[ordinaryguy]

asking--I tried to give you rep but apparently I have praised you too much recently. I love the way you think and the way you explain why you think the way you do. Your discussion of "emergent properties" should be in textbooks. You rock!

[asking]

I find your experiments fascinating but sometimes gruesome. :rolleyes:

Tony,
I thought those were gruesome too, and I haven't told you the half of it. But I hope you don't think those WERE the experiments! In the first case, I was a college student looking that the difference between how two males interact and two females. I had NO idea that male mice would be so aggressive. I thought the first death was a fluke. Maybe it was sick? My naiveté is embarrassing now. (All the pairs of females lived in perfect harmony, sleeping together even... :rolleyes:)

In the second case, I was taking care of animals for a biotech company and didn't know that I'd mixed two sexes together (sexing hamsters takes some concentration). Again, I didn't realize how dangerous males could be... I was shocked.

I agree that "morality itself is deeper seated and a separate thing" and "the moral impulse was already there". (Where? ):eek:

I meant that our moral impulse has evolved. Here's another weird example. We think of altruism as being a uniquely human thing. But it's not; lots of animals take care of one another and even take significant risks for one another. But in most cases, biologists can show that animals are much more likely to sacrifice for close relatives than for strangers. They call it "kin selection" or "kin altruism." When it happens with non relatives, it's typically characterized as spillover behavior--like a dog raising a kitten. Her maternal instincts just kick in inappropriately. Of course, out own altruistic acts are never characterized that way--as just spillover behavior from our evolved tendency to take care of kin.

But in fact some animals engage in regular altruism with non relatives. In that case, it's more of a good karma situation, where if you do for someone else in your group, it'll come back to you at some point. A classic example of this is vampire bats, which starve very quickly if they don't get a meal every night. Fortunately, if someone in the colony doesn't manage to get a meal on one night, the other bats will share--and they need not be relatives. This is called "reciprocal altruism." Humans do this too when we save someone we don't know or share food with a street person. It's a moral impulse that is millions of years old.

In fact, I sometimes hear people on the radio tell listeners that it's better to donate to a charity than to give to street people and while I recognize that as a rational argument, I think it's contrary to human moral code, which is to help immediately in a tangible way if we see someone we think is in distress. How does it affect us morally to blunt that impulse over and over? (And I'm not arguing that everyone who begs is in distress.)

The essential difference between us and animals... is that unlike them we kill... if we regard it as the lesser of two evils.

What I'm arguing is that animals also kill under such circumstances. Humans and animals make similar moral decisions--if you just look at what we do. There is little that we do that other animals don't also do--whether it's helping one another or killing or raping. The big exceptions to that rule are our intelligence and ornate language and culture. I don't think our sense of right and wrong is one of those exceptions.

The main point is that in our case the buck stops with each of us individually... and that needs explanation...

Here I'm confused. I honestly don't see anything that needs explaining.

How does the buck stop with an individual in a way that's unique to humans? I would appreciate it if you gave a concrete and substantive example, as I don't know what you mean.

[Akoue]

Here's one way we might approach it:

There are two complementary conceptual frameworks within which we think of ourselves.

1. Reasons-framework. We are rational agents and our actions can be justified by appeal to reasons which can be formulated and expressed linguistically in a way that renders those actions, and ourselves as the authors of those actions, subject to moral evaluation. (Of course they also render us subject to other sorts of evaluation as well: considerations of legality, where these differ from strictly moral considerations; considerations of practical rationality (given our ends, have we gone about realizing them in a rational way); prudential considerations (where these may be thought to be distinct from considerations of practical rationality); etiquette.

2. Causal framework. We are physical entities, organisms functioning in the ways that organisms of this type (i.e. the type that we are, human beings) function. Our actions are caused by massively complex physical processes and events occurring in our bodies and of which we are not reflectively* aware and over which we do not exercise control.

* When I say that we are not reflectively aware of these events and processes, I mean only to say that we have no access to them by means of introspection. I can be introspectively aware of myself wanting more light in the room (and so I reach for the lamp), but I am not introspectively aware of the neurochemical event that is simultaneous with, and perhaps identical to, my desire for more light.

The first framework is necessary in order for us to regard ourselves and each other as rational beings, as reflective, self-aware subjects with purposes and intentions which are morally evaluable. We can even challenge each others actions, and reasons for action: Suppose I tell a friend a lie. A friend asks me if her husband is cheating on her. I know perfectly well that he is and yet I disabuse her of her suspicions, assuring her that he is, in fact, faithful to her. Now suppose I chose to lie to her because I thought it inappropriate of me to meddle in the marital life of my friend and her husband. This reason for acting, for lying to my friend, is up for moral appraisal. One might think that my reason was a bad reason, that the duties of friendship obligated me to tell her the truth. Or one might think that I did the right thing but for the wrong reason: It was good not to tell her the truth, but only because what she doesn't know won't hurt her. Good reasons or bad, those reasons are justifications for acting in the ways that we do. And this, I am prepared to argue, is central to the very concept of a person. It is not, I would also argue, something with which we can dispense; it is part-and-parcel of how we understand ourselves at a very fundamental level.

Now the causal framework does not provide for reasons-explanations of action. A causal account of the same action would make no mention of persons and feelings and principles and the like. A causal explanation would tell us what, as a matter of empirical fact, was the physical (chemical and electrical) process by which I came to utter the words, "No, Rodney isn't having an affair". Were someone, perhaps the very friend to whom I told the lie, to ask me "Why did you lie about it?", it would be inappropriate to respond with a causal explanation (supposing I had one to hand). It would be inappropriate, that is, to say that such-and-such brain activity was occurring at the time I dissembled. And the inappropriateness isn't just the inappropriateness of the demands of etiquette: To give a causal explanation would be to give no explanation at all; it would rather amount to changing the subject. When asked why I did it, I am being asked what my reasons were, why I thought it was the thing to do.

The question is, are these two frameworks really complementary or can one be reduced to, or eliminated in favor of, the other? Materialists of a reductionistic bent would argue that the reasons-framework can be reduced to the causal framework, this for the reason that it is the physical events in the agent's brain (or, at any rate, body) that are doing all the work, and so only causal explanations are really explanatory. The other stuff is a sort of fiction... or is at least not the real story. If you want to understand agency, behavior, you have to locate the appropriate causal mechanisms.

Another way to answer the question would be to say that the two frameworks are genuinely complementary because they answer different, but equally legitimate, questions. We understand ourselves and each other by means of both reasons-explanations and causal-explanations. To try to make sense of ourselves and others without both sorts of framework would leave us with a radically deficient picture. This non-reductionistic complementarity view needn't be non-materialistic. In fact, many of the people who defend it roundly reject the sort of dualism that holds that the mental is a non-physical soul-stuff.

I propose this as a way of capturing intuitions which seem to be guiding both asking and tonyrey. This isn't to take a final stand vis-à-vis the OP, since the complementarity view is neutral regarding the question whether the mental (the stuff that pertains to the reasons framework) is itself through-and-through physical. One could very well develop it in the direction of a very strident dualism were one inclined to do so.

I would, though, urge that we extend these frameworks to organisms other than humans. And not without reason. There are, to be sure, causal mechanisms in play when a dog responds to the rattling of her dinner bowl by trotting into the kitchen with perky ears. But she also has good reason to act this way, since she expects that bowl to be presented to her with something tasty in it. And so for manifold other behaviors. If there is something special or unique about humans, I am inclined to think it lies in the ways in which we hold second-order desires, i.e. we can want to want certain things, and we can want not to want certain things. I am not at all sure what to say about non-humans. Do they too have second-order desires?

Perhaps our biology expert can shed some light on this? Or, at least, give us a sense whether there is any standing biological orthodoxy regarding the subject. For my part, I can well see it going either way.

[tonyrey]

[QUOTE=asking;1574809]
Humans and animals make similar moral decisions--if you just look at what we do. There is little that we do that other animals don't also do--whether it's helping one another or killing or raping. The big exceptions to that rule are our intelligence and ornate language and culture. I don't think our sense of right and wrong is one of those exceptions.

There is no evidence that animals make any moral decisions at all. Their actions are the result of their genetic makeup and their environment.They cannot choose to act according to a moral principle regardless of the consequences. The mouse which killed two male mice did not so as the result of premeditation: it did so as an instinctive response to the presence of a potential rival. The fact that people call a dog "bad" does not imply that the dog has a conscience and can distinguish between right and wrong. They are simply treating the animal as if it were a rational being capable of self-control whereas it is not.

The buck stops with us because we are unique in our power of hindsight, insight and foresight.To say that our behaviour and that of animals is fundamentally the same overlooks our ability to plan ahead, to establish priorities, to weigh the consequences, to resist our instincts and to die for the sake of a principle. I am not disputing the nobility, beauty and altruism of the sacrifices made by many animals but they are neither morally nor legally responsible for their actions.

Since this is the consensus of humanity the onus is on a dissenter to explain how and why other species should be considered moral agents. They certainly have rights but they do not have any moral or legal obligations.

Neither can robots be regarded as decision-makers in the full sense of the term. Their activity is entirely the result of the ways in which they have been programmed. It is either prededetermined or indeterminate (if randomised). The one thing it cannot be is self-determined. If the self is simply a framework it cannot exercise self-control or be a responsible entity. Your analogy of the mind with traffic patterns, flocks of birds and groups of birds does not account for the mind's unity, continuity and self-awareness.

If the mind is just a word for a higher order function of the brain and resides in the interactions between neurons it is, as you say, "a product of the whole body". This interpretation does not correspond with the belief that persons have the right to life, liberty and happiness. In daily life we do not regard other people as biological robots. This is because a mechanistic interpretation of reality does not account for the existence of purpose and values. When a theory conflicts with the fundamental tenets of civilised human beings one is entitled to be sceptical.

[tonyrey]

[QUOTE=tonyrey;1579052]

Humans and animals make similar moral decisions--if you just look at what we do. There is little that we do that other animals don't also do--whether it's helping one another or killing or raping. The big exceptions to that rule are our intelligence and ornate language and culture. I don't think our sense of right and wrong is one of those exceptions.

There is no evidence that animals make any moral decisions at all. Their actions are the result of their genetic makeup and their environment.They cannot choose to act according to a moral principle regardless of the consequences. The mouse which killed two male mice did not so as the result of premeditation: it did so as an instinctive response to the presence of a potential rival. The fact that people call a dog "bad" does not imply that the dog has a conscience and can distinguish between right and wrong. They are simply treating the animal as if it were a rational being capable of self-control whereas it is not.

The buck stops with us because we are unique in our power of hindsight, insight and foresight.To say that our behaviour and that of animals is fundamentally the same overlooks our ability to plan ahead, to establish priorities, to weigh the consequences, to resist our instincts and to die for the sake of a principle. I am not disputing the nobility, beauty and altruism of the sacrifices made by many animals but they are neither morally nor legally responsible for their actions.

Since this is the consensus of humanity the onus is on a dissenter to explain how and why other species should be considered moral agents. They certainly have rights but they do not have any moral or legal obligations.

Neither can robots be regarded as decision-makers in the full sense of the term. Their activity is entirely the result of the ways in which they have been programmed. It is either prededetermined or indeterminate (if randomised). The one thing it cannot be is self-determined. If the self is simply a framework it cannot exercise self-control or be a responsible entity. Your analogy of the mind with traffic patterns, flocks of birds and groups of cells does not account for the mind's unity, continuity and self-awareness.

If the mind is just a word for a higher order function of the brain and resides in the interactions between neurons it is, as you say, "a product of the whole body". This interpretation does not correspond with the belief that persons have the right to life, liberty and happiness. In daily life we do not regard other people as biological robots. This is because a mechanistic interpretation of reality does not account for the existence of purpose and values. When a theory conflicts with the fundamental tenets of civilised human beings one is entitled to be sceptical.

(correction: groups of birds>groups of cells)

[tonyrey]

Tony,
I thought those were gruesome too, and I haven't told you the half of it. But I hope you don't think those WERE the experiments! In the first case, I was a college student looking that the difference between how two males interact and two females. I had NO idea that male mice would be so aggressive. I thought the first death was a fluke. Maybe it was sick?? My naiveté is embarrassing now. (All the pairs of females lived in perfect harmony, sleeping together even...:rolleyes:)

In the second case, I was taking care of animals for a biotech company and didn't know that I'd mixed two sexes together (sexing hamsters takes some concentration). Again, I didn't realize how dangerous males could be...I was shocked.



I meant that our moral impulse has evolved. Here's another weird example. We think of altruism as being a uniquely human thing. But it's not; lots of animals take care of one another and even take significant risks for one another. But in most cases, biologists can show that animals are much more likely to sacrifice for close relatives than for strangers. They call it "kin selection" or "kin altruism." When it happens with non relatives, it's typically characterized as spillover behavior--like a dog raising a kitten. Her maternal instincts just kick in inappropriately. Of course, out own altruistic acts are never characterized that way--as just spillover behavior from our evolved tendency to take care of kin.

But in fact some animals engage in regular altruism with non relatives. In that case, it's more of a good karma situation, where if you do for someone else in your group, it'll come back to you at some point. A classic example of this is vampire bats, which starve very quickly if they don't get a meal every night. Fortunately, if someone in the colony doesn't manage to get a meal on one night, the other bats will share--and they need not be relatives. This is called "reciprocal altruism." Humans do this too when we save someone we don't know or share food with a street person. It's a moral impulse that is millions of years old.

In fact, I sometimes hear people on the radio tell listeners that it's better to donate to a charity than to give to street people and while I recognize that as a rational argument, I think it's contrary to human moral code, which is to help immediately in a tangible way if we see someone we think is in distress. How does it affect us morally to blunt that impulse over and over? (And I'm not arguing that everyone who begs is in distress.)



What I'm arguing is that animals also kill under such circumstances. Humans and animals make similar moral decisions--if you just look at what we do. There is little that we do that other animals don't also do--whether it's helping one another or killing or raping. The big exceptions to that rule are our intelligence and ornate language and culture. I don't think our sense of right and wrong is one of those exceptions.



Here I'm confused. I honestly don't see anything that needs explaining.

How does the buck stop with an individual in a way that's unique to humans? I would appreciate it if you gave a concrete and substantive example, as I don't know what you mean.

Humble apologies for mishandling the system. Please forgive me...

There is no evidence that animals make any moral decisions at all. Their actions are the result of their genetic makeup and their environment.They cannot choose to act according to a moral principle regardless of the consequences. The mouse which killed two male mice did not so as the result of premeditation: it did so as an instinctive response to the presence of a potential rival. The fact that people call a dog "bad" does not imply that the dog has a conscience and can distinguish between right and wrong. They are simply treating the animal as if it were a rational being capable of self-control whereas it is not.

The buck stops with us because we are unique in our power of hindsight, insight and foresight.To say that our behaviour and that of animals is fundamentally the same overlooks our ability to plan ahead, to establish priorities, to weigh the consequences, to resist our instincts and to die for the sake of a principle. I am not disputing the nobility, beauty and altruism of the sacrifices made by many animals but they are neither morally nor legally responsible for their actions.

Since this is the consensus of humanity the onus is on a dissenter to explain how and why other species should be considered moral agents. They certainly have rights but they do not have any moral or legal obligations.

Neither can robots be regarded as decision-makers in the full sense of the term. Their activity is entirely the result of the ways in which they have been programmed. It is either prededetermined or indeterminate (if randomised). The one thing it cannot be is self-determined. If the self is simply a framework it cannot exercise self-control or be a responsible entity. Your analogy of the mind with traffic patterns, flocks of birds and groups of cells does not account for the mind's unity, continuity and self-awareness.

If the mind is just a word for a higher order function of the brain and resides in the interactions between neurons it is, as you say, "a product of the whole body". This interpretation does not correspond with the belief that persons have the right to life, liberty and happiness. In daily life we do not regard other people as biological robots. This is because a mechanistic interpretation of reality does not account for the existence of purpose and values. When a theory conflicts with the fundamental tenets of civilised human beings one is entitled to be sceptical.

[asking]

Humble apologies for mishandling the system. Please forgive me...

No problem. It takes some getting used to.

I would argue the reverse. There is no evidence that animals DON'T make decisions. They decide to help one another, or not. They decide to eat the cupcakes or not. This dog has managed to resist the impulse to take a cupcake. Previously, it took food constantly.

YouTube - The ORIGINAL Stains from "It's Me or the Dog"

He has learned that he's not supposed to take a cupcake, just as I know I'm not supposed to steal a Snicker's bar from the grocery store even though sometimes I would like to. In another scene, the trainer teaches the dog that "someone" is watching all the time, even when there appear to be no humans in the room, and he learns to leave the cupcakes alone even when he's all by himself. It's a staged learning process.

The trick to training animals to resist impulses is pretty much the same as for training children. Consequences must be significant and rewards and punishments consistent, otherwise they do not resist impulses. The habit of impulse control is learned, but impulse control is also located within a specific region of the brain, since certain forms of brain damage can obliterate it. Certain drugs can increase restraint in both humans and other animals.

Self control is a physical process. It is not a function of an abstract mind but a direct result of the functioning of the brain. And it is certainly not unique to humans. To call such restraint "instinct" in animals but high principle in humans is defining the same behavior in two different ways depending on who is doing it, and attributing more high mindedness to us than there is evidence for. I can't prove that dogs have learned principles, but you can't actually prove that some of them don't.

There is no evidence that animals make any moral decisions at all. Their actions are the result of their genetic makeup and their environment.They cannot choose to act according to a moral principle regardless of the consequences.

I don't think there is evidence for a difference between humans and other animals in this respect. When animals risk their lives to help others, we don't attribute this intention and planning to them, in part because we don't know what they are thinking, but we do with people, often even when people's motivations are significantly more complex than simple principle. That is, we often attribute more principle to people than is actually deserved.

For example, when a dog or a 7 year old boy rouses the family during a fire, and everyone gets out, both boy and dog are depicted in heroic terms. But in fact, they may have just been afraid and trying to get help or reassurance. They did nothing wrong and it all turned out well, but the heroism in these situations is consistently exaggerated for effect.

The mouse which killed two male mice did not so as the result of premeditation: it did so as an instinctive response to the presence of a potential rival.

Well, we'd have to discuss "instinctive." Speaking as a zoologist, I would not say this was instinctive behavior anymore than when my neighbor murders his wife's lover. I assume you would not call that instinctive.

The buck stops with us because we are unique in our power of hindsight, insight and foresight.To say that our behaviour and that of animals is fundamentally the same overlooks our ability to plan ahead, to establish priorities, to weigh the consequences, to resist our instincts and to die for the sake of a principle. I am not disputing the nobility, beauty and altruism of the sacrifices made by many animals but they are neither morally nor legally responsible for their actions.

You are making an argument for holding us more responsible for what we do. That's different from saying we are fundamentally different in our behavior. There is little evidence for the latter.

Since this is the consensus of humanity the onus is on a dissenter to explain how and why other species should be considered moral agents. They certainly have rights but they do not have any moral or legal obligations.

I am not going to address legal standing, which is a separate issue. Three year olds are not responsible for their behavior legally, but we do not say they have no minds.

I think your position that animals have no values and are not responsible for having any is far from a consensus opinion. A dog has no obligation to refrain from dragging human food off the counters? Even if it were a consensus opinion, that does not make it true.

Your analogy of the mind with traffic patterns, flocks of birds and groups of cells does not account for the mind's unity, continuity and self-awareness.

Certainly I can't provide any mechanistic details. But "mind" as a concept accounts for nothing either as far as I can tell. I'm arguing that at least there's a starting point for a model that might explain the mind. And certainly some aspects of our self awareness is beginning to be understood in mechanistic terms. It's a least a start and leaves less for a more mystical understanding of mind to explain.

In daily life we do not regard other people as biological robots.

I really object to the word "robot" here. I am sorry I mentioned the Roomba, which, if you'll recall I compared to a flatworm, the animal with the least developed brain of any animal that has an integrated nervous system at all. I think this is just rhetoric. Of course we do not regard our partners as robots. But they are not ethereal beings whose every motivation is a product of pure good and evil either. We eat because we are hungry. We hold our animals and children close because we crave intimacy, warmth, and love, all feelings we share with other animals.

This is because a mechanistic interpretation of reality does not account for the existence of purpose and values.

Yes, they do! This is what I am saying. Even my cats show purpose, foresight,and planning, and they have less need to plan that practically any animal on Earth. Most wild animals MUST plan, which means purpose. They have values, too. They just can't articulate them. That doesn't mean the values aren't there. A five year old cannot articulate a lot of the values she has picked up either, but she still abides by them.

[tonyrey]

I really object to the word "robot" here. I am sorry I mentioned the Roomba, which, if you'll recall I compared to a flatworm, the animal with the least developed brain of any animal that has an integrated nervous system at all. I think this is just rhetoric. Of course we do not regard our partners as robots. But they are not ethereal beings whose every motivation is a product of pure good and evil either.

I used the word "robot" only because you stated that a robot can make decisions and ours are just more nuanced, implying that we are no more than biological machines.

Self-control cannot be a physical process because it entails a self, a conscious entity. Restraint in animals is due to the effects of training whereas self-restraint results from the exercise of the intellect and free will. We are fundamentally different from animals because we can control ourselves in a situation where we have not been trained to do so.

Animals make decisions but they are not moral decisions. They cannot choose to act according to a universal moral principle regardless of the consequences.The man who murdered his wife's lover is guilty if there is sufficient evidence that he did so with malice aforethought. The mouse which killed another male is not guilty because it does not have a conscience and is motivated solely by biological factors. It cannot distinguish between what is right and what is wrong. . We exercise our judgment in a way that is impossible for an animal.

Legal responsibility is based on moral responsibility. A small child is not morally responsible because its intellect has not developed sufficiently whereas an animal's intelligence never even develops sufficiently for it to understand moral principles. Animals do have values but they are not moral values. Your cats behave purposefully but their attention is limited to the present and the immediate future. A dog is not taken to court because it has dragged food off a counter but its owner may be if he has allowed it to do so. He is to blame because he knows he should not let it steal whereas the pet's appetite simply overcomes its conditioned reflexes. We cannot appeal to its sense of fair play and say "How would you like it if some one stole your food?" Experimental evidence shows animals do not understand the mental state of other individuals. Nor can they understand or apply abstract rules like "Every animal has a right to life",
.
It is a false dilemma that we are either advanced animals or "ethereal beings whose every motivation is a product of pure good and evil". We have both a mind and a body which interact but the mind is the dominant partner. We have similar feelings of intimacy and warmth to animals but unlike them we cannot be genuinely fulfilled unless we pursue truth, goodness, justice, beauty and a love which embraces humans, animals, plants and even inanimate things like the earth and sky. We alone on this planet are responsible for its future destiny because we alone can deliberately alter the course of events on a vast scale.

The attempt to explain the mind in mechanistic terms is motivated by faith in the neoDarwinist theory of evolution which regards all life as the result of random combinations of molecules. Yet it has never been explained how intelligent and purposeful activity are produced by things which lack intelligence and purpose. To attribute reason to a chain of accidents is the height of unreason! If the mind had originated fortuitously it would hardly be capable of the sublime achievements of mankind in philosophy, religion, art, literature, music, science and technology - which presuppose an inexhaustible source of conscious creativity.

To attribute all this to minute electrical impulses in the lump of tissue we call the brain is a grossly inadequate hypothesis... In the words of Pascal, "Pensee fait la grandeur de l'homme" - our greatness stems from our power of thought. The concept of mind would not have emerged, still less survived to this day, if it accounted for nothing. The mind is aware of the brain but the brain is unaware of itself, let alone the mind. From the dawn of history humans have realised it is impossible to explain persons in terms of material objects. They have always looked for a reason and a purpose in their existence and that of the world. They know intuitively there is a dimension of reality beyond what they can see and touch.

[ordinaryguy]

Okay. After checking definitions at Wikipedia, I think I can say I am talking about "weak emergence." So, for example, the simple attraction between two masses we know as gravity doesn't immediately suggest stars with systems of orbiting planets and moons, which appear to be engineered, but in fact that is what you get. Planetary orbitals are an emergent property of moving masses in space that are interacting with one another. I'm sure there's a more elegant way to say this.

If you look at a section of an impressionist painting up close, you see patches of color that have no pattern or meaning. But if you step back and look at the whole painting from several feet away, a beautiful image emerges. No matter how much time you spend going over the painting with a magnifying glass, you are unlikely to see the whole picture unless you study it at the correct level of complexity.

Often, when we look at a the behavior of, say, five different molecules in a cell, we don't see what role they play in the whole body over the course of a lifetime--in other words, how they interact with all the other molecules and cells in the body to create higher orders of function and pattern. The same is true of genes.

For example, the hungtingtin gene, whose mutant allele causes Huntington's Disease is expressed in cells all over the body. As far as anyone knows, Huntington's is a disease of the brain. What does the protein huntingtin do in these other cells? Does it matter if it's the mutant form or not in these other cells? I'm digressing here and arguing for complexity, but it's related to emergent properties. Simple rules that govern the interactions of simple objects can lead to complex properties.

Consider the moon's influence on the tides. The moon's gravity pulls on our oceans. Daily changes in water level affect the ecology and evolution of intertidal animals and seaweeds in ways that can only be studied by looking at these communities. (Most of these organisms would not even exist if we had no moon.) If you brought them into the lab and studied them individually--or ground them up and looked at their constituent molecules--you would never be able to decide why they do the things they do, let alone THAT they do them. To find out what they do and why, you need to study them do in situ-- at least for a time.

If anyone has got this far, here's your reward, flocking starlings in Rome.
YouTube - Mesmerizing Starlings - Rome

The pattern of their movements -- as a flock -- is an emergent property of their individual interactions with one another. No single bird is responsible for the pattern--which is neither random nor hierarchically imposed by a leader. Yet there is a pattern that is based on simple interactions between each bird and those immediately nearby it.

Cells in developing embryos behave in similar ways, adjusting their movements and differentiation according to who is nearby and thereby creating beautiful and functional forms.

In the movie below, you can see individual cells marked with different colored dyes moving into the interior of a ball of cells in a process called gastrulation. These embryos are not human, but human embryos also gastrulate, which is the first stage in the formation of layers of tissues. All animals and plants are made of layers of tissues, which are an emergent property of groups of cells.

Notice that all the red cells disappear into the interior of the embryo.
http://academic.reed.edu/biology/pro.../spider-05.mov

Edit: To clarify, two things are occurring here. The cells are dividing so that there are more and more smaller and smaller cells, and they are also "invaginating" into the interior of the ball of cells to form the gastrula. There is no one gene that directs this process. It's the product of individual interactions among cells. (In fact, some eggs can get pretty far in development without any nuclear DNA at all.)

I find this whole discussion of emergent properties of groups fascinating stuff. I ran across this discussion of "biofilms" -- large aggregations of microbes embedded in a slimy matrix--in today's Washington Post: Scientists Learning to Target Bacteria Where They Live.

Scientists have learned that bacteria that are vulnerable when floating around as individual cells in what is known as their "planktonic state" are much tougher to combat once they get established in a suitable place -- whether the hull of a ship or inside the lungs -- and come together in tightly bound biofilms. In that state, they can activate mechanisms like tiny pumps to expel antibiotics, share genes that confer protection against drugs, slow down their metabolism or become dormant, making them harder to kill.

I sincerely hope that there are some emergent properties of the human race that will make our species less vulnerable to being purged from the biosphere as a threat to life on the planet. In order for such properties to emerge, I'm guessing that some critical mass of individuals will have to relax their attachment to the more extreme forms of individualism. What do you think?

This is kind of what I was trying to get at in this thread.

[tonyrey]

I sincerely hope that there are some emergent properties of the human race that will make our species less vulnerable to being purged from the biosphere as a threat to life on the planet. In order for such properties to emerge, I'm guessing that will have to relax their attachment to the more extreme forms of individualism. What do you think?

Your suggestion that"some critical mass of individuals will have to relax their attachment to the more extreme forms of individualism" seems to imply they can choose whether to do so. How can self-determinism emerge from that which is determined by the laws of nature?

[ordinaryguy]

Your suggestion that"some critical mass of individuals will have to relax their attachment to the more extreme forms of individualism" seems to imply they can choose whether to do so.

Yes, I guess it does assume a degree of individual choice about how closely to identify with the collective.

How can self-determinism emerge from that which is determined by the laws of nature?

I'm not sure I understand the question. I guess I don't see a contradiction between individual choice and "the laws of nature". I'm a rancher by trade, so I know something about the individual/herd dynamic in cattle. Individual cows can and do choose to abandon the herd, for various reasons in various situations, but the bovine species is a herd species, and most individuals "obey" the "laws" of herd behavior most of the time. The individual/social dynamic in human behavior seems essentially similar to me, and I don't see any of it as being inconsistent with the laws of nature as I understand them.

Reading back over a couple of your previous posts, your main concern seems to be to magnify and emphasize the differences between homo sapiens and other species, and to insist that these differences are so fundamental and so vast that they can't be accounted for by the impartial operation of "the laws of nature". Consequently, humans must be the product of something other than, or in addition to, those laws, while all other life forms are strictly subject to them. Do I have that about right?

[tonyrey]

I guess I don't see a contradiction between individual choice and "the laws of nature". I'm a rancher by trade, so I know something about the individual/herd dynamic in cattle. Individual cows can and do choose to abandon the herd, for various reasons in various situations, but the bovine species is a herd species, and most individuals "obey" the "laws" of herd behavior most of the time. The individual/social dynamic in human behavior seems essentially similar to me, and I don't see any of it as being inconsistent with the laws of nature as I understand them.

Reading back over a couple of your previous posts, your main concern seems to be to magnify and emphasize the differences between homo sapiens and other species, and to insist that these differences are so fundamental and so vast that they can't be accounted for by the impartial operation of "the laws of nature". Consequently, humans must be the product of something other than, or in addition to, those laws, while all other life forms are strictly subject to them. Do I have that about right?

Dead right :) We often behave like cows or sheep but we are the only beings on this planet who are morally responsible - at least sometimes - for what we choose. We are not bio- machines operating according to natural laws but free agents who can transcend our heredity and environment. How is this possible?

[ordinaryguy]

Dead right :) We often behave like cows or sheep but we are the only beings on this planet who are morally responsible - at least sometimes - for what we choose.

What do you mean by "morally responsible"? In every social species, individuals are held accountable by the group for transgressions of group norms. Are you talking about being held responsible by God for transgressions of Divine law?

We are not bio- machines operating according to natural laws but free agents who can transcend our heredity and environment. How is this possible?

I think this dichotomy you are trying to create is a false one. As I see it, there is no contradiction between "operating according to natural laws" and being "free agents". The operation of natural laws sets the boundaries within which free agency can function.

I think your preoccupation with the supposedly vast and fundamental differences between human and other species is misguided and unnecessary. It seems to me that you can still have a spiritual/religious dimension to human existence without having to claim that humans are dramatically and fundamentally different from other animal species. That's what motivates your claim, isn't it?

[tonyrey]

In every social species, individuals are held accountable by the group for transgressions of group norms.

Human accountability is based on our ability to distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong, whereas animal accountability is the result of their genetic makeup and environmental conditioning. We do not regard animals as innocent or guilty.

I think this dichotomy you are trying to create is a false one. As I see it, there is no contradiction between "operating according to natural laws" and being "free agents". The operation of natural laws sets the boundaries within which free agency can function.

The dichotomy between freedom and determinism is a fact not an opinion. There is no scope for choice if all mental events have biochemical causes. If our decisions are caused by what happens in our brain we are no more than biological machines.

I think your preoccupation with the supposedly vast and fundamental differences between human and other species is misguided and unnecessary. It seems to me that you can still have a spiritual/religious dimension to human existence without having to claim that humans are dramatically and fundamentally different from other animal species. That's what motivates your claim, isn't it?

If we are not fundamentally different from other animal species then their existence must also have a spiritual/religious dimension. If not, what does our spiritual/religious dimension consist of?

[ordinaryguy]

Human accountability is based on our ability to distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong, whereas animal accountability is the result of their genetic makeup and environmental conditioning. We do not regard animals as innocent or guilty.

We may not regard them that way, but they seem to regard each other that way, just as humans regard other humans that way.

The dichotomy between freedom and determinism is a fact not an opinion. There is no scope for choice if all mental events have biochemical causes. If our decisions are caused by what happens in our brain we are no more than biological machines.

I suppose it depends on how you define "freedom" and "determinism". The way I define them, they're not mutually exclusive, but you're certainly entitled to your own definitions. I always cringe when somebody proclaims something to be "a fact, not an opinion", because it usually represents an attempt to "upgrade" their opinion to something unassailable and beyond discussion.

If we are not fundamentally different from other animal species then their existence must also have a spiritual/religious dimension.

What would be so awful about that?

If not, what does our spiritual/religious dimension consist of?

I think it consists of our desire to transcend the bounds of conscious existence within this physical body, within this physical world. Whether other species are capable of such a desire is irrelevant, as far as I can see. Why is so important to you that they NOT be capable of it?

[tonyrey]

We may not regard them that way, but they seem to regard each other that way, just as humans regard other humans that way.

Are you implying that there is no difference between the way animals and humans regard each other? That animals can distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong? That both we and they reason and behave in fundamentally the same way?

I suppose it depends on how you define "freedom" and "determinism". The way I define them, they're not mutually exclusive, but you're certainly entitled to your own definitions. I always cringe when somebody proclaims something to be "a fact, not an opinion", because it usually represents an attempt to "upgrade" their opinion to something unassailable and beyond discussion.

You may cringe but you haven't explained how you define "freedom" and "determinism", nor how there is scope for choice if all mental events have biochemical causes.

I think it consists of our desire to transcend the bounds of conscious existence within this physical body, within this physical world. Whether or not other species are capable of such a desire is irrelevant, as far as I can see. Why is so important to you that they NOT be capable of it?

If our spiritual/religious dimension consists solely of a desire to transcend the bounds of conscious existence within this physical world it is no more than a futile illusion doomed to bring us misery and frustration.

[Wondergirl]

You may cringe but you haven't explained how you define "freedom" and "determinism", nor how there is scope for choice if all mental events have biochemical causes.

Wouldn't this highlight the difference between objective and subjective? The physiological process of the synapses connecting axons to dendrites with neurotransmitters flowing from one to the other cause the processes of thought and perception to occur. Thus, the objective physiological process is the "determinism," but the subjective processes that result are the "freedom."

[tonyrey]

Wouldn't this highlight the difference between objective and subjective? The physiological process of the synapses connecting axons to dendrites with neurotransmitters flowing from one to the other cause the processes of thought and perception to occur. Thus, the objective physiological process is the "determinism," but the subjective processes that result are the "freedom."

I don't see how results can constitute freedom :) I interpret freedom as the power of self-control. How can the conscious self be the effect of biochemical events which lack consciousness?

[Akoue]

You may cringe but you haven't explained how you define "freedom" and "determinism", nor how there is scope for choice if all mental events have biochemical causes.

You seem to suppose that where there is causality there is determinism (or necessitation). But, at the same time, you clearly wish to see mental events and states as causes of behavior. So do you imagine that mental causes necessitate the behaviors to which they give rise?

If not, then why suppose that neurophysiological events and states are any more deterministic? Suppose that the mental event that causes me to perform action S is the desire D. Suppose further that D is token-identical to neurophysiological event N. Then, you seem to want to say, action S is not freely understaken, since N is causally necessitating. But this would be to take for granted a very primitive view of causality. Why suppose that the free performance of S is imperiled by the token-identity of D and N in a way that it isn't by the non-identity of D and N? What motivates this supposition?

[Wondergirl]

I don't see how results can constitute freedom :) I interpret freedom as the power of self-control. How can the conscious self be the effect of biochemical events which lack consciousness?

The objective processes ("biochemical events") are the same for you and for me, but the results ("conscious self") are subjective, your experience different from mine. My neurotransmitters flow between my synapses (determinism), and I think to myself, "I want to eat a banana" (free will). Your neurotransmitters flow between your synapses (determinism), and you think to yourself, "I want to eat a mango" (free will).