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It is hardly the first time the Obama administration has seemed uncertain on its feet during the Egyptian crisis, as it struggles to stay on the right side of history and to avoid accelerating a revolution that could spin out of control.
The mixed messages have been confusing and at times embarrassing —
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When the first protesters appeared in Tahrir Square, Mrs. Clinton, working off the traditional American script that portrays Mr. Mubarak as a reliable ally in need of quiet, sustained pressure on human rights and political reform, said, “Our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people.”
One week later, that script was cast aside for the first time in three decades. On Tuesday night, Mr. Obama and his top national security aides watched Mr. Mubarak’s defiant speech, in which he refused to resign but insisted he had never intended to run for re-election in September. It confirmed the conclusion they had gradually reached as the protest mounted: Instability would reign until the Mr. Mubarak got out of the way.
“He needed a push,” said one official who was in the Situation Room with the president. When Mr. Mubarak’s speech was over, Mr. Obama called him, for what turned into a tense 30-minute conversation.
Shortly afterward, Mr. Obama appeared in the foyer of the White House to declare that “orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now.” He did not press Mr. Mubarak directly to resign, but Mr. Mubarak’s loyalists clearly interpreted it that way. The next day, government supporters were bused into the square and changed what had been a largely peaceful process in a day of rage, stone-throwing, clubbing and arrests, the most violent so far.
By Friday, it was clear that Mr. Mubarak would not go gently, which led to the third iteration of the White House policy. In private, the administration worked to peel away Mr. Mubarak’s key supporters in the Egyptian elite. His defense minister, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, went into Tahrir Square, ostensibly to inspect the troops there, but largely to associate himself with the protesters.
His appearance, along with a visit to the square by Amr Moussa, the head of the Arab League and a former Egyptian foreign minister under Mr. Mubarak, created the impression of the Egyptian leader’s increasing isolation.
Mr. Obama also tried talking about Mr. Mubarak differently, almost in the past tense. He described him as a man who had made “that psychological break” and urged him to ask himself, “How do I leave a legacy behind in which Egypt is able to get through this transformative period?”
Administration officials say that in phone calls and e-mails from the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon, they have urged a “council of elders” in Egypt to begin drafting revisions to the Constitution that could be sped through Parliament, while encouraging Mr. Suleiman to jump-start conversations with an array of opposition leaders, including the Muslim Brotherhood, from which some of Al Qaeda’s leadership emerged.
“We are not trying to be prescriptive,” a senior Obama adviser said on Saturday. “The Egyptian leadership knows what it needs to do, and they don’t need us to lay it out in detail.”