to do so, your objections to dualism lack foundation. Many explanations are incomplete or entail difficulties but they are better than no explanation at all.

You ask why I suppose physicalism requires an account of the origin of consciousness, rationality, truth, goodness, justice, freedom and purpose. If it explains none of the most important aspects of reality it is vacuous. The laws of planetary motion don't require an account of the origin of the universe because they are concerned with only one aspect of reality. This discussion is concerned with the nature of reality itself.

Your view of science seems outdated. There are many examples of mechanistic thinking in current science. Proponents of AI, for example, have argued that the human mind is a machine and subject to the same laws of physics as any other machine.

The view that mental properties or states or events as higher-order functional properties of lower-order physical properties throws no light on their relationship. There is no direct inference from introspection to the nature of reality but the fact remains that our primary data are our thoughts, feelings and decisions. There is no guarantee that the physical world even exists whereas we cannot deny our thoughts exist without contradicting ourselves. That should give you pause for thought...

If materialism isn't committed to the equation of temporal with ontological priority why does it focus on the origin of the universe rather than consider the entire process? Why does it have a one-way view of causality, explaining the present in terms of the past and rejecting explanation in terms of final causes, i.e. teleology?

" I can see no good reason to suppose that from the fact that I do not experience my mental states as physical states of my body I can therefore take it for granted that they are not physical states of my body."

If we do not experience mental states as physical states of the body even though they are physical states of the body the whole of humanity has been labouring under a colossal delusion for thousands of years. You may not take it for granted but the onus is on you to explain how they are physical states. Most physicalists are not reductionists but they have not explained how higher-order functional properties are derived from their lower-order supervenience bases. "Supervenience" is a description not an explanation.

You are quite mistaken in dismissing as an appeal to sentiment my statement that regarding persons as the product of particles is to devalue everything. In fact you have confirmed it by asking why we should suppose our prephilosophical commonsense commitments are unrevisable. Your question implies you have no sound basis for believing in human rights. If you regard human rights as fictive you're not alone - so did Hitler, Stalin and a multitude of others. If you don't, how do you explain them?

[0rphan]

Is the mind anything distinct from the body?

Here's another, perhaps more precise, way of asking the question:

Are mental states (thoughts, beliefs, desires, sensations, fears) states of the brain or are mental states distinct from brain states?

Please provide support for your claims. I would like to hear from people who hold different views about this, so kindly support your view or any claims you make with reasons so that those who don't hold your view can see where you are coming from and why you think what you think.

Thank you in advance.

Hi AKoue,

What an interesting question.. unfortunately I don't have enough knowledge to add to this discussion, only to say I believe..

The brain is responsible for all our thoughts, feelings, beliefs, desires and so on,

Purely because you can train parts of the brain that are not used.. shall we say for e.g.. After suffering a stroke.. or if you are a O C D sufferer with C B T.

I think mental states can be controlled by the brain in what ever way it is trained.

The brain is the engine of the body, the controller of all the states of mind.

The states of mind cannot be separate from the brain states, the are one in the same.

I have no answer as to why, having had an outer body experience, how all of this works, only to say that maybe, because I had not died and my brain was still functioning, the outer body was some how supported.

This happened many years ago, it was the strangest thing I have ever experienced.

I think there are things that we are not meant to know, no matter how hard we try to scientifically back them up... it's just how it's meant to be.

[tonyrey]

The brain is responsible for all our thoughts, feelings, beliefs, desires and so on,

Purely because you can train parts of the brain that are not used..shall we say for eg. after suffering a stroke..or if you are a O C D sufferer with C B T.

I think mental states can be controlled by the brain in what ever way it is trained.

The brain is the engine of the body, the controller of all the states of mind.

The states of mind cannot be separate from the brain states, the are one in the same.

I have no answer as to why, having had an outer body experience, how all of this works, only to say that maybe, because i had not died and my brain was still functioning, the outer body was some how supported.

This happened many years ago, it was the strangest thing i have ever experienced.

I think there are things that we are not meant to know, no matter how hard we try to scientifically back them up...it's just how it's meant to be.

I'm intrigued by your last statement: "meant" usually means "intended". Should we interpret that literally? If so, there is at least one state of mind that is not controlled by the brain :)

[tonyrey]

Hi AKoue,

What an interesting question..unfortunately i don't have enough knowledge to add to this discussion, only to say i believe..

The brain is responsible for all our thoughts, feelings, beliefs, desires and so on,

Purely because you can train parts of the brain that are not used..shall we say for eg. after suffering a stroke..or if you are a O C D sufferer with C B T.

I think mental states can be controlled by the brain in what ever way it is trained.

The brain is the engine of the body, the controller of all the states of mind.

The states of mind cannot be separate from the brain states, the are one in the same.

I have no answer as to why, having had an outer body experience, how all of this works, only to say that maybe, because i had not died and my brain was still functioning, the outer body was some how supported.

This happened many years ago, it was the strangest thing i have ever experienced.

I think there are things that we are not meant to know, no matter how hard we try to scientifically back them up...it's just how it's meant to be.

To say that mental states can be controlled by the brain in what ever way it is trained implies that there is a trainer :)

[Fydor Bloom]

Have you ever hear of something called "The ghost in the machine"? It's a problem that has been around for a while, we're the ghost and our bodies are the machine. I think our bodies are a necessity of evolution. We need them to fulfill our aspirations. Also I think our minds and the knowledge we have are different. Meaning the mind and that brain are not the same.