I am doing research on a paper regarding Descartes' evil demon hypothesis. Presently reading Caton and Kennington, and struggling to interpret the Latin and French terminology they are employing-

In particular, I've been unable to locate the meaning of the following two terms:

ratio dubitandi

medius terminus

Examples of their use are as follows:

"Kennington does not consider the possibility that the deus deceptor is the medius terminus through which God and the demon are identified."

"God, 'who can do everything,' enters Medit I as a reason for doubting all things, especially arithmetic and geometry; towards the end of Medit I he is withdrawn as a ratio dubitandi and replaced by the Evil Genius."

I am guessing that, based on the context, ratio dubitandi may mean reason for doubting? But unsure... and medius terminus is not clear to me at all at this point.:confused:

Any insights would be greatly appreciated.

Thanks!

Quote:

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Originally Posted by margog85

I am doing research on a paper regarding Descartes' evil demon hypothesis. Presently reading Caton and Kennington, and struggling to interpret the Latin and French terminology they are employing-

In particular, I've been unable to locate the meaning of the following two terms:

ratio dubitandi

medius terminus

Examples of their use are as follows:

"Kennington does not consider the possibility that the deus deceptor is the medius terminus through which God and the demon are identified."

"God, 'who can do everything,' enters Medit I as a reason for doubting all things, especially arithmetic and geometry; towards the end of Medit I he is withdrawn as a ratio dubitandi and replaced by the Evil Genius."

I am guessing that, based on the context, ratio dubitandi may mean reason for doubting? But unsure... and medius terminus is not clear to me at all at this point.:confused:

Any insights would be greatly appreciated.

Thanks!

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Hello Margog,

Kennington wants to argue that the evil demon is the same the omnipotent deceiver. i.e.. God. This is probably not what Descartes intended but there still exists a philosophical dispute over this.

ratio dubitandi = ground of doubt

medius terminus = something like the middle stage in a process.


Regards

Tut

I'm trying to muddle through the arguments- I'm hoping you can help clarify and tell me if I'm understanding correctly- you seem to be knowledgeable on the subject, so I'd appreciate any guidance you can give.

In Meditations, AT 21 Descartes discusses the "long-standing belief" that God made him the sort of creature he is- and asks how he can know that God didn't basically create him with an unreliable ability to perceive things- with a nature so that he is always deceived even by those things which seem evident.

He follows this by addressing the atheist perspective, and says that the less powerful his author, the greater the likelihood that he is "so imperfect as to be deceived all the time."

Robert Stoothoff, in Descartes Dilemma refers to this as the dilemmatic argument: that either he was created by god, or he was not. If he was created by god, it is possible that he was created in such a way that, by nature, he always goes wrong. If he were the result of fate and chance, it is more likely that he is always deceived. Stoothoff claims that this is the ground for doubt... and that the evil demon hypothesis isn't so much a hypothesis in the sense that the dream argument proposes what one could take as an actual possibility- it isn't meant to give reason for doubt- but is instead a methodological and rhetorical device utilized to help him avoid habitually relying on his senses- Stoothoff says that the evil demon "plays no logical role in Descartes' argument".

Kennington seems to be arguing that Cartesian doubt isn't meant to be universal (which I was under the assumption it was, and I'm not clear on his textual references... they seem nit-picky to me, but maybe I'm just not understanding something)- he says that the "evil genius" must be finite in order for the cogito to be possible- as an omnipotent evil demon would necessitate the suspension of the rule of noncontradiction and reasoning would be impossible- He seems to believe that Descartes very much intended there to be a logical role for the evil demon in his argument... but I can't make clear why.

I'm really unclear on Caton's points as well- what is his perspective exactly?

Please let me know if I'm understanding this somewhat accurately thus far-
Any clarification/insight you could provide would be extremely helpful.

Thanks!

Hi Margog,

Sorry I mislead you in regarded to Kennington. It has been a while since I looked at this stuff. Yes, Kenning is saying that Cartesian doubt isn't universal. I haven't read Caton so all I can assume is that he is arguing that Cartesian doubt is universal.

If we want to know what the status of the evil demon argument then we can look at in terms of moving from ordinary doubt (dreaming doubt) to the most extreme doubt (evil demon doubt).

It could be the case that God is deceiving us so Descartes wants to rule out this possibility. God by his nature is not a deceiver so instead Descartes introduces the evil demon. Nonetheless, an evil demon can trick us into believing there is no God.

Clearly the evil demon is very powerful and this is Descartes intention. But the question being asked,'Is the evil demon powerful enough to be considered omnipotent?

Probably not because Descartes wants to use the evil demon in a logical role. If something were true and false at the same time then it would not be possible for the demon to deceive Descartes. This is because he would have nothing to deceive Descartes with.

There are too many beliefs to doubt individually so he assumes these beliefs rest on basic principles and these principle are capable of being undermined. These principles are finite and associated with sense experience and reason.

This is why Kennington says that the evil demon must be finite in order for the cogito to be possible.

Descartes attempts to refute the evil demon doubt by replacing it with a non-deceiving God. Descartes thinks he can trust reason in this respect. Descartes uses circular reasoning to claim that his reasoning is sound.

As for Stoothoff's position I would have to read it.

I don't know if this is of any help. I hope so.

Regards

Tut