Quote:
Originally Posted by
excon
Hello again, Steve:
I can mount a legal argument with anybody. Scalia, in this case, makes it easy. He has a sharp legal mind. It's just pointed in the wrong direction...
In this case, he argues against the decision because it's based on what others perceive as changes in our society. He sees no change as it relates to the Constitution and thereby dissented against the decision.
If I argued the case with nothing more than the bare facts presented here, I'd ask where in the Constitution does it say NOW, or where did it say it longer than 15 years ago, that we could execute children?
You should probably read his argument entirely before making those arguments. He does discuss the "changes in our society," but he doesn't believe - correctly - that 18 states is a "consensus." Do you?
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In determining that capital punishment of offenders who committed murder before age 18 is "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment, the Court first considers, in accordance with our modern (though in my view mistaken) jurisprudence, whether there is a "national consensus," ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted), that laws allowing such executions contravene our modern "standards of decency,"1 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958). We have held that this determination should be based on "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction"--namely, "statutes passed by society's elected representatives." tanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, 370 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). As in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 312 (2002), the Court dutifully recites this test and claims halfheartedly that a national consensus has emerged since our decision in Stanford, because 18 States--or 47% of States that permit capital punishment--now have legislation prohibiting the execution of offenders under 18, and because all of four States have adopted such legislation since Stanford. See ante, at 11.
Words have no meaning if the views of less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus. See Atkins, supra, at 342-345 (Scalia, J. dissenting). Our previous cases have required overwhelming opposition to a challenged practice, generally over a long period of time...
Of course, the real force driving today's decision is not the actions of four state legislatures, but the Court's " ' "own judgment" ' " that murderers younger than 18 can never be as morally culpable as older counterparts. Ante, at 9 (quoting Atkins, 536 U. S. at 312 (in turn quoting Coker, 433 U. S. at 597 (plurality opinion))). The Court claims that this usurpation of the role of moral arbiter is simply a "retur[n] to the rul[e] established in decisions predating Stanford," ante, at 9. That supposed rule--which is reflected solely in dicta and never once in a holding that purports to supplant the consensus of the American people with the Justices' views7--was repudiated in Stanford for the very good reason that it has no foundation in law or logic. If the Eighth Amendment set forth an ordinary rule of law, it would indeed be the role of this Court to say what the law is. But the Court having pronounced that the Eighth Amendment is an ever-changing reflection of "the evolving standards of decency" of our society, it makes no sense for the Justices then to prescribe those standards rather than discern them from the practices of our people. On the evolving-standards hypothesis, the only legitimate function of this Court is to identify a moral consensus of the American people. By what conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the Nation? 8
The reason for insistence on legislative primacy is obvious and fundamental: " '[I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.'...
In other words, all the Court has done today, to borrow from another context, is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out its friends.
Your turn.