The body is somewhat a dormant slave of the mind, the mind has its own frequency of working its through thoughts and the environment that's around the body.
At a certain level the mind has free play when we don't think about it!
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The body is somewhat a dormant slave of the mind, the mind has its own frequency of working its through thoughts and the environment that's around the body.
At a certain level the mind has free play when we don't think about it!
I'm not sure what this means.Quote:
Originally Posted by greatodie
This is all really helpful. I must confess, however--and I'm not doing this to be a jerk--I'm not quite sure how this maps on to mental states. I get that you take the mind or mentality to be an emergent property, but I'm not quite seeing how my belief that 2+2=4 is analogous to a flock of birds. Or rather, I think I get it if I squint my eyes so that things become blurry. But when I open them wide again I feel a bit confused. I have the sense that you've laid all the pieces right out in front of me but that I'm not quite able to see how they fit together.Quote:
Originally Posted by asking
BTW, I know that you're not saying that my belief that 2+2=4 is like a flock of birds. What I meant to get at with that is that I'm having difficulty connecting your really nice discussion of emergent properties with determinate mental states. I just wanted to make sure it doesn't seem like I'm trying to be snotty. Right now it all looks to me like a really cool metaphor. But still a metaphor.
Could we use some other mental state besides 2 +2 = 4? How about your intention to have a tuna sandwich tomorrow? It would help me to have an array of examples so that I know what you mean by "determinate mental states." Right now, I don't really know what is and isn't "determinate" in your view.Quote:
Originally Posted by Akoue
I can't offer a mechanism because (a) I'm not a neuroscientist and don't follow all this. Stuff and (b) I'm not sure anyone really knows at this point. I supect though that if I went and did some digging I could come up with some examples of what I mean. I'm for hire as a researcher. :)
This really just an opinion. I'm telling you want I think is how it will turn out based on my half a lifetime of thinking about biology. I'm moderately confident that I'm right and I guess I'd say it's closer to a model than a metaphor. It's not LIKE an emergent property. It is one.
I gave flocking birds and migrating cells as examples of emergence so that you could better understand what emergent properties are, since you seemed skeptical and doubtful about even their existence. They are simply understanding things at a higher order of organization.
I definitely don't want you to spend time digging around for neurosciencey stuff. I am perfectly happy to accede to your far greater expertise with regard to the biology of all this. (In fact, it's one of the reasons you're fun to talk to about this.) And I don't want to quarrel with the existence of emergent properties. I thought your post about this made a lot of sense (hence the "greenie"). It's just that the more I think about that post the less I feel I understand how it maps on to the mental. I am entirely open to the possibility that the fault for this is my own. But there it is; I appear to be a bit stuck.Quote:
Originally Posted by asking
Oh, and on the determinate mental states thing. Yes, by all means, use whatever example you like. 2+2=4 was just the one that popped into my head and so I've been working with it (and probably beating it to death). Let's go with the intention to eat a tuna sandwich. By a determinate mental state I just mean a mental state that has some specific content. The belief that 2+2=4, say, or the intention to eat a tuna sandwich tomorrow. I'm afraid I inadvertently got jargonny on you. I don't think anything hangs on the use of the word "determinate" as I've been thinking of it.
So, using a better example, can you sketch, even roughly, how you see the stuff about emergent properties giving us a way to think about a mental state? I promise I will treat anything you say as provisional. And I really don't expect you to come armed with lots of neuroscience. I'm just looking for a better understanding of the way you see this stuff fitting together.
I will think about a mechanism. I guess that's what you are asking, but I doubt I can come up with anything without a serious dip into the neuro/mind literature, which I have basically avoided as it has some of the same flaws (in my opinion) as the cosmological.
I don't even know what you mean by "a better way to think about a mental state." Is there a way to think about it already? What exactly should I be thinking about mental states? Why should I think about them. I'm happy to have one!
I really don't know what you are after if not a specific mechanism for how a particular combination of neurons firing and not firing produces a specific memory or intention. I know there's research in this area... An actual mechanism for the mind is the stuff of real experiments, not thought experiments as far as I know. There will be simple rules that, when they are operating in large sections of the brain, will produce understanding, knowing, intention. There is already research on inspiration, which I found very interesting.
I have given this a bit more thought and I will sleep on it, but what I'm thinking right now is that your understanding of "mental" is quite philosophical and abstract, and probably derived from centuries of thought in the absence of anything tangible to hinge the concept on beyond the bare existence of a brain. Whereas I'm talking (extremely vaguely) about something concrete and physical. I think even if I had a concrete answer to your question, which I don't, we might be having some of the same problems we are having with the species question. Just a thought.Quote:
Originally Posted by Akoue
Why are animals not considered responsible for their behaviour? Isn't that evidence that animals' sense of fair play is "rudimentary" compared to ours? Do you believe all our thoughts, values and decisions are ultimately determined by our heredity and environment?Quote:
Originally Posted by asking
The dichotomy that the ten commandments are "either social conventions OR you will get into trouble if you do something different" is invalid. They are both. They are social conventions based on facts about co-existence. We ignore them at our peril. Morality also includes proscriptions against things which do not necessarily cause social disruption. It is concerned with the welfare and happiness of the individual. The first commandment, for example, is intended to avert the dangers of idolatry: obsession with false gods like power and wealth, and above all "egolatry" - the worship of oneself.
Let me put it another way. If the mind is simply the functioning of the brain then "truth", "goodness", "freedom", "justice", "purpose" and "love" are mere symbols that refer to nothing. (Bertrand Russell could not evade the reality of "similarity" and concluded materialism must be false). If the mind itself is not an intangible reality why believe in other intangible realities? How can a physical organ like the brain grasp abstractions?Quote:
Originally Posted by Akoue
The hypothesis that everything is physical is self-destructive because it leads to total scepticism: it presupposes the ability to arrive at the truth (which is non-existent!)...
If the mind is a biological machine all its activity is the result of physical events. If this is the case we cannot choose what to think nor are we responsible for anything we do! According to this hypothesis there is no guarantee that any of our thoughts correspond to reality...Quote:
Originally Posted by asking
I think to the extent that we incorporate animals into our lives we do hold them responsible for their behavior. Don't you hold your dog responsible for bad behavior such as biting? One of the reasons we like dogs is that they play by the same kinds of rules that we do. If we take the time we teach our pets and work animals what the rules are, they mostly abide by those.Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
The talk about human superiority in moral affairs is basically hot air. We have always been prone to setting ourselves above others, whether it is our next door neighbors, our colleagues at work, another nation, slaves, or animals. We are constantly looking for ways in which we are different and special. Talk about egolatry.
In any case, the extent to which WE hold animals responsible is not a measure of THEIR sense of fair play.
I don't think of my own thoughts as being predetermined in any final sense, if that is where you are going. But my thoughts will certainly trend in different ways depending on what species** I am, my particular genetic makeup, my development in the womb and as an infant, and my experiences throughout life.(** If I see an ant, I do not suddenly start thinking about dinner, as a pangolin might.)
For example, recent research shows that children who are abused have a permanently altered reaction to stress***. That change is going to alter someone's feelings and therefore their thoughts. No amount of willpower is going to make that alteration in feelings and thoughts go away entirely, although, I'm guessing, there are things that can be done to mitigate it. The brain is plastic. Plus, there is the matter of behavior, which is separate from thoughts. We hold people responsible for what they do, not for every passing thought or stress reaction.
So I guess I would say the dichotomy between determinate behavior and freewill is a false one and, for my purposes, unimportant. We are what we are, regardless of how you want to frame it philosophically.
Of course the dichotomy between social convention and *get you into trouble in a troop of chimps* is exaggerated. A sin can very much be both. But the things to which we object chimps object to too. A sin for us is a sin for them (with the obvious exception of things they wouldn't ever do, like painting icons or not covering their heads on the sabbath). And they ignore them at their peril (constantly, like us).
Furthermore, animals have culture. Populations of different kinds of social animals from elephants to apes whose societies have been disrupted by disaster or heavy hunting show a breakdown in social rules, not unlike the kind you see in humans. It's very difficult to lose elders with wisdom or the stability that comes with intact social structures. It leads to the loss of social codes that contribute to stability, happiness, mutual support, prosperity, and good health. All of these things are as important to other animals as they are for us.
***
Quote:
Abuse Leaves Its Mark on the Brain
By Constance Holden
ScienceNOW Daily News
23 February 2009
Child abuse doesn't just cause emotional problems; it also causes long-lasting changes in the brain. A new study shows that in men who were abused as children, a gene involved in stress control is affected even decades later, following a pattern also seen in stressed baby rats.
Rat studies have revealed that maternal neglect alters the workings of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, a system that secretes particular hormones in response to stress (ScienceNOW, 2 August 2004). In the abused animals, the regulatory region of a gene for the glucocorticoid receptor, responsible for damping down the HPA response, doesn't do its job properly. As a result, the animals experience chronically higher stress levels.
For example.Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
(This was the first hit in a Google search.)
Researchers home in on how brain handles abstract thought - MIT News OfficeQuote:
Researchers home in on how brain handles abstract thought
Donna Coveney, News Office
July 18, 2001
MIT researchers reported in the June 21 issue of Nature that they have pinpointed how and where abstract thoughts are represented in the brain.
The study, in which monkeys apply rules about "same" and "different" to a myriad of images, shows that the prefrontal cortex -- the part of the brain directly behind the eyes -- works on the abstract assignment rather than simply recalling the pictures.
In other words, the MIT researchers have identified the part of the brain that figures out the rules of the game, but does not play the game. Most previous brain research has uncovered brain regions that perform concrete tasks, such as recognizing places or moving muscles.
First, I don't buy the dichotomy that we are either responsible for everything we do or responsible for nothing.Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
Second, it doesn't follow that because we are biological "machines" we have no choices and do not make decisions. If a dog has a choice between getting up on the sofa where he's not supposed to be or staying on the carpet, we certainly can give ourselves no less credit for responsible behavior. The fact that we can make decisions does not prove that we are non physical beings.
A robot can make decisions. Ours are just more nuanced.
I don't get your point about thoughts and reality. Do you feel that a non material mind is more in touch with reality than a materially based mind?
As for our ability to choose what to think, I think the part of the brain that enforces inhibition is a good contrary argument. People with Tourettes have brains that don't function quite right and--depending on what kind of Tourettes they have--cannot inhibit their own thoughts and impulses to say inappropriate things as most people can. Unless you are arguing that Tourettes is a moral failing, I don't see how you can not accept that inhibition is physically mediated.
We don't hold animals morally responsible for their behaviour. We don't appeal to their conscience or reason with them to change the way they behave. They cannot choose to act in accordance with an abstract principle like "All animals are equal". We are not morally superior to them for the simple reason that they have no moral insight or responsibility. The false belief that we are superior to them is not egolatry but humanolatry! They are superior to us in at least one respect: they are not guilty of any premeditated crime or indeed any crime whatsoever whereas we have well nigh ruined this planet.Quote:
Originally Posted by asking
We are what we are, regardless of how we frame it philosophically, but robots are not held responsible for the way they function whereas we are. Why?
Obviously abstract thoughts can be represented in the brain. Otherwise we would not be able to communicate them to others. But that is a far cry from grasping the meaning of abstract terms. Electrical activity alone cannot produce insight or consciousness.Quote:
Originally Posted by asking
I agree. But that is our decision, not something about them. (And I guess I do hold some of them morally responsble, if you want to know the truth.)Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
Animals are capable of premeditated murder of their own kind, including apes. But others as well. I have seen one male mouse kill another with my own eyes. There was no shortage food or space. I say it was premeditated because I put another male mouse in and he did the same a second time. (I learned my lesson and felt awful.)
I once inadvertently put a young female hamster into a cage with several males. When I returned in the morning, she could no longer walk, was paralyzed from the waist down, and the males were still crowding around her. I had to put her out of her misery. If there was criminal court for hamsters, I would have hauled there a$$es in. Of course, they were already in jail...
Good points, all. But you are talking about differences in our ability to communicate with words, to use abstract concepts, and our cognitive abilities. I readily grant that we are far better at those. But I think morality itself is deeper seated and a separate thing. Yes we humans can TALK about morality and (mostly unsuccessfully) appeal to people's moral sensibility. But the moral impulse was already there and, like other animals, we depart from it quite often, depending on circumstance. The argument over the difference between "murder" and "killing" is a case in point. These fine arguments are mere rationalization for doing what we know is wrong. When we find it useful to kill, we find a way to justify it. Animals just don't think about it as much. But our behavior and theirs is fundamentally the same.Quote:
We don't appeal to their conscience or reason with them to change the way they behave. They cannot choose to act in accordance with an abstract principle like "All animals are equal". We are not morally superior to them for the simple reason that they have no moral insight or responsibility. The false belief that we are superior to them is not egolatry but humanolatry! They are superior to us in at least one respect: they are not guilty of any premeditated crime or indeed any crime whatsoever whereas we have well nigh ruined this planet.
Hmm.. An awful lot of people shout at computers. :)Quote:
We are what we are, regardless of how we frame it philosophically, but robots are not held responsible for the way they function whereas we are. Why?
But seriously, you keep coming back to how we view things, not how they are.
Here's how they are: If a human murders, we have a trial and put him to death or jail him indefinitely. If a dog kills, we put it down after a certain amount of due process (because it belongs to someone). If a tiger kills a human, it too is put down. If a robot killed a human, I'm sure it would be destroyed unless it was a military robot, in which case we'd make another thousand of them. So how is that functionally different? If something is sufficiently dangerous we kill it. What's different is how we talk about it.
If the mind has a physical basis it cannot control itself or be capable of self-determination. The fact that inability to inhibit thoughts and impulses may be due to a physical (or mental) disorder does not explain our ability to choose for ourselves. In fact the self must be an illusion if our thoughts and choices emerge from the brain because the self is an intangible entity. Where would the self be located if it had a physical basis?Quote:
Originally Posted by asking
Where is the control-centre in the brain? If all your thoughts are produced by the brain those that are not predetermined must be indeterminate, i.e. fortuitous. There is certainly no scope for freedom of choice because such a choice would transcend physical laws.
Robots make choices and decisions because they are programmed to do so. Similarly a dog is conditioned by its training to behave in certain ways but if it makes a decision to act differently we don't regard it as morally defective. Why are we unique in this respect?
https://www.askmehelpdesk.com/images...s/rolleyes.gifQuote:
Originally Posted by asking
:rolleyes:
I find your experiments fascinating but sometimes gruesome. :rolleyes:
I agree that "morality itself is deeper seated and a separate thing" and "the moral impulse was already there". (Where? ):eek:
I do keep coming back to how we view things but I don't think humanity is all that misguided. The success of science is evidence of our insight into reality. In fact the onus is on the sceptic or cynic to explain why, for example, the UN Declaration of Human Rights contains no more than convenient fictions.
The essential difference between us and animals or robots is that unlike them we kill (when we are reasonable) if we regard it as the lesser of two evils. (We may be mistaken but we're not infallible). And in some instances we may choose to be killed rather than kill. Robots could certainly be programmed to do so but animals would not do so because of a moral principle.
The main point is that in our case the buck stops with each of us individually... and that needs explanation...
I think this statement is far from self evident.Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
Maybe the self is a kind of illusion, or at least simply a framework for how we behave.Quote:
The self must be an illusion if our thoughts and choices emerge from the brain because the self is an intangible entity. Where would the self be located if it had a physical basis?
The self need not be located in a single place. Do you mean the "self" is located in a particular place in the brain? That would surprise me.
This question assumes a hierarchical organization of the body, as well as the brain, with a single "master" in charge of everything. There is no evidence that the body works that way. Consider this: every "master switch" is also a "weak link."Quote:
Where is the control-centre in the brain?
I can't prove that any of this is wrong. But I don't think you can prove that any of it is true either. Can you support this statement?Quote:
If all your thoughts are produced by the brain those that are not predetermined must be indeterminate, i.e. fortuitous. There is certainly no scope for freedom of choice because such a choice would transcend physical laws.
The more sophisticated the robot, the more sophisticated and nuanced its decisions appear to be. Can a robot pass a turing test? Not yet. But the decisions that humans make are not self evidently NOT flexibly programmed, allowing for innumerable alternatives. When you get out of bed in the morning, how many choices do you really allow yourself? We are creatures of habit, which, I'm thinking maybe, is another way of saying we are semi-programmed for most of what we do day to day.Quote:
Robots make choices and decisions because they are programmed to do so.
First, a dog is not trained to love its owner and defend him against enemies. They do that of their own volition, although that's partly programmed. The dog is trained to respect its owner and to do less natural things like shake hands.Quote:
Similarly a dog is conditioned by its training to behave in certain ways but if it makes a decision to act differently we don't regard it as morally defective.
Second, again, WE may not regard the dog as morally defective. Although I've often heard "baaaad dog" which suggests you are mistaken. Either way, that's just our subjective opinion, a judgment based on what? The behavior of the dog is the same regardless of what label we decide to put on it.
I'm sorry. In what respect?Quote:
Why are we unique in this respect?
Asking and Tonyrey - It is a pleasure to see such two fine minds at work.Quote:
Originally Posted by asking
asking--I tried to give you rep but apparently I have praised you too much recently. I love the way you think and the way you explain why you think the way you do. Your discussion of "emergent properties" should be in textbooks. You rock!
Tony,Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
I thought those were gruesome too, and I haven't told you the half of it. But I hope you don't think those WERE the experiments! In the first case, I was a college student looking that the difference between how two males interact and two females. I had NO idea that male mice would be so aggressive. I thought the first death was a fluke. Maybe it was sick? My naiveté is embarrassing now. (All the pairs of females lived in perfect harmony, sleeping together even... :rolleyes:)
In the second case, I was taking care of animals for a biotech company and didn't know that I'd mixed two sexes together (sexing hamsters takes some concentration). Again, I didn't realize how dangerous males could be... I was shocked.
I meant that our moral impulse has evolved. Here's another weird example. We think of altruism as being a uniquely human thing. But it's not; lots of animals take care of one another and even take significant risks for one another. But in most cases, biologists can show that animals are much more likely to sacrifice for close relatives than for strangers. They call it "kin selection" or "kin altruism." When it happens with non relatives, it's typically characterized as spillover behavior--like a dog raising a kitten. Her maternal instincts just kick in inappropriately. Of course, out own altruistic acts are never characterized that way--as just spillover behavior from our evolved tendency to take care of kin.Quote:
I agree that "morality itself is deeper seated and a separate thing" and "the moral impulse was already there". (Where? ):eek:
But in fact some animals engage in regular altruism with non relatives. In that case, it's more of a good karma situation, where if you do for someone else in your group, it'll come back to you at some point. A classic example of this is vampire bats, which starve very quickly if they don't get a meal every night. Fortunately, if someone in the colony doesn't manage to get a meal on one night, the other bats will share--and they need not be relatives. This is called "reciprocal altruism." Humans do this too when we save someone we don't know or share food with a street person. It's a moral impulse that is millions of years old.
In fact, I sometimes hear people on the radio tell listeners that it's better to donate to a charity than to give to street people and while I recognize that as a rational argument, I think it's contrary to human moral code, which is to help immediately in a tangible way if we see someone we think is in distress. How does it affect us morally to blunt that impulse over and over? (And I'm not arguing that everyone who begs is in distress.)
What I'm arguing is that animals also kill under such circumstances. Humans and animals make similar moral decisions--if you just look at what we do. There is little that we do that other animals don't also do--whether it's helping one another or killing or raping. The big exceptions to that rule are our intelligence and ornate language and culture. I don't think our sense of right and wrong is one of those exceptions.Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
Here I'm confused. I honestly don't see anything that needs explaining.Quote:
The main point is that in our case the buck stops with each of us individually... and that needs explanation...
How does the buck stop with an individual in a way that's unique to humans? I would appreciate it if you gave a concrete and substantive example, as I don't know what you mean.
Here's one way we might approach it:
There are two complementary conceptual frameworks within which we think of ourselves.
1. Reasons-framework. We are rational agents and our actions can be justified by appeal to reasons which can be formulated and expressed linguistically in a way that renders those actions, and ourselves as the authors of those actions, subject to moral evaluation. (Of course they also render us subject to other sorts of evaluation as well: considerations of legality, where these differ from strictly moral considerations; considerations of practical rationality (given our ends, have we gone about realizing them in a rational way); prudential considerations (where these may be thought to be distinct from considerations of practical rationality); etiquette.
2. Causal framework. We are physical entities, organisms functioning in the ways that organisms of this type (i.e. the type that we are, human beings) function. Our actions are caused by massively complex physical processes and events occurring in our bodies and of which we are not reflectively* aware and over which we do not exercise control.
* When I say that we are not reflectively aware of these events and processes, I mean only to say that we have no access to them by means of introspection. I can be introspectively aware of myself wanting more light in the room (and so I reach for the lamp), but I am not introspectively aware of the neurochemical event that is simultaneous with, and perhaps identical to, my desire for more light.
The first framework is necessary in order for us to regard ourselves and each other as rational beings, as reflective, self-aware subjects with purposes and intentions which are morally evaluable. We can even challenge each others actions, and reasons for action: Suppose I tell a friend a lie. A friend asks me if her husband is cheating on her. I know perfectly well that he is and yet I disabuse her of her suspicions, assuring her that he is, in fact, faithful to her. Now suppose I chose to lie to her because I thought it inappropriate of me to meddle in the marital life of my friend and her husband. This reason for acting, for lying to my friend, is up for moral appraisal. One might think that my reason was a bad reason, that the duties of friendship obligated me to tell her the truth. Or one might think that I did the right thing but for the wrong reason: It was good not to tell her the truth, but only because what she doesn't know won't hurt her. Good reasons or bad, those reasons are justifications for acting in the ways that we do. And this, I am prepared to argue, is central to the very concept of a person. It is not, I would also argue, something with which we can dispense; it is part-and-parcel of how we understand ourselves at a very fundamental level.
Now the causal framework does not provide for reasons-explanations of action. A causal account of the same action would make no mention of persons and feelings and principles and the like. A causal explanation would tell us what, as a matter of empirical fact, was the physical (chemical and electrical) process by which I came to utter the words, "No, Rodney isn't having an affair". Were someone, perhaps the very friend to whom I told the lie, to ask me "Why did you lie about it?", it would be inappropriate to respond with a causal explanation (supposing I had one to hand). It would be inappropriate, that is, to say that such-and-such brain activity was occurring at the time I dissembled. And the inappropriateness isn't just the inappropriateness of the demands of etiquette: To give a causal explanation would be to give no explanation at all; it would rather amount to changing the subject. When asked why I did it, I am being asked what my reasons were, why I thought it was the thing to do.
The question is, are these two frameworks really complementary or can one be reduced to, or eliminated in favor of, the other? Materialists of a reductionistic bent would argue that the reasons-framework can be reduced to the causal framework, this for the reason that it is the physical events in the agent's brain (or, at any rate, body) that are doing all the work, and so only causal explanations are really explanatory. The other stuff is a sort of fiction... or is at least not the real story. If you want to understand agency, behavior, you have to locate the appropriate causal mechanisms.
Another way to answer the question would be to say that the two frameworks are genuinely complementary because they answer different, but equally legitimate, questions. We understand ourselves and each other by means of both reasons-explanations and causal-explanations. To try to make sense of ourselves and others without both sorts of framework would leave us with a radically deficient picture. This non-reductionistic complementarity view needn't be non-materialistic. In fact, many of the people who defend it roundly reject the sort of dualism that holds that the mental is a non-physical soul-stuff.
I propose this as a way of capturing intuitions which seem to be guiding both asking and tonyrey. This isn't to take a final stand vis-à-vis the OP, since the complementarity view is neutral regarding the question whether the mental (the stuff that pertains to the reasons framework) is itself through-and-through physical. One could very well develop it in the direction of a very strident dualism were one inclined to do so.
I would, though, urge that we extend these frameworks to organisms other than humans. And not without reason. There are, to be sure, causal mechanisms in play when a dog responds to the rattling of her dinner bowl by trotting into the kitchen with perky ears. But she also has good reason to act this way, since she expects that bowl to be presented to her with something tasty in it. And so for manifold other behaviors. If there is something special or unique about humans, I am inclined to think it lies in the ways in which we hold second-order desires, i.e. we can want to want certain things, and we can want not to want certain things. I am not at all sure what to say about non-humans. Do they too have second-order desires?
Perhaps our biology expert can shed some light on this? Or, at least, give us a sense whether there is any standing biological orthodoxy regarding the subject. For my part, I can well see it going either way.
[QUOTE=asking;1574809]
Humans and animals make similar moral decisions--if you just look at what we do. There is little that we do that other animals don't also do--whether it's helping one another or killing or raping. The big exceptions to that rule are our intelligence and ornate language and culture. I don't think our sense of right and wrong is one of those exceptions.
There is no evidence that animals make any moral decisions at all. Their actions are the result of their genetic makeup and their environment.They cannot choose to act according to a moral principle regardless of the consequences. The mouse which killed two male mice did not so as the result of premeditation: it did so as an instinctive response to the presence of a potential rival. The fact that people call a dog "bad" does not imply that the dog has a conscience and can distinguish between right and wrong. They are simply treating the animal as if it were a rational being capable of self-control whereas it is not.
The buck stops with us because we are unique in our power of hindsight, insight and foresight.To say that our behaviour and that of animals is fundamentally the same overlooks our ability to plan ahead, to establish priorities, to weigh the consequences, to resist our instincts and to die for the sake of a principle. I am not disputing the nobility, beauty and altruism of the sacrifices made by many animals but they are neither morally nor legally responsible for their actions.
Since this is the consensus of humanity the onus is on a dissenter to explain how and why other species should be considered moral agents. They certainly have rights but they do not have any moral or legal obligations.
Neither can robots be regarded as decision-makers in the full sense of the term. Their activity is entirely the result of the ways in which they have been programmed. It is either prededetermined or indeterminate (if randomised). The one thing it cannot be is self-determined. If the self is simply a framework it cannot exercise self-control or be a responsible entity. Your analogy of the mind with traffic patterns, flocks of birds and groups of birds does not account for the mind's unity, continuity and self-awareness.
If the mind is just a word for a higher order function of the brain and resides in the interactions between neurons it is, as you say, "a product of the whole body". This interpretation does not correspond with the belief that persons have the right to life, liberty and happiness. In daily life we do not regard other people as biological robots. This is because a mechanistic interpretation of reality does not account for the existence of purpose and values. When a theory conflicts with the fundamental tenets of civilised human beings one is entitled to be sceptical.
[QUOTE=tonyrey;1579052](correction: groups of birds>groups of cells)Quote:
Originally Posted by asking
Humble apologies for mishandling the system. Please forgive me...Quote:
Originally Posted by asking
There is no evidence that animals make any moral decisions at all. Their actions are the result of their genetic makeup and their environment.They cannot choose to act according to a moral principle regardless of the consequences. The mouse which killed two male mice did not so as the result of premeditation: it did so as an instinctive response to the presence of a potential rival. The fact that people call a dog "bad" does not imply that the dog has a conscience and can distinguish between right and wrong. They are simply treating the animal as if it were a rational being capable of self-control whereas it is not.
The buck stops with us because we are unique in our power of hindsight, insight and foresight.To say that our behaviour and that of animals is fundamentally the same overlooks our ability to plan ahead, to establish priorities, to weigh the consequences, to resist our instincts and to die for the sake of a principle. I am not disputing the nobility, beauty and altruism of the sacrifices made by many animals but they are neither morally nor legally responsible for their actions.
Since this is the consensus of humanity the onus is on a dissenter to explain how and why other species should be considered moral agents. They certainly have rights but they do not have any moral or legal obligations.
Neither can robots be regarded as decision-makers in the full sense of the term. Their activity is entirely the result of the ways in which they have been programmed. It is either prededetermined or indeterminate (if randomised). The one thing it cannot be is self-determined. If the self is simply a framework it cannot exercise self-control or be a responsible entity. Your analogy of the mind with traffic patterns, flocks of birds and groups of cells does not account for the mind's unity, continuity and self-awareness.
If the mind is just a word for a higher order function of the brain and resides in the interactions between neurons it is, as you say, "a product of the whole body". This interpretation does not correspond with the belief that persons have the right to life, liberty and happiness. In daily life we do not regard other people as biological robots. This is because a mechanistic interpretation of reality does not account for the existence of purpose and values. When a theory conflicts with the fundamental tenets of civilised human beings one is entitled to be sceptical.
No problem. It takes some getting used to.Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
I would argue the reverse. There is no evidence that animals DON'T make decisions. They decide to help one another, or not. They decide to eat the cupcakes or not. This dog has managed to resist the impulse to take a cupcake. Previously, it took food constantly.
YouTube - The ORIGINAL Stains from "It's Me or the Dog"
He has learned that he's not supposed to take a cupcake, just as I know I'm not supposed to steal a Snicker's bar from the grocery store even though sometimes I would like to. In another scene, the trainer teaches the dog that "someone" is watching all the time, even when there appear to be no humans in the room, and he learns to leave the cupcakes alone even when he's all by himself. It's a staged learning process.
The trick to training animals to resist impulses is pretty much the same as for training children. Consequences must be significant and rewards and punishments consistent, otherwise they do not resist impulses. The habit of impulse control is learned, but impulse control is also located within a specific region of the brain, since certain forms of brain damage can obliterate it. Certain drugs can increase restraint in both humans and other animals.
Self control is a physical process. It is not a function of an abstract mind but a direct result of the functioning of the brain. And it is certainly not unique to humans. To call such restraint "instinct" in animals but high principle in humans is defining the same behavior in two different ways depending on who is doing it, and attributing more high mindedness to us than there is evidence for. I can't prove that dogs have learned principles, but you can't actually prove that some of them don't.
I don't think there is evidence for a difference between humans and other animals in this respect. When animals risk their lives to help others, we don't attribute this intention and planning to them, in part because we don't know what they are thinking, but we do with people, often even when people's motivations are significantly more complex than simple principle. That is, we often attribute more principle to people than is actually deserved.Quote:
There is no evidence that animals make any moral decisions at all. Their actions are the result of their genetic makeup and their environment.They cannot choose to act according to a moral principle regardless of the consequences.
For example, when a dog or a 7 year old boy rouses the family during a fire, and everyone gets out, both boy and dog are depicted in heroic terms. But in fact, they may have just been afraid and trying to get help or reassurance. They did nothing wrong and it all turned out well, but the heroism in these situations is consistently exaggerated for effect.
Well, we'd have to discuss "instinctive." Speaking as a zoologist, I would not say this was instinctive behavior anymore than when my neighbor murders his wife's lover. I assume you would not call that instinctive.Quote:
The mouse which killed two male mice did not so as the result of premeditation: it did so as an instinctive response to the presence of a potential rival.
You are making an argument for holding us more responsible for what we do. That's different from saying we are fundamentally different in our behavior. There is little evidence for the latter.Quote:
The buck stops with us because we are unique in our power of hindsight, insight and foresight.To say that our behaviour and that of animals is fundamentally the same overlooks our ability to plan ahead, to establish priorities, to weigh the consequences, to resist our instincts and to die for the sake of a principle. I am not disputing the nobility, beauty and altruism of the sacrifices made by many animals but they are neither morally nor legally responsible for their actions.
I am not going to address legal standing, which is a separate issue. Three year olds are not responsible for their behavior legally, but we do not say they have no minds.Quote:
Since this is the consensus of humanity the onus is on a dissenter to explain how and why other species should be considered moral agents. They certainly have rights but they do not have any moral or legal obligations.
I think your position that animals have no values and are not responsible for having any is far from a consensus opinion. A dog has no obligation to refrain from dragging human food off the counters? Even if it were a consensus opinion, that does not make it true.
Certainly I can't provide any mechanistic details. But "mind" as a concept accounts for nothing either as far as I can tell. I'm arguing that at least there's a starting point for a model that might explain the mind. And certainly some aspects of our self awareness is beginning to be understood in mechanistic terms. It's a least a start and leaves less for a more mystical understanding of mind to explain.Quote:
Your analogy of the mind with traffic patterns, flocks of birds and groups of cells does not account for the mind's unity, continuity and self-awareness.
I really object to the word "robot" here. I am sorry I mentioned the Roomba, which, if you'll recall I compared to a flatworm, the animal with the least developed brain of any animal that has an integrated nervous system at all. I think this is just rhetoric. Of course we do not regard our partners as robots. But they are not ethereal beings whose every motivation is a product of pure good and evil either. We eat because we are hungry. We hold our animals and children close because we crave intimacy, warmth, and love, all feelings we share with other animals.Quote:
In daily life we do not regard other people as biological robots.
This is because a mechanistic interpretation of reality does not account for the existence of purpose and values.
Yes, they do! This is what I am saying. Even my cats show purpose, foresight,and planning, and they have less need to plan that practically any animal on Earth. Most wild animals MUST plan, which means purpose. They have values, too. They just can't articulate them. That doesn't mean the values aren't there. A five year old cannot articulate a lot of the values she has picked up either, but she still abides by them.
I used the word "robot" only because you stated that a robot can make decisions and ours are just more nuanced, implying that we are no more than biological machines.Quote:
Originally Posted by asking
Self-control cannot be a physical process because it entails a self, a conscious entity. Restraint in animals is due to the effects of training whereas self-restraint results from the exercise of the intellect and free will. We are fundamentally different from animals because we can control ourselves in a situation where we have not been trained to do so.
Animals make decisions but they are not moral decisions. They cannot choose to act according to a universal moral principle regardless of the consequences.The man who murdered his wife's lover is guilty if there is sufficient evidence that he did so with malice aforethought. The mouse which killed another male is not guilty because it does not have a conscience and is motivated solely by biological factors. It cannot distinguish between what is right and what is wrong. . We exercise our judgment in a way that is impossible for an animal.
Legal responsibility is based on moral responsibility. A small child is not morally responsible because its intellect has not developed sufficiently whereas an animal's intelligence never even develops sufficiently for it to understand moral principles. Animals do have values but they are not moral values. Your cats behave purposefully but their attention is limited to the present and the immediate future. A dog is not taken to court because it has dragged food off a counter but its owner may be if he has allowed it to do so. He is to blame because he knows he should not let it steal whereas the pet's appetite simply overcomes its conditioned reflexes. We cannot appeal to its sense of fair play and say "How would you like it if some one stole your food?" Experimental evidence shows animals do not understand the mental state of other individuals. Nor can they understand or apply abstract rules like "Every animal has a right to life",
.
It is a false dilemma that we are either advanced animals or "ethereal beings whose every motivation is a product of pure good and evil". We have both a mind and a body which interact but the mind is the dominant partner. We have similar feelings of intimacy and warmth to animals but unlike them we cannot be genuinely fulfilled unless we pursue truth, goodness, justice, beauty and a love which embraces humans, animals, plants and even inanimate things like the earth and sky. We alone on this planet are responsible for its future destiny because we alone can deliberately alter the course of events on a vast scale.
The attempt to explain the mind in mechanistic terms is motivated by faith in the neoDarwinist theory of evolution which regards all life as the result of random combinations of molecules. Yet it has never been explained how intelligent and purposeful activity are produced by things which lack intelligence and purpose. To attribute reason to a chain of accidents is the height of unreason! If the mind had originated fortuitously it would hardly be capable of the sublime achievements of mankind in philosophy, religion, art, literature, music, science and technology - which presuppose an inexhaustible source of conscious creativity.
To attribute all this to minute electrical impulses in the lump of tissue we call the brain is a grossly inadequate hypothesis... In the words of Pascal, "Pensee fait la grandeur de l'homme" - our greatness stems from our power of thought. The concept of mind would not have emerged, still less survived to this day, if it accounted for nothing. The mind is aware of the brain but the brain is unaware of itself, let alone the mind. From the dawn of history humans have realised it is impossible to explain persons in terms of material objects. They have always looked for a reason and a purpose in their existence and that of the world. They know intuitively there is a dimension of reality beyond what they can see and touch.
I find this whole discussion of emergent properties of groups fascinating stuff. I ran across this discussion of "biofilms" -- large aggregations of microbes embedded in a slimy matrix--in today's Washington Post: Scientists Learning to Target Bacteria Where They Live.Quote:
Originally Posted by asking
I sincerely hope that there are some emergent properties of the human race that will make our species less vulnerable to being purged from the biosphere as a threat to life on the planet. In order for such properties to emerge, I'm guessing that some critical mass of individuals will have to relax their attachment to the more extreme forms of individualism. What do you think?Quote:
Scientists have learned that bacteria that are vulnerable when floating around as individual cells in what is known as their "planktonic state" are much tougher to combat once they get established in a suitable place -- whether the hull of a ship or inside the lungs -- and come together in tightly bound biofilms. In that state, they can activate mechanisms like tiny pumps to expel antibiotics, share genes that confer protection against drugs, slow down their metabolism or become dormant, making them harder to kill.
This is kind of what I was trying to get at in this thread.
Your suggestion that"some critical mass of individuals will have to relax their attachment to the more extreme forms of individualism" seems to imply they can choose whether to do so. How can self-determinism emerge from that which is determined by the laws of nature?Quote:
Originally Posted by ordinaryguy
Yes, I guess it does assume a degree of individual choice about how closely to identify with the collective.Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
I'm not sure I understand the question. I guess I don't see a contradiction between individual choice and "the laws of nature". I'm a rancher by trade, so I know something about the individual/herd dynamic in cattle. Individual cows can and do choose to abandon the herd, for various reasons in various situations, but the bovine species is a herd species, and most individuals "obey" the "laws" of herd behavior most of the time. The individual/social dynamic in human behavior seems essentially similar to me, and I don't see any of it as being inconsistent with the laws of nature as I understand them.Quote:
How can self-determinism emerge from that which is determined by the laws of nature?
Reading back over a couple of your previous posts, your main concern seems to be to magnify and emphasize the differences between homo sapiens and other species, and to insist that these differences are so fundamental and so vast that they can't be accounted for by the impartial operation of "the laws of nature". Consequently, humans must be the product of something other than, or in addition to, those laws, while all other life forms are strictly subject to them. Do I have that about right?
Dead right :) We often behave like cows or sheep but we are the only beings on this planet who are morally responsible - at least sometimes - for what we choose. We are not bio- machines operating according to natural laws but free agents who can transcend our heredity and environment. How is this possible?Quote:
Originally Posted by ordinaryguy
What do you mean by "morally responsible"? In every social species, individuals are held accountable by the group for transgressions of group norms. Are you talking about being held responsible by God for transgressions of Divine law?Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
I think this dichotomy you are trying to create is a false one. As I see it, there is no contradiction between "operating according to natural laws" and being "free agents". The operation of natural laws sets the boundaries within which free agency can function.Quote:
We are not bio- machines operating according to natural laws but free agents who can transcend our heredity and environment. How is this possible?
I think your preoccupation with the supposedly vast and fundamental differences between human and other species is misguided and unnecessary. It seems to me that you can still have a spiritual/religious dimension to human existence without having to claim that humans are dramatically and fundamentally different from other animal species. That's what motivates your claim, isn't it?
Human accountability is based on our ability to distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong, whereas animal accountability is the result of their genetic makeup and environmental conditioning. We do not regard animals as innocent or guilty.Quote:
Originally Posted by ordinaryguy
The dichotomy between freedom and determinism is a fact not an opinion. There is no scope for choice if all mental events have biochemical causes. If our decisions are caused by what happens in our brain we are no more than biological machines.Quote:
Originally Posted by ordinaryguy
If we are not fundamentally different from other animal species then their existence must also have a spiritual/religious dimension. If not, what does our spiritual/religious dimension consist of?Quote:
Originally Posted by ordinaryguy
We may not regard them that way, but they seem to regard each other that way, just as humans regard other humans that way.Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
I suppose it depends on how you define "freedom" and "determinism". The way I define them, they're not mutually exclusive, but you're certainly entitled to your own definitions. I always cringe when somebody proclaims something to be "a fact, not an opinion", because it usually represents an attempt to "upgrade" their opinion to something unassailable and beyond discussion.Quote:
The dichotomy between freedom and determinism is a fact not an opinion. There is no scope for choice if all mental events have biochemical causes. If our decisions are caused by what happens in our brain we are no more than biological machines.
What would be so awful about that?Quote:
If we are not fundamentally different from other animal species then their existence must also have a spiritual/religious dimension.
I think it consists of our desire to transcend the bounds of conscious existence within this physical body, within this physical world. Whether other species are capable of such a desire is irrelevant, as far as I can see. Why is so important to you that they NOT be capable of it?Quote:
If not, what does our spiritual/religious dimension consist of?
Are you implying that there is no difference between the way animals and humans regard each other? That animals can distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong? That both we and they reason and behave in fundamentally the same way?Quote:
Originally Posted by ordinaryguy
You may cringe but you haven't explained how you define "freedom" and "determinism", nor how there is scope for choice if all mental events have biochemical causes.Quote:
Originally Posted by ordinaryguy
If our spiritual/religious dimension consists solely of a desire to transcend the bounds of conscious existence within this physical world it is no more than a futile illusion doomed to bring us misery and frustration.Quote:
Originally Posted by ordinaryguy
Wouldn't this highlight the difference between objective and subjective? The physiological process of the synapses connecting axons to dendrites with neurotransmitters flowing from one to the other cause the processes of thought and perception to occur. Thus, the objective physiological process is the "determinism," but the subjective processes that result are the "freedom."Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
I don't see how results can constitute freedom :) I interpret freedom as the power of self-control. How can the conscious self be the effect of biochemical events which lack consciousness?Quote:
Originally Posted by Wondergirl
You seem to suppose that where there is causality there is determinism (or necessitation). But, at the same time, you clearly wish to see mental events and states as causes of behavior. So do you imagine that mental causes necessitate the behaviors to which they give rise?Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
If not, then why suppose that neurophysiological events and states are any more deterministic? Suppose that the mental event that causes me to perform action S is the desire D. Suppose further that D is token-identical to neurophysiological event N. Then, you seem to want to say, action S is not freely understaken, since N is causally necessitating. But this would be to take for granted a very primitive view of causality. Why suppose that the free performance of S is imperiled by the token-identity of D and N in a way that it isn't by the non-identity of D and N? What motivates this supposition?
The objective processes ("biochemical events") are the same for you and for me, but the results ("conscious self") are subjective, your experience different from mine. My neurotransmitters flow between my synapses (determinism), and I think to myself, "I want to eat a banana" (free will). Your neurotransmitters flow between your synapses (determinism), and you think to yourself, "I want to eat a mango" (free will).Quote:
Originally Posted by tonyrey
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