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Right now, the United States is in the midst of a huge rebalancing of its external accounts. A big current-account deficit has begun the inevitable and ineluctable shift to a correspondingly big current-account surplus. The mechanism by which this will occur is a decline in the trade-weighted value of the US dollar. As the dollar buys less abroad, Americans will be constrained to consume fewer foreign goods and services - and foreigners will be induced to buy more from Americans.
With luck, this process will occur without a recession. The pace of domestic economic activity will continue brisk, dollar-denominated incomes will remain stable or even rise, unemployment may even decline as exports accelerate. This is what happened in 1985-86, the last time we saw a big drop in the value of the dollar.
All holders of dollar assets lose some of their wealth - but the burden falls most heavily on those with the most wealth to lose, who also happen to be the people who enjoyed the biggest gains during the previous increase in the value of the dollar. The burden falls least heavily on those with nothing to sell but their labor. This approach is not only equitable, but also surprisingly painless. Since permanently abandoning gold convertibility in 1933, the US economy has experienced far less economic volatility. Recessions are fewer and shallower (if sometimes longer).
Of course, that's not the only way to balance accounts. There is another, the way Americans experienced in 1837, 1857, 1893, and 1930-33. In those years, the value of the dollar was fixed to gold. (One dollar = 1/20 of an ounce.) If something bad happened in the world or US economy, the dollar could not adjust. A recession was like a car accident without bumpers or crumple zones - the full pain was conveyed uncushioned to the riders in the cabin. Domestic asset values collapsed. Unemployment jumped overnight to 15% or 20%. Homes were lost, businesses disappeared.
That's why the 19th century was the golden age (if I may be excused the expression) of monetary cranks. From the Greenback party of the 1870s to the William Jennings Bryan crusade in 1896 for free, unlimited coinage of silver (meaning, under the circumstances of the time, a deliberate policy of inflation), Americans rebelled again and again against the gold standard's habit of hurling America off the economic cliff once in every generation.
In 1896, ironically, the gold standard got lucky. Bryan lost, McKinley won. Almost immediately after McKinley's elections, gold miners first in South Africa and then in Australia found huge new goldfields. America got the inflation it needed without silver, thanks to a geological accident. From 1896 to 1913, the world economy expanded in what is known to history as "La Belle Epoque." Because that expansion was immediately followed by the catastrophe of World War I, it shines even happier than it really was. (There are doubts for example how rapidly the personal incomes of ordinary people really rose over those two decades.) And that happy interval casts an undeserved retrospective glow on America's experience with gold.
What the gold standard really is, fundamentally, is a rule that the nation's monetary stock should be determined, not by central bankers, but by miners. Why that should be regarded as an improvement by anyone, I cannot understand.
Let me add one final note. Even to treat the gold standard as a live option is to utterly misunderstand modern finance. It can never be restored, even if anyone were foolish enough to try, for a reason brilliantly explained by John Maynard Keynes almost nine decades ago:
The gold standard was ultimately sustained by a near universal belief that gold was money - and that nothing else was. There's a story told about the socialist minister in the British Labour government of 1929-31, who was stunned when his more conservative successors took Britain off gold in 1931. "They never told us we could do that!"
Well, now we all know that "they can do that."
Suppose that the US were on the gold standard right now. Suppose the country headed to recession. We would all know that the president and Congress of the moment could mitigate the recession by going off gold. We, each of us, would have to anticipate that possibility in our financial planning. So what would we do? We'd trade our "gold" dollars for commodity gold, and we'd hoard that - thus transforming a looming recession into an instant financial panic.
And since the government of the moment would have to anticipate that reaction, it would have to move even faster, dumping gold at the first tremor of bad news.
So you and I would have to act even faster still, never accepting "gold" dollars in the first place...
Which is why the whole thing is so irrecoverably dead.