[gemhorse4]

I have been living with a man for 4 years. He has basically took over the father figure roll only in paying for bills and expenses for living. He has bought the food, and bought the children clothes for school. I did not make much money and I have now been out of a job since last October. I live in Florida, and jobs here are scarce. I have applied for public assistance. The guy I live with has decided to up and go on his own. He decided that he only wants to think about himself, as he puts it. My friends have told me that they have heard of a law that would make him help me get on my feet and not leave us in the street. They said that the man, even though was not the biological father and is not an adoptive father, had to pay support to help out because he had taken on the roll of father, and we have depended on him. Is there such a law? If so, how do I proceed in finding out more about it to see if this case applies to the law?

[justcurious55]

That doesn't sound right at all. Morally, I understand why you feel he should be helping you and your children. He's been helping you all this time and now he's deciding he just doesn't want to anymore. But legally? Come on. Legally why should he have any responsibility at all? He's not actually the bio father and he didn't adopt them. Here's a link to florida's page on child support FAQ's. Everything says PARENT. Nothing about ex-boyfriends. Speaking of parents, where is the biological father? Why aren't you going after him for support?

MyFloridaCounty.com --> Child Support Service FAQs

[djkluff]

What about the BIO father? He should be sought after! Don't let him get off the hook!

[stevetcg]

He has no legal rights to your child, why should he have a legal obligation?

He doesn't. Sorry - you're on your own. Go after the bio father if you want support.

I believe the law you are talking about is a presumption of paternity, which doesn't apply here.

[cadillac59]

I really cannot speak to Florida law, but in California we do have a doctrine in family law that developed known as the "de facto parent" doctrine, or the doctrine of "parentage by estoppel." The notion is that if a child has come to know a person as his parent due to the conduct of that person, and if that person has held himself out as the child's parent and interfered with the child discovering his true legal parent we can, in appropriate circumstances, impose a duty of support on that individual. This has usually arisen in the context of a marriage, but I cannot see any reason why it could not be applied in a non-marital context.

Check with a good family law attorney in Florida to see if "parentage by estoppel" is recognized and what must be proven to establish it.

[joysjrny]

I realize your dilemma, but what if the situation was reversed would you want a man coming after you for support? Don't you have family? There is a lot of help for food, electric bill help, rent assistance - call 211 or Google it at a library. Sometimes we always look for others to help but we need to empower ourselves and that will be great for your kids to see such an example. Go back to school because they help with the finances. I am a 46 year old and am a single parent. Decided to go back to school, and I will graduate this June. Sometimes we feel spent and that we don't have it in us, but dig deep because you do. All these other people that say go after the biological dads... yes, they are right. I realize that they may have skipped town, falsely report their income, yadi you... but be strong! Join single parent support groups, get daily hugs, and kiss your children daily!

[GV70]

I really cannot speak to Florida law, but in California we do have a doctrine in family law that developed known as the "de facto parent" doctrine, or the doctrine of "parentage by estoppel." The notion is that if a child has come to know a person as his parent due to the conduct of that person, and if that person has held himself out as the child's parent and interfered with the child discovering his true legal parent we can, in appropriate circumstances, impose a duty of support on that individual. This has usually arisen in the context of a marriage, but I cannot see any reason why it could not be applied in a non-marital context.

Check with a good family law attorney in Florida to see if "parentage by estoppel" is recognized and what must be proven to establish it.

Neither "de facto parent" nor "paternity by estoppel" doctrines are applicable in this case.
Paternity by estoppel doctrine is used by courts only to stop a legally established father/marital presumption or acknowledged father/ to deny his support obligations.
/Therefore, in order to ensure that the child will not become a public charge, the Judge will decide that it is in the best interests of the child not to grant a disestablishment motion/

De facto parent doctrine only allows third parties to gain standing to petition a court for the visitation.


Where a statute provides that a stepparent has a duty to support a stepchild, the statute is essentially no more than a codification of the doctrine of in loco parentis doctrine. The in loco parentis doctrine states that if a stepparent takes stepchildren into his or her family or under his or her care in such a way that he or she places himself or herself in loco parentis, then the stepparent assumes an obligation to support the stepchildren.Thus, the codification of the in loco parentis doctrine into state legislation has not expanded the support rights of stepchildren as defined under the common law.

Asking a step-parent support after divorce is actually perverse, providing disincentives for socially desirable behavior. First, it discourages people from entering into relationships with single parents. Second,it discourages people from attempting to forge close relationships with their step-children if they are so foolhardy as to overcome the first disincentive.
If a single parent wants to find someone to help support her kids permanently—that is, even if the relationship ends and the kids stop visiting--the onus should be on her to get that explicit, unambiguous commitment (preferably in writing) from the prospective step-parent. If she can't, the law should not impose it on someone merely because he was kind enough to help shoulder the burden for some period.

[ScottGem]

I realize your dilemma, but what if the situation was reversed would you want a man coming after you for support? Don't you have family? There is a lot of help for food, electric bill help, rent assistance - call 211 or google it at a library. Sometimes we always look for others to help but we need to empower ourselves and that will be great for your kids to see such an example. Go back to school because they help with the finances. I am a 46 year old and am a single parent. Decided to go back to school, and I will graduate this June. Sometimes we feel spent and that we don't have it in us, but dig deep because you do. All these other people that say go after the biological dads... yes, they are right. I realize that they may have skipped town, falsely report their income, yadi ya... but be strong! Join single parent support groups, get daily hugs, and kiss your children daily!

You are new here and need to pay attention to the forum where a thread has been posted. While this post is generally good advice, its NOT appropriate to a legal forum. Answers here need to conform to statute. Your response has nothing to do with the law.

[cadillac59]

Neither "de facto parent" nor "paternity by estoppel" doctrines are applicable in this case.
Paternity by estoppel doctrine is used by courts only to stop a legally established father/marital presumption or acknowledged father/ to deny his support obligations.
/Therefore, in order to ensure that the child will not become a public charge, the Judge will decide that it is in the best interests of the child not to grant a disestablishment motion/

De facto parent doctrine only allows third parties to gain standing to petition a court for the visitation.


Where a statute provides that a stepparent has a duty to support a stepchild, the statute is essentially no more than a codification of the doctrine of in loco parentis doctrine. The in loco parentis doctrine states that if a stepparent takes stepchildren into his or her family or under his or her care in such a way that he or she places himself or herself in loco parentis, then the stepparent assumes an obligation to support the stepchildren.Thus, the codification of the in loco parentis doctrine into state legislation has not expanded the support rights of stepchildren as defined under the common law.

Asking a step-parent support after divorce is actually perverse, providing disincentives for socially desirable behavior. First, it discourages people from entering into relationships with single parents. Second,it discourages people from attempting to forge close relationships with their step-children if they are so foolhardy as to overcome the first disincentive.
If a single parent wants to find someone to help support her kids permanently—that is, even if the relationship ends and the kids stop visiting--the onus should be on her to get that explicit, unambiguous commitment (preferably in writing) from the prospective step-parent. If she can't, the law should not impose it on someone merely because he was kind enough to help shoulder the burden for some period of time.

I didn't say that parentage by estoppel was available in this case and specifically stated that I could not speak to Florida law on the subject and referenced California's only as a starting point for discussion.

Paternity by estoppel doctrine is used by courts only to stop a legally established father/marital presumption or acknowledged father/ to deny his support obligations.

This is not true in California. (In re Marriage of Pedregon (2003)107 Cal. App. 4th 1284.)

In Pedregon the court specifically rejected the notion that rebuttal of a parentage/marital presumption was relevant to the support obligation. ("More importantly, the issue here is not whether the presumption of paternity under section 7611, subdivision (d) has been rebutted but, rather, whether husband is obligated to pay child support based on parentage by estoppel." ) Thus, it would seem that the doctrine exists apart from any of the established presumptions of paternity although, I would agree, that the 7611(d) presumption, which applies in non-marital contexts as well as a cases of marriage, would likely be established in most cases where the doctrine were applicable (7611(d) is the presumption of parentage which arises when a person takes a child into his home and holds the child out as his own).


De facto parent doctrine only allows third parties to gain standing to petition a court for the visitation.

Again, I disagree. The de facto parentage doctrine, at least in California, has been used to establish a support obligation not rights to custody or visitation. However, if you have any authority of its use outside of California to establish custody or visitation rights I'd be interested in hearing it as this has come up occasionally in my practice. I personally cannot see any reason why it should not apply to establish rights to custody if it's otherwise available as a means to establish a support obligation.

Asking a step-parent support after divorce is actually perverse, providing disincentives for socially desirable behavior. First, it discourages people from entering into relationships with single parents. Second,it discourages people from attempting to forge close relationships with their step-children if they are so foolhardy as to overcome the first disincentive.


Interesting social commentary but fortunately we don't have this problem where I live and practice law.

[GV70]

Paternity by estoppel doctrine is used by courts only to stop a legally established father/marital presumption or acknowledged father/ to deny his support obligations.

This is not true in California. (In re Marriage of Pedregon (2003)107 Cal. App. 4th 1284.)

In Pedregon the court specifically rejected the notion that rebuttal of a parentage/marital presumption was relevant to the support obligation. ("More importantly, the issue here is not whether the presumption of paternity under section 7611, subdivision (d) has been rebutted but, rather, whether husband is obligated to pay child support based on parentage by estoppel." ) Thus, it would seem that the doctrine exists apart from any of the established presumptions of paternity although, I would agree, that the 7611(d) presumption, which applies in non-marital contexts as well as a cases of marriage, would likely be established in most cases where the doctrine were applicable (7611(d) is the presumption of parentage which arises when a person takes a child into his home and holds the child out as his own).

This is true even in California. In a more recent case:
County of San Diego vs. David Arzaga (2007) Cal.App.4thD047798 (Super. Ct. No. DF184605)
The same Court rejected to apply doctrine of Paternity by estoppel .Arzaga appealed a judgment finding him to be legal father of a child under the doctrine of parentage by estoppel.They lived together,he behaved as child's father and after the breakup of the relationship between Arzaga and the mother,he sent cards to the child and checks
Payable to the mother with notation “For Karen's support”…

[GV70]

De facto parent doctrine only allows third parties to gain standing to petition a court for the visitation.

Again, I disagree. The de facto parentage doctrine, at least in California, has been used to establish a support obligation not rights to custody or visitation. .

Not sure how California deals with “ Parentage by estoppel” and “De facto parentage”
According to Superior Court of California parties in a Juvenile Dependency Proceeding may be:The mother,the father ,the child, the social worker, a legal guardian for the child and a de facto parent.
The Court distinguishes between PARENT and DE FACTO PARENT/ and it should be./
The UPA and ALI principles divide parents as:
1. Legal parent /an individual who is defined under the other state law/ and
1a Parent by estoppel /liable for child support because he/she is afforded with all of the privileges of a legal parent/
2. De facto parent/ a person lived with the child not less than two years, regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived/

The UPA , Section 204 eliminates the presumption of paternity for an unmarried man who takes a child into his home and holds the child out as his own./ and most states repealed that presumption from their codes except California/
Section 608 limits the application of estoppel principles for assigning parental responsibility, including child support obligations, to married couples.only/ See Arzaga decision/.


According to study of Christopher Steuart,Esq. several states had rejected the concept of “de facto parent”
Kentucky has found that statutes are controlling and have covered the subject completely
And there is no common law left to address “de facto parent” or “de facto custodian.”
West Virginia rejected “de factor child” and by implication “de factor parent” in Glen Falls
Ins. Co. v. Smith.
Ohio in the unpublished opinion in IN RE: CHEYENNE MADISON JONES ruled in a
Case involving two women, that Ms Dvorak (the non-biological partner) was neither the natural nor the adoptive parent of Cheyenne, therefor she cannot be a "parent" within the meaning of Ohio law, and she is not entitled to an award of parental rights under the statute without first proving that Jones is unsuitable.
A New York court rejected extension of visitation rights to a same sex domestic partner
Claiming to be a "parent by estoppel," "de facto parent," or "psychological parent" in In the Matter of Janis C. v. Christine T.

.

Also in the middle leaning toward rejecting the concept of “De Facto Parent” or a related
Concepts is Florida in Azmierazak v. Query.
Appellant sought custody and temporary visitation of appellee's biological child. The court
Denied the request because appellant failed to state a cause of action and lacked standing to seek custody or visitation. The court rejected the concept of loco parentis which had appeared only in the context of a marital relationship. Without status equivalent to biological parent, appellant lacked standing to seek custody or visitation of appellee's biological child against her wishes. The court had recognized the concept of psychological parent but did not construe these cases as holding a psychological parent is entitled to parental status equivalent to the biological parent./ the OP is in Florida?? /

[Fr_Chuck]

Where is the real bio father and why are you not already getting support from them.

[GV70]

However, if you have any authority of its use outside of California to establish custody or visitation rights I'd be interested in hearing it as this has come up occasionally in my practice. I personally cannot see any reason why it should not apply to establish rights to custody if it's otherwise available as a means to establish a support obligation. .

Some cases allowed a non-biological co-parent to have some continued involvement with the children, upon the termination of her relationship with the children's legal mother:

Connecticut: Laspina-Williams v. Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d 840 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)
Maryland: S.F. v. M.D. 751 A.2d 9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000), holding that the co-parent was a de-facto parent and could request visitation; visitation was refused, however, because of the visitation's negative impact on the child,
Minnesota: LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), upholding an agreement between the biological mother and the co-parent to share legal custody after the couple separated
Missouri: Matter of T.L. 1996 WL 393521 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 2000) holding that, if denying custody to a co-parent resulted in actual detriment to the child, then the co-parent could obtain custody over the biological mother;

[GV70]

Massachusetts: E.N.O. v. L.M.M. 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999), holding that there was no statutory authority for the co-parent's request for visitation; the court, however, ordered visitation under its equitable powers the co-parent acted as a de facto parent and the parties had a written co-parenting agreement)
Wisconsin: In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), overruling In re Z.J.H. 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991) holding that the court has equitable powers to award visitation to a co-parent and enforced the parties' written co-parenting agreement.

New York: J.C. v. C.T, 711 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Fam. Ct. 2000) in which the biological mother was estopped from dismissing the co-parent's petition for visitation, based on the mother's prior, inconsistent conduct, distinguishing the case from Alison D. v. Virginia M. 552 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) and Lynda A. H. v. Diane T. O. 673 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998),

[cadillac59]

This is true even in California. In a more recent case:
County of San Diego vs. David Arzaga (2007) Cal.App.4thD047798 (Super. Ct. No. DF184605)
the same Court rejected to apply doctrine of Paternity by estoppel .Arzaga appealed a judgment finding him to be legal father of a child under the doctrine of parentage by estoppel.They lived together,he behaved as child's father and after the breakup of the relationship between Arzaga and the mother,he sent cards to the child and and checks
payable to the mother with notation “For Karen's support”…

No. You are wrong.

Sorry. I think you need to go back and re-read Arzaga. Arzaga and Pedregon are not inconsistent.

All Arzaga did was add an element to the parentage by estoppel analysis: The alleged father must know that he is not the biological father and, in spite of that, behave toward the child as the child's father. In other words, the doctrine does not apply in cases where the alleged father mistakenly believes himself to be the biological father and for that reason acts as such:

We have not found any case applying the doctrine of paternity by estoppel to an alleged father where the factual circumstances established that the alleged father acted without knowledge that he was not truly the child's biological parent. To the contrary, in each case it is apparent the father knew the true facts. Equitable estoppel is a principle grounded in fundamental fairness, and “ ' “takes its life … from the equitable principle that no man [may] profit from his own wrongdoing in a court of justice.” ' ” (Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 383 [2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 73 P.3d 517]; see Cordova v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 89, 106 & fn. 56 [28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 170]; Valle, supra, 53 Cal. App. 3d at p. 840.) In general, the knowledge attributable to the party to be estopped must be actual and not merely presumptive knowledge. (La Mancha Dev. Corp. v. Sheegog (1978) 78 Cal. App. 3d 9, 17 [144 Cal. Rptr. 59]; Meyer v. Glenmoor Homes, Inc. (1966) 246 Cal. App. 2d 242, 264 [54 Cal. Rptr. 786]; Primm v. Joyce (1948) 87 Cal. App. 2d 288, 291 [196 P.2d 829].) 5 While we are sensitive to the emotional detriment that can result to a child who has relied upon conduct of a person who has held himself out as a father, it would be unfair, in our view, to apply the doctrine to an individual whose conduct was based on his mistaken belief that he actually was the child's natural father.

Your point earlier was that the doctrine can only apply in cases where a presumption of paternity is operative. Not so, at least in California, as Pedregon clearly states. Parentage by estoppel can be established in a non-marital relationship and one in which no 7611 presumption of paternity exists.

[GV70]

No. You are wrong.

Sorry. I think you need to go back and re-read Arzaga. Arzaga and Pedregon are not inconsistent.

All Arzaga did was add an element to the parentage by estoppel analysis: The alleged father must know that he is not the biological father and, in spite of that, behave toward the child as the child's father. In other words, the doctrine does not apply in cases where the alleged father mistakenly believes himself to be the father and for that reason acts as such:

We have not found any case applying the doctrine of paternity by estoppel to an alleged father where the factual circumstances established that the alleged father acted without knowledge that he was not truly the child's biological parent. To the contrary, in each case it is apparent the father knew the true facts. Equitable estoppel is a principle grounded in fundamental fairness, and “ ‘ “takes its life … from the equitable principle that no man [may] profit from his own wrongdoing in a court of justice.” ’ ” (Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 383 [2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 73 P.3d 517]; see Cordova v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 89, 106 & fn. 56 [28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 170]; Valle, supra, 53 Cal. App. 3d at p. 840.) In general, the knowledge attributable to the party to be estopped must be actual and not merely presumptive knowledge. (La Mancha Dev. Corp. v. Sheegog (1978) 78 Cal. App. 3d 9, 17 [144 Cal. Rptr. 59]; Meyer v. Glenmoor Homes, Inc. (1966) 246 Cal. App. 2d 242, 264 [54 Cal. Rptr. 786]; Primm v. Joyce (1948) 87 Cal. App. 2d 288, 291 [196 P.2d 829].) 5 While we are sensitive to the emotional detriment that can result to a child who has relied upon conduct of a person who has held himself out as a father, it would be unfair, in our view, to apply the doctrine to an individual whose conduct was based on his mistaken belief that he actually was the child's natural father.

Your point earlier was that the doctrine can only apply in cases where a presumption of paternity is operative. Not so, at least in California, as Pedregon clearly states.

I read it at h is way
II. The Court's Finding of Parentage by Estoppel Cannot Be Supported By the Evidence
Arzaga contends the trial court erred in determining he was Karen's father; that
County's trial evidence did not establish the elements of parentage by estoppel as set out
In Clevenger v. Clevenger (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 658 (Clevenger) and its progeny. The
Contention has merit.
In Clevenger, the court addressed "the duty of support which a husband owes to
His wife's illegitimate child when the husband, from the date of the birth of the child,
Accepts the child into his family, publicly acknowledges the child as his own and treats
The child as if he were legitimate." (Clevenger, supra, 189 Cal.App.2d at p. 662.)
In In re Marriage of Pedregon- the husband treated the
child as his son, and the child considered the husband his father and called him "daddy."placed the child on his health insurance, and
requested the child use his last name; she further stated the husband was the only father the child had known, and the child was unaware the husband was not his biological
Father.

[cadillac59]

Massachusetts: E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999), holding that there was no statutory authority for the co-parent's request for visitation; the court, however, ordered visitation under its equitable powers the co-parent acted as a de facto parent and the parties had a written co-parenting agreement)
Wisconsin: In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), overruling In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991) holding that the court has equitable powers to award visitation to a co-parent and enforced the parties' written co-parenting agreement.

New York: J.C. v. C.T, 711 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Fam. Ct. 2000) in which the biological mother was estopped from dismissing the co-parent's petition for visitation, based on the mother's prior, inconsistent conduct, distinguishing the case from Alison D. v. Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) and Lynda A. H. v. Diane T. O., 673 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998),

Thanks for the cites.

[cadillac59]

I read it at h is way
II. The Court's Finding of Parentage by Estoppel Cannot Be Supported By the Evidence
Arzaga contends the trial court erred in determining he was Karen's father; that
County's trial evidence did not establish the elements of parentage by estoppel as set out
in Clevenger v. Clevenger (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 658 (Clevenger) and its progeny. The
contention has merit.
In Clevenger, the court addressed "the duty of support which a husband owes to
his wife's illegitimate child when the husband, from the date of the birth of the child,
accepts the child into his family, publicly acknowledges the child as his own and treats
the child as if he were legitimate." (Clevenger, supra, 189 Cal.App.2d at p. 662.)
In In re Marriage of Pedregon- the husband treated the
child as his son, and the child considered the husband his father and called him "daddy."placed the child on his health insurance, and
requested the child use his last name; she further stated the husband was the only father the child had known, and the child was unaware the husband was not his biological
father.

If the Arzaga court had intended to base its decision on the fact that there was no presumption of paternity operative in that case it would have simply said so and there would have been no need to get into a discussion of Arzaga's mistaken belief at pertinent times in the child's life that he was the biological father. No where does the Arzaga court state that application of the parentage by estoppel analysis is limited to marriage cases, or cases in which 7611 presumptions of paternity exist because that is not the law in California. As I stated earlier, Pedregon specifically stated that the inquiry was irrelevant to application of the doctrine. That cases were decided in which the doctrine was applied where concurrently a marital presumption of paternity existed does not prove that a marital (or non-marital) presumption of paternity is essential to making out a case of parentage by estoppel.

[GV70]

7611. A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if...
(d) He receives the child into his home and openly holds out the
Child as his natural child.
Ok-I understand it as" The man receives the child into his home and insists on he is the natural father towards the child and society.

[cadillac59]

7611. A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if...
(d) He receives the child into his home and openly holds out the
child as his natural child.
ok-I understand it as" The man receives the child into his home and insists on he is the natural father towards the child and society.

I'm not sure of the point you are trying to make but you may wish to go back and re-read Pedregon. In that case the trial judge made the same error you are making here in believing that parentage by estoppel can only apply in cases where a presumption of paternity under 7611 is operative. There, the trial judge, in believing that the 7611 presumption had been rebutted rejected parentage by estoppel because he wrongly believed the two were inextricably connected. The appellate court reversed on that specific point and said parentage presumptions are irrelevant the doctrine.

Having said that I'll repeat what I said earlier, that I would find it a rare case indeed in which a court found parentage by estoppel in the absence of at least the 7611(d) presumption applying which you cited. But that being so does not mean that the two go hand in hand as a matter of law.