[excon]

Hello:

If gay marriage were left up to the states, would a gay couple married in a state where it was legal, be married if they moved to a state where it wasn't legal?

excon

[Synnen]

Well, when something which was determined from state to state--like, say, slavery--was in effect, the state one was VISITING had to honor the home state's laws on it.

However, if you actually move to a new state, and their laws are different, I would think that you'd be subject to the laws of the state you are a resident in.

At least--that's the way it worked with slavery.

[Fr_Chuck]

Not automatically, for example now in those states that allow marriage, other states normally don't reconise this.

The same with gay marriage or plural marriage from other nations, Normal marriage is honored and reconised from other nations for couples that move to the US, but gay relationships are not reconised by Immigration

Some states have already specificly listed this as not valid marriage, as in marriage is between a mon and women only.

The poor wording of some states laws are actually how gay marriage has been forced in by the courts already in some states.

So it will be a state by state issue, and state by state court battle.

On a Federal level there is no right to marriage for anyone and no national marriage laws.

[inthebox]

EX


I have to wonder about your obsession with gay marriage :confused:;)




G&P

[tomder55]

Although the courts have ruled that the full faith and credit clause does not apply to the State's right to define marriage (many states do not recognize marriages from other states regarding issues like age of consent) . I have held the position that the clause ultimately means that the issue will have to be decided by a national amendment one way or other .
Here is the math... 38 states are needed for an amendment and 39 states have DOMA like laws. There is also a national DOMA law that has yet to be ruled unconstitutional .

I suspect that a same sex couple married in a state allowing it will move to a DOMA state and eventually a challenge will make it to SCOTUS . I do not know how they would rule. But the losing side would then move aggressively to get an amendment moving . I do not know for sure the ultimate outcome, but I am under no illusions about the probable result.

[excon]

I have to wonder about your obsession with gay marriage :confused:;)

Hello in:

You can't understand someone supporting gay rights if they're not gay. I can't understand someone NOT supporting gay rights if they're an American. I don't own a gun, but I support your right to own one. I'm not black, but I worked tirelessly for their freedoms too.

You see, in my view, if ONE group isn't free, then MY group is NEXT. Yours too, only you don't know it, or you're just fine with it... I have to wonder about your lack of obsession for our freedoms.

excon

[inthebox]

Hello in:

You can't understand someone supporting gay rights if they're not gay. I can't understand someone NOT supporting gay rights if they're an American. I don't own a gun, but I support your right to own one. I'm not black, but I worked tirelessly for their freedoms too.

You see, in my view, if ONE group isn't free, then MY group is NEXT. Yours too, only you don't know it, or you're just fine with it.... I have to wonder about your lack of obsession for our freedoms.

excon

Where are your posts or threads on the rights of the unborn?




G&P

[excon]

Where are your posts or threads on the rights of the unborn?

Hello again, in:

You can own a gun without trampling on the rights of others... You can enjoy your right not be searched without a warrant, or enjoy your right to habeas corpus, ALL without infringing on the rights of others...

Those are easy calls. Abortion isn't. The rights of the unborn conflict with the rights of the mother. As a society, we've decided to support the mother at the expense of the offspring. Therefore, Constitutionally, the unborn doesn't have legal rights, and I don't support giving them any. It isn't an easy call.

People who have been born, like gay people DO have rights, and I'm going to do what I can to see that they get 'em.

excon

[tomder55]

It isn't an easy call.

It is true that there is no clear language on the issue in the Constitution .My own view is that the founders "intent" was that based on the language in the preamble.. the right to live trumps the right to "choice" .But that is certainly open to a constitutional debate.

Since there is no clear language ,then the next best thing was for SCOTUS to refuse to decide on the issue and to let it remain a federalism issue. There is where the big error occurred ;and most likely why it is still a raging issue in the country. It was the SCOTUS overreach(as they have done so often in the past) that created the controversy .If there were to be a national decision on the issues it should've come from Congress and the President ;or by amendment.

[tomder55]

Update :

The Justice Department has moved to dismiss the first gay marriage case filed in federal court, saying it is not the right venue to tackle legal questions raised by a couple already married in California.

The motion argued the case of Arthur Smelt and Christopher Hammer does not address the right of gay couples to marry but rather questions whether their marriage must be recognized nationwide by states that have not approved gay marriage.

"This case does not call upon the Court to pass judgment ... on the legal or moral right of same-sex couples, such as plaintiffs here, to be married," ..."Plaintiffs are married, and their challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") poses a different set of questions."


The Obama Justice Dept .said Smelt and Hammer seek a ruling on "whether by virtue of their marital status they are constitutionally entitled to acknowledgment of their union by states that do not recognize same-sex marriage, and whether they are similarly entitled to certain federal benefits.

Under the law binding on this Court, the answer to these questions must be no."

In other words;the Obama administration is defending the Constitutionality of DOMA .[ Amazingly ;many of the arguments heard here and dismissed about incest and marrying children are in the Obama's Justice Dept. motion. ]

The courts have followed this principle, moreover, in relation to the validity of marriages performed in other States. Both the First and Second Restatements of Conflict of Laws recognize that State courts may refuse to give effect to a marriage, or to certain incidents of a marriage, that contravene the forum State's policy. See Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 134; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 284.5 And the courts have widely held that certain marriages performed elsewhere need not be given effect, because they conflicted with the public policy of the forum. See, e.g., Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728-29 (Conn. 1961) (marriage of uncle to niece, "though valid in Italy under its laws, was not valid in Connecticut because it contravened the public policy of th[at] state"); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 67-68 (N.J. 1958) (marriage of 16-year-old female held invalid in New Jersey, regardless of validity in Indiana where performed, in light of N.J. policy reflected in statute permitting adult female to secure annulment of her underage marriage); In re Mortenson's Estate, 316 P.2d 1106 (Ariz. 1957) (marriage of first cousins held invalid in Arizona, though lawfully performed in New Mexico, given Arizona policy reflected in statute declaring such marriages "prohibited and void").

The fact that States have long had the authority to decline to give effect to marriages performed in other States based on the forum State's public policy strongly supports the constitutionality of Congress's exercise of its authority in DOMA.

Obama's Motion to Dismiss Marriage case

[excon]

Hello again, tom:

The contract of marriage is, like all other contracts, a voluntary act. The capacity of the parties to enter into such contract are determined, therefore, by the law of the place where the marriage ceremony is performed. The general rule is that a marriage good where entered into is good anywhere.

The question of the validity of a marriage valid where entered into, in a state where such marriage would have been prohibited, was discussed at length in the case of Van Voorhis vs. Brintnall,3 the decision in which case was in part as follows:

3 86 N. Y. 18.

"That question involves the civil status acquired by Barker Van Voorhis and Ida by the marriage in Connecticut. First, it is a general rule of law that a contract entered into in another State or country, if valid according to the law of that place, is valid everywhere (The King of Spain vs. Machado, 4 Russ. 225; Potter vs. Brown, 5 East, 130; Story's Conflict of Laws, Sec. 242); and this, says Kent (2 Com. 454), 'is jure gentium, and by tacit assent,' and Lord Brougham in Warrender vs. Warrender (2 Cl. & Fin. 529, 530), declares that the courts of the country where the question arises resort to the law of the country where the contract was made, not ex comitati, but ex debito justitiae. And coming to the case in hand, the rule recognizes as valid a marriage considered valid in the place where celebrated. (Story's Conflict of Laws, Sec. 69, 79; Connelly vs. Connelly, 2 Eng. L. & Eq. 570.) 'We all know,' say the court in that case, 'that in questions of marriage contract, the lex loci contractus is that which is to determine the status of the parties,' and also declare that this by consent of all nations is gentium. In Dalrymple vs. Dalrymple (2 Hagg. Const. 54), it was held that a marriage good in Scotland, though otherwise by the law of England, is valid in that country; and this was put upon the ground that the rights of the parties must be tried by reference to the law of the country where they originated. In Scrimshire vs. Scrimshire (2 Hagg. Const. 395), the same principle is stated in different words. The court say, 'All parties contracting gain a forum in the place where the contract is entered into.' (Warrender vs. Warrender, supra; Lacon vs. Higgins, 1 Dow. & Ry. 38; Butler vs. Freeman, 1 Amb. 303.) Not only is this the result of English decisions, but is believed to state the principle upon which the courts of many of our sister States have acted (Greenwood vs. Curtis, 6 Mass. 358; Medway vs. Needham, 16 id. 157; Parton vs. Hervey, 1 Gray, 119; Putnam vs. Putnam, 8 Pick. 433; son vs. son, 1 Yerg. 110; Stevenson vs. Gray, 17 B. Monr. 193; Fornshill vs. Murray, 1 Bland. Ch. 479); and by which our own, with few exceptions, have been governed. In Decouche vs. Savetier (3 Johns. Ch. 210), Chancellor Kent says: 'There is no doubt of the general principle that the rights dependent upon nuptial contracts are to be determined by the lex loci.' In Cropsy vs. Ogden (11 N. Y. 228), Johnson, J. says (p. 236): 'By the universal practice of civilized nations the permission or prohibition of particular marriages of right belongs to the country where the marriage is to be celebrated.' The court had before it the case of one who, having a former wife living, from whom he then had been divorced for adultery by him committed, married a second time in this State. His last marriage was held to be void under our statute prohibiting a second or other subsequent marriage of any person 'during the life-time of any former husband or wife of such person.' There the former marriage, his adultery, and the existence of his first wife established the condition or quality of the man. They were facts in his history, and brought him within the terms of our law. The general rule above stated was applied. The lex loci governed. But the court said it was not necessary for them to consider what would have been the effect of a marriage celebrated out of this State. Its attention was, however, directly brought to the statute relating to marriages, and the circumstances under which the remarks above quoted, and others seeming to discriminate between a marriage in this State and out of it, were made, render them the more significant. In Hoviland vs. Halstead (34 N. Y. 643), a person divorced for the same offense in this State promised in New Jersey to marry the plaintiff. He married another and an action for the breach of this promise was brought here and failed. The parties resided in this State and contemplated the performance of the contract here. The court carefully distinguish the case so presented from one where a marriage had taken place in a foreign State. They assume that the latter would be treated as valid, although the parties had gone there with intent to evade the laws of this State, and citing Medway vs. Needham (supra), say, the doctrine 'in favor of marriage so contracted is founded on principles of policy to prevent the great inconvenience and cruelty of bastardizing the issue of such marriages, and to avoid the public mischief which would result from the loose state in which people so situated would live.' Indeed the general doctrine is so well settled by the decisions of all courts and the reiteration of text writers as to become a maxim in the law, that one rule in these cases should be followed by all countries; that is, the law of the country where the contract is made. (Story, supra, 84; 2 Kent's Com. 91 - 92.) There are no doubt exceptions to this rule; cases, first of incest or polygamy coming within the prohibitions of natural law (Wightman vs. Wight-man, 4 Johns. Ch. 343; Hutchins vs. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 133; Story, supra, Sec. 113 a [7th ed.]); second, of prohibition by positive law. It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the judgment may be upheld upon the ground that the marriage is one of the latter class. The assertion, however, is left unsupported by argument or the citation of authorities. Its truth is not so self evident as to dispense with either, and the omission, coupled with our own examination, leads us to think that the courts have not yet spoken with a controlling voice in its favor. It is to be maintained if at all upon the prohibition in the judgment of divorce already referred to and the provisions of the statute which made the judgment proper. (Graves vs. Graves, 2 Paige, 62.) The question is not one of ethics or morality, but the extent of the authority of the statute as a rule of conduct. As a direct inquiry it is here for the first time. There are dicta and expressions having relation to it in Cropsey vs. Ogden, and Haviland vs. Halstead (supra), tending to confine the effect of the statutory prohibition and declaration of invalidity to second marriages within this State; but in neither case was the precise question before the court for judgment. In other courts of this State it has met with differing answers. In the Supreme Court, first department, Marshall vs. Marshall (2 Hun. 238), by a divided court, and Thorpe vs. Thorpe (Superior Court of New York City), following it, a marriage under similar circumstances was held void. The judgment now before us went upon the principle of stare decisis, the court below also following Marshall vs. Marshall (supra); Kerrison vs. Kerrison, Special Term, fourth department (8 Abb. N. C, 444), and Matter of Webb (1 Tucker, 372, [Surr. Ct.]) are to the contrary. To the latter class may be added Pons-ford vs. Johnson, before Nelson and Betts, J. J. (2 Blatchf. 51). These decisions are irreconcilable, and any determination reached by us must overrule one class or the other. We are therefore at liberty to treat the subject as res integra, unaffected by any paramount authority, although greatly assisted by the reasoning of the learned judges who have taken part in those judgments.

Need I say more?

excon

[tomder55]

Sorry ; even NY there are exceptions to the Van Voorhis v. Brintnall case .

Like

The PEOPLE of the State of N.Y v.Gregory EZEONU

Generally, a marriage is recognized in New York if it is valid where consummated. (Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18). However, it is well established that this general rule does not apply where recognition of a marriage is repugnant to public policy.

That has been the standard throughout the country . That is why polygamy is not allowed throughout the country even though other nations allow it. That is why states can and do have different laws regarding incest
(in some states cousins can marry ) and age of consent provisions. States with DOMA laws have determined that same sex marriage is repugnant to public policy.

[cozyk]

Need I say more?

Excon[/QUOTE]

Please, do not say more. Reading legaleeze is as bad as reading the bible. Gives me a head ache. And when I'm done, I don't really know what I read. But, I will trust you that it was pertinent to your stand. And I'm usually standing in the same place.:)