[greatodie]

The body is somewhat a dormant slave of the mind, the mind has its own frequency of working its through thoughts and the environment that's around the body.
At a certain level the mind has free play when we don't think about it!

[Akoue]

the body is somewhat a dormant slave of the mind, the mind has its own frequency of working its through thoughts and the environment that's around the body.
at a certain level the mind has free play when we don't think about it!

I'm not sure what this means.

[Akoue]

Okay. After checking definitions at Wikipedia, I think I can say I am talking about "weak emergence." So, for example, the simple attraction between two masses we know as gravity doesn't immediately suggest stars with systems of orbiting planets and moons, which appear to be engineered, but in fact that is what you get. Planetary orbitals are an emergent property of moving masses in space that are interacting with one another. I'm sure there's a more elegant way to say this.

If you look at a section of an impressionist painting up close, you see patches of color that have no pattern or meaning. But if you step back and look at the whole painting from several feet away, a beautiful image emerges. No matter how much time you spend going over the painting with a magnifying glass, you are unlikely to see the whole picture unless you study it at the correct level of complexity.

Often, when we look at a the behavior of, say, five different molecules in a cell, we don't see what role they play in the whole body over the course of a lifetime--in other words, how they interact with all the other molecules and cells in the body to create higher orders of function and pattern. The same is true of genes.

For example, the hungtingtin gene, whose mutant allele causes Huntington's Disease is expressed in cells all over the body. As far as anyone knows, Huntington's is a disease of the brain. What does the protein huntingtin do in these other cells? Does it matter if it's the mutant form or not in these other cells? I'm digressing here and arguing for complexity, but it's related to emergent properties. Simple rules that govern the interactions of simple objects can lead to complex properties.

Consider the moon's influence on the tides. The moon's gravity pulls on our oceans. Daily changes in water level affect the ecology and evolution of intertidal animals and seaweeds in ways that can only be studied by looking at these communities. (Most of these organisms would not even exist if we had no moon.) If you brought them into the lab and studied them individually--or ground them up and looked at their constituent molecules--you would never be able to decide why they do the things they do, let alone THAT they do them. To find out what they do and why, you need to study them do in situ-- at least for a time.

If anyone has got this far, here's your reward, flocking starlings in Rome.
YouTube - Mesmerizing Starlings - Rome

The pattern of their movements -- as a flock -- is an emergent property of their individual interactions with one another. No single bird is responsible for the pattern--which is neither random nor hierarchically imposed by a leader. Yet there is a pattern that is based on simple interactions between each bird and those immediately nearby it.

Cells in developing embryos behave in similar ways, adjusting their movements and differentiation according to who is nearby and thereby creating beautiful and functional forms.

In the movie below, you can see individual cells marked with different colored dyes moving into the interior of a ball of cells in a process called gastrulation. These embryos are not human, but human embryos also gastrulate, which is the first stage in the formation of layers of tissues. All animals and plants are made of layers of tissues, which are an emergent property of groups of cells.

Notice that all the red cells disappear into the interior of the embryo.
http://academic.reed.edu/biology/pro.../spider-05.mov

Edit: To clarify, two things are occurring here. The cells are dividing so that there are more and more smaller and smaller cells, and they are also "invaginating" into the interior of the ball of cells to form the gastrula. There is no one gene that directs this process. It's the product of individual interactions among cells. (In fact, some eggs can get pretty far in development without any nuclear DNA at all.)

This is all really helpful. I must confess, however--and I'm not doing this to be a jerk--I'm not quite sure how this maps on to mental states. I get that you take the mind or mentality to be an emergent property, but I'm not quite seeing how my belief that 2+2=4 is analogous to a flock of birds. Or rather, I think I get it if I squint my eyes so that things become blurry. But when I open them wide again I feel a bit confused. I have the sense that you've laid all the pieces right out in front of me but that I'm not quite able to see how they fit together.

BTW, I know that you're not saying that my belief that 2+2=4 is like a flock of birds. What I meant to get at with that is that I'm having difficulty connecting your really nice discussion of emergent properties with determinate mental states. I just wanted to make sure it doesn't seem like I'm trying to be snotty. Right now it all looks to me like a really cool metaphor. But still a metaphor.

[asking]

This is all really helpful. I must confess, however--and I'm not doing this to be a jerk--I'm not quite sure how this maps on to mental states. I get that you take the mind or mentality to be an emergent property, but I'm not quite seeing how my belief that 2+2=4 is analogous to a flock of birds. Or rather, I think I get it if I squint my eyes so that things become blurry. But when I open them wide again I feel a bit confused. I have the sense that you've laid all the pieces right out in front of me but that I'm not quite able to see how they fit together.

BTW, I know that you're not saying that my belief that 2+2=4 is like a flock of birds. What I meant to get at with that is that I'm having difficulty connecting your really nice discussion of emergent properties with determinate mental states. I just wanted to make sure it doesn't seem like I'm trying to be snotty. Right now it all looks to me like a really cool metaphor. But still a metaphor.

Could we use some other mental state besides 2 +2 = 4? How about your intention to have a tuna sandwich tomorrow? It would help me to have an array of examples so that I know what you mean by "determinate mental states." Right now, I don't really know what is and isn't "determinate" in your view.

I can't offer a mechanism because (a) I'm not a neuroscientist and don't follow all this. Stuff and (b) I'm not sure anyone really knows at this point. I supect though that if I went and did some digging I could come up with some examples of what I mean. I'm for hire as a researcher. :)

This really just an opinion. I'm telling you want I think is how it will turn out based on my half a lifetime of thinking about biology. I'm moderately confident that I'm right and I guess I'd say it's closer to a model than a metaphor. It's not LIKE an emergent property. It is one.

I gave flocking birds and migrating cells as examples of emergence so that you could better understand what emergent properties are, since you seemed skeptical and doubtful about even their existence. They are simply understanding things at a higher order of organization.

[Akoue]

Could we use some other mental state besides 2 +2 = 4? How about your intention to have a tuna sandwich tomorrow? It would help me to have an array of examples so that I know what you mean by "determinate mental states." Right now, I don't really know what is and isn't "determinate" in your view.

I can't offer a mechanism because (a) I'm not a neuroscientist and don't follow all this. stuff and (b) I'm not sure anyone really knows at this point. I supect though that if I went and did some digging I could come up with some examples of what I mean. I'm for hire as a researcher. :)

This really just an opinion. I'm telling you want I think is how it will turn out based on my half a lifetime of thinking about biology. I'm moderately confident that I'm right and I guess I'd say it's closer to a model than a metaphor. It's not LIKE an emergent property. It is one.

I gave flocking birds and migrating cells as examples of emergence so that you could better understand what emergent properties are, since you seemed skeptical and doubtful about even their existence. They are simply understanding things at a higher order of organization.

I definitely don't want you to spend time digging around for neurosciencey stuff. I am perfectly happy to accede to your far greater expertise with regard to the biology of all this. (In fact, it's one of the reasons you're fun to talk to about this.) And I don't want to quarrel with the existence of emergent properties. I thought your post about this made a lot of sense (hence the "greenie"). It's just that the more I think about that post the less I feel I understand how it maps on to the mental. I am entirely open to the possibility that the fault for this is my own. But there it is; I appear to be a bit stuck.

Oh, and on the determinate mental states thing. Yes, by all means, use whatever example you like. 2+2=4 was just the one that popped into my head and so I've been working with it (and probably beating it to death). Let's go with the intention to eat a tuna sandwich. By a determinate mental state I just mean a mental state that has some specific content. The belief that 2+2=4, say, or the intention to eat a tuna sandwich tomorrow. I'm afraid I inadvertently got jargonny on you. I don't think anything hangs on the use of the word "determinate" as I've been thinking of it.

So, using a better example, can you sketch, even roughly, how you see the stuff about emergent properties giving us a way to think about a mental state? I promise I will treat anything you say as provisional. And I really don't expect you to come armed with lots of neuroscience. I'm just looking for a better understanding of the way you see this stuff fitting together.

[asking]

I will think about a mechanism. I guess that's what you are asking, but I doubt I can come up with anything without a serious dip into the neuro/mind literature, which I have basically avoided as it has some of the same flaws (in my opinion) as the cosmological.

I don't even know what you mean by "a better way to think about a mental state." Is there a way to think about it already? What exactly should I be thinking about mental states? Why should I think about them. I'm happy to have one!

I really don't know what you are after if not a specific mechanism for how a particular combination of neurons firing and not firing produces a specific memory or intention. I know there's research in this area... An actual mechanism for the mind is the stuff of real experiments, not thought experiments as far as I know. There will be simple rules that, when they are operating in large sections of the brain, will produce understanding, knowing, intention. There is already research on inspiration, which I found very interesting.

[asking]

It's just that the more I think about that post the less I feel I understand how it maps on to the mental. I am entirely open to the possibility that the fault for this is my own. But there it is; I appear to be a bit stuck.

I have given this a bit more thought and I will sleep on it, but what I'm thinking right now is that your understanding of "mental" is quite philosophical and abstract, and probably derived from centuries of thought in the absence of anything tangible to hinge the concept on beyond the bare existence of a brain. Whereas I'm talking (extremely vaguely) about something concrete and physical. I think even if I had a concrete answer to your question, which I don't, we might be having some of the same problems we are having with the species question. Just a thought.

[tonyrey]

tonyrey
The two kinds of moral distinctions were intended to answer this question. Those that are universal among social animals are, I think, basically hard wired. Or perhaps some combination of hard wired and learned. This is an important distinction. Our tendency to learn language is hard wired; the specific language we learn as infants is learned. Likewise our tendency to learn to walk at age two is hard wired;our style of walking as adults is partly learned.

On the other hand, proscriptions against eating certain foods or wearing certain clothes are clearly "social conventions," although I think that is a rather weak way to put it. Cultural mandates are much stronger than the word "convention" suggests. But perhaps you were engaging in some rhetorical play.

As for your assertion that animals' sense of fair play is "rudimentary" compared to ours, I don't think there's any evidence for that.

Here are some of the 10 commandments.
Either they are social conventions OR you will get into trouble if you do something different*, whether you are a human being or a chimpanzee. I put a star next to the ones that would cause trouble in a troop of chimpanzees.

Both animals and humans sometimes do them anyway. We have proscriptions against these sorts of things because we humans often do them and they cause social disruption. We do not have proscriptions against things that we never do or which do not cause social disruption.

11 For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that is in them, but rested the seventh day; therefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day and consecrated it. (By social agreement only.)

*12 Honor your father and your mother, so that your days may be long in the land that the Lord your God is giving you.

*13 You shall not kill

*14 You shall not commit adultery. (You shall not be near a female in heat when an alpha male or his buddies are nearby.)

*15 You shall not steal.

*16 You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour.

*17 You shall not covet your neighbour’s house; you shall not covet your neighbour’s wife, or male or female slave, or ox, or donkey, or anything that belongs to your neighbour.

Why are animals not considered responsible for their behaviour? Isn't that evidence that animals' sense of fair play is "rudimentary" compared to ours? Do you believe all our thoughts, values and decisions are ultimately determined by our heredity and environment?

The dichotomy that the ten commandments are "either social conventions OR you will get into trouble if you do something different" is invalid. They are both. They are social conventions based on facts about co-existence. We ignore them at our peril. Morality also includes proscriptions against things which do not necessarily cause social disruption. It is concerned with the welfare and happiness of the individual. The first commandment, for example, is intended to avert the dangers of idolatry: obsession with false gods like power and wealth, and above all "egolatry" - the worship of oneself.

[tonyrey]

I don't get how this follows. Even if we accept your premise that the primary givens aren't extra-mental objects but rather mental states themselves, it doesn't follow from this that we have no purchase on the nature of (extra-mental) reality.

Let me put it another way. If the mind is simply the functioning of the brain then "truth", "goodness", "freedom", "justice", "purpose" and "love" are mere symbols that refer to nothing. (Bertrand Russell could not evade the reality of "similarity" and concluded materialism must be false). If the mind itself is not an intangible reality why believe in other intangible realities? How can a physical organ like the brain grasp abstractions?

The hypothesis that everything is physical is self-destructive because it leads to total scepticism: it presupposes the ability to arrive at the truth (which is non-existent!)...

[tonyrey]

I will think about a mechanism. I guess that's what you are asking, but I doubt I can come up with anything without a serious dip into the neuro/mind literature, which I have basically avoided as it has some of the same flaws (in my opinion) as the cosmological.

I don't even know what you mean by "a better way to think about a mental state." Is there a way to think about it already? What exactly should I be thinking about mental states? Why should I think about them. I'm happy to have one!

I really don't know what you are after if not a specific mechanism for how a particular combination of neurons firing and not firing produces a specific memory or intention. I know there's research in this area... An actual mechanism for the mind is the stuff of real experiments, not thought experiments as far as I know. There will be simple rules that, when they are operating in large sections of the brain, will produce understanding, knowing, intention. There is already research on inspiration, which I found very interesting.

If the mind is a biological machine all its activity is the result of physical events. If this is the case we cannot choose what to think nor are we responsible for anything we do! According to this hypothesis there is no guarantee that any of our thoughts correspond to reality...

[asking]

Why are animals not considered responsible for their behaviour? Isn't that evidence that animals' sense of fair play is "rudimentary" compared to ours? Do you believe all our thoughts, values and decisions are ultimately determined by our heredity and environment?

The dichotomy that the ten commandments are "either social conventions OR you will get into trouble if you do something different" is invalid. They are both. They are social conventions based on facts about co-existence. We ignore them at our peril. Morality also includes proscriptions against things which do not necessarily cause social disruption. It is concerned with the welfare and happiness of the individual. The first commandment, for example, is intended to avert the dangers of idolatry: obsession with false gods like power and wealth, and above all "egolatry" - the worship of oneself.

I think to the extent that we incorporate animals into our lives we do hold them responsible for their behavior. Don't you hold your dog responsible for bad behavior such as biting? One of the reasons we like dogs is that they play by the same kinds of rules that we do. If we take the time we teach our pets and work animals what the rules are, they mostly abide by those.

The talk about human superiority in moral affairs is basically hot air. We have always been prone to setting ourselves above others, whether it is our next door neighbors, our colleagues at work, another nation, slaves, or animals. We are constantly looking for ways in which we are different and special. Talk about egolatry.

In any case, the extent to which WE hold animals responsible is not a measure of THEIR sense of fair play.

I don't think of my own thoughts as being predetermined in any final sense, if that is where you are going. But my thoughts will certainly trend in different ways depending on what species** I am, my particular genetic makeup, my development in the womb and as an infant, and my experiences throughout life.(** If I see an ant, I do not suddenly start thinking about dinner, as a pangolin might.)

For example, recent research shows that children who are abused have a permanently altered reaction to stress***. That change is going to alter someone's feelings and therefore their thoughts. No amount of willpower is going to make that alteration in feelings and thoughts go away entirely, although, I'm guessing, there are things that can be done to mitigate it. The brain is plastic. Plus, there is the matter of behavior, which is separate from thoughts. We hold people responsible for what they do, not for every passing thought or stress reaction.

So I guess I would say the dichotomy between determinate behavior and freewill is a false one and, for my purposes, unimportant. We are what we are, regardless of how you want to frame it philosophically.

Of course the dichotomy between social convention and *get you into trouble in a troop of chimps* is exaggerated. A sin can very much be both. But the things to which we object chimps object to too. A sin for us is a sin for them (with the obvious exception of things they wouldn't ever do, like painting icons or not covering their heads on the sabbath). And they ignore them at their peril (constantly, like us).

Furthermore, animals have culture. Populations of different kinds of social animals from elephants to apes whose societies have been disrupted by disaster or heavy hunting show a breakdown in social rules, not unlike the kind you see in humans. It's very difficult to lose elders with wisdom or the stability that comes with intact social structures. It leads to the loss of social codes that contribute to stability, happiness, mutual support, prosperity, and good health. All of these things are as important to other animals as they are for us.

***

Abuse Leaves Its Mark on the Brain

By Constance Holden
ScienceNOW Daily News
23 February 2009

Child abuse doesn't just cause emotional problems; it also causes long-lasting changes in the brain. A new study shows that in men who were abused as children, a gene involved in stress control is affected even decades later, following a pattern also seen in stressed baby rats.

Rat studies have revealed that maternal neglect alters the workings of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, a system that secretes particular hormones in response to stress (ScienceNOW, 2 August 2004). In the abused animals, the regulatory region of a gene for the glucocorticoid receptor, responsible for damping down the HPA response, doesn't do its job properly. As a result, the animals experience chronically higher stress levels.

[asking]

How can a physical organ like the brain grasp abstractions?

For example.
(This was the first hit in a Google search.)

Researchers home in on how brain handles abstract thought
Donna Coveney, News Office
July 18, 2001

MIT researchers reported in the June 21 issue of Nature that they have pinpointed how and where abstract thoughts are represented in the brain.

The study, in which monkeys apply rules about "same" and "different" to a myriad of images, shows that the prefrontal cortex -- the part of the brain directly behind the eyes -- works on the abstract assignment rather than simply recalling the pictures.

In other words, the MIT researchers have identified the part of the brain that figures out the rules of the game, but does not play the game. Most previous brain research has uncovered brain regions that perform concrete tasks, such as recognizing places or moving muscles.

Researchers home in on how brain handles abstract thought - MIT News Office

[asking]

If the mind is a biological machine all its activity is the result of physical events. If this is the case we cannot choose what to think nor are we responsible for anything we do! According to this hypothesis there is no guarantee that any of our thoughts correspond to reality...

First, I don't buy the dichotomy that we are either responsible for everything we do or responsible for nothing.

Second, it doesn't follow that because we are biological "machines" we have no choices and do not make decisions. If a dog has a choice between getting up on the sofa where he's not supposed to be or staying on the carpet, we certainly can give ourselves no less credit for responsible behavior. The fact that we can make decisions does not prove that we are non physical beings.

A robot can make decisions. Ours are just more nuanced.

I don't get your point about thoughts and reality. Do you feel that a non material mind is more in touch with reality than a materially based mind?

As for our ability to choose what to think, I think the part of the brain that enforces inhibition is a good contrary argument. People with Tourettes have brains that don't function quite right and--depending on what kind of Tourettes they have--cannot inhibit their own thoughts and impulses to say inappropriate things as most people can. Unless you are arguing that Tourettes is a moral failing, I don't see how you can not accept that inhibition is physically mediated.

[tonyrey]

I think to the extent that we incorporate animals into our lives we do hold them responsible for their behavior. Don't you hold your dog responsible for bad behavior such as biting? One of the reasons we like dogs is that they play by the same kinds of rules that we do. If we take the time we teach our pets and work animals what the rules are, they mostly abide by those.

The talk about human superiority in moral affairs is basically hot air. We have always been prone to setting ourselves above others, whether it is our next door neighbors, our colleagues at work, another nation, slaves, or animals. We are constantly looking for ways in which we are different and special. Talk about egolatry.

In any case, the extent to which WE hold animals responsible is not a measure of THEIR sense of fair play.

I don't think of my own thoughts as being predetermined in any final sense, if that is where you are going. But my thoughts will certainly trend in different ways depending on what species** I am, my particular genetic makeup, my development in the womb and as an infant, and my experiences throughout life.(** If I see an ant, I do not suddenly start thinking about dinner, as a pangolin might.)

For example, recent research shows that children who are abused have a permanently altered reaction to stress***. That change is going to alter someone's feelings and therefore their thoughts. No amount of willpower is going to make that alteration in feelings and thoughts go away entirely, although, I'm guessing, there are things that can be done to mitigate it. The brain is plastic. Plus, there is the matter of behavior, which is separate from thoughts. We hold people responsible for what they do, not for every passing thought or stress reaction.

So I guess I would say the dichotomy between determinate behavior and freewill is a false one and, for my purposes, unimportant. We are what we are, regardless of how you want to frame it philosophically.

Of course the dichotomy between social convention and *get you into trouble in a troop of chimps* is exaggerated. A sin can very much be both. But the things to which we object to chimps do too. A sin for us is a sin for them (with the obvious exception of things they wouldn't ever do, like painting icons or not covering their heads on the sabbath). And they ignore them at their peril (constantly, like us).

Furthermore, animals have culture. Populations of different kinds of social animals from elephants to apes whose societies have been disrupted by disaster or heavy hunting show a breakdown in social rules, not unlike the kind you see in humans. It's very difficult to lose elders with wisdom or the stability that comes with intact social structures. It leads to the loss of social codes that contribute to stability, happiness, mutual support, prosperity, and good health. All of these things are as important to other animals as they are for us.

***

We don't hold animals morally responsible for their behaviour. We don't appeal to their conscience or reason with them to change the way they behave. They cannot choose to act in accordance with an abstract principle like "All animals are equal". We are not morally superior to them for the simple reason that they have no moral insight or responsibility. The false belief that we are superior to them is not egolatry but humanolatry! They are superior to us in at least one respect: they are not guilty of any premeditated crime or indeed any crime whatsoever whereas we have well nigh ruined this planet.

We are what we are, regardless of how we frame it philosophically, but robots are not held responsible for the way they function whereas we are. Why?

[tonyrey]

For example.
(This was the first hit in a google search.)


Researchers home in on how brain handles abstract thought - MIT News Office

Obviously abstract thoughts can be represented in the brain. Otherwise we would not be able to communicate them to others. But that is a far cry from grasping the meaning of abstract terms. Electrical activity alone cannot produce insight or consciousness.

[asking]

We don't hold animals morally responsible for their behaviour.

I agree. But that is our decision, not something about them. (And I guess I do hold some of them morally responsble, if you want to know the truth.)

Animals are capable of premeditated murder of their own kind, including apes. But others as well. I have seen one male mouse kill another with my own eyes. There was no shortage food or space. I say it was premeditated because I put another male mouse in and he did the same a second time. (I learned my lesson and felt awful.)

I once inadvertently put a young female hamster into a cage with several males. When I returned in the morning, she could no longer walk, was paralyzed from the waist down, and the males were still crowding around her. I had to put her out of her misery. If there was criminal court for hamsters, I would have hauled there a$$es in. Of course, they were already in jail...

We don't appeal to their conscience or reason with them to change the way they behave. They cannot choose to act in accordance with an abstract principle like "All animals are equal". We are not morally superior to them for the simple reason that they have no moral insight or responsibility. The false belief that we are superior to them is not egolatry but humanolatry! They are superior to us in at least one respect: they are not guilty of any premeditated crime or indeed any crime whatsoever whereas we have well nigh ruined this planet.

Good points, all. But you are talking about differences in our ability to communicate with words, to use abstract concepts, and our cognitive abilities. I readily grant that we are far better at those. But I think morality itself is deeper seated and a separate thing. Yes we humans can TALK about morality and (mostly unsuccessfully) appeal to people's moral sensibility. But the moral impulse was already there and, like other animals, we depart from it quite often, depending on circumstance. The argument over the difference between "murder" and "killing" is a case in point. These fine arguments are mere rationalization for doing what we know is wrong. When we find it useful to kill, we find a way to justify it. Animals just don't think about it as much. But our behavior and theirs is fundamentally the same.

We are what we are, regardless of how we frame it philosophically, but robots are not held responsible for the way they function whereas we are. Why?

Hmm.. An awful lot of people shout at computers. :)

But seriously, you keep coming back to how we view things, not how they are.

Here's how they are: If a human murders, we have a trial and put him to death or jail him indefinitely. If a dog kills, we put it down after a certain amount of due process (because it belongs to someone). If a tiger kills a human, it too is put down. If a robot killed a human, I'm sure it would be destroyed unless it was a military robot, in which case we'd make another thousand of them. So how is that functionally different? If something is sufficiently dangerous we kill it. What's different is how we talk about it.

[tonyrey]

First, I don't buy the dichotomy that we are either responsible for everything we do or responsible for nothing.

Second, it doesn't follow that because we are biological "machines" we have no choices and do not make decisions. If a dog has a choice between getting up on the sofa where he's not supposed to be or staying on the carpet, we certainly can give ourselves no less credit for responsible behavior. The fact that we can make decisions does not prove that we are non physical beings.

A robot can make decisions. Ours are just more nuanced.

I don't get your point about thoughts and reality. Do you feel that a non material mind is more in touch with reality than a materially based mind?

As for our ability to choose what to think, I think the part of the brain that enforces inhibition is a good contrary argument. People with Tourettes have brains that don't function quite right and--depending on what kind of Tourettes they have--cannot inhibit their own thoughts and impulses to say inappropriate things as most people can. Unless you are arguing that Tourettes is a moral failing, I don't see how you can not accept that inhibition is physically mediated.

If the mind has a physical basis it cannot control itself or be capable of self-determination. The fact that inability to inhibit thoughts and impulses may be due to a physical (or mental) disorder does not explain our ability to choose for ourselves. In fact the self must be an illusion if our thoughts and choices emerge from the brain because the self is an intangible entity. Where would the self be located if it had a physical basis?

Where is the control-centre in the brain? If all your thoughts are produced by the brain those that are not predetermined must be indeterminate, i.e. fortuitous. There is certainly no scope for freedom of choice because such a choice would transcend physical laws.

Robots make choices and decisions because they are programmed to do so. Similarly a dog is conditioned by its training to behave in certain ways but if it makes a decision to act differently we don't regard it as morally defective. Why are we unique in this respect?

[tonyrey]

I agree. But that is our decision, not something about them. (And I guess I do hold some of them morally responsble, if you want to know the truth.)

Animals are capable of premeditated murder of their own kind, including apes. But others as well. I have seen one male mouse kill another with my own eyes. There was no shortage food or space. I say it was premeditated because I put another male mouse in and he did the same a second time. (I learned my lesson and felt awful.)

I once inadvertently put a young female hamster into a cage with several males. When I returned in the morning, she could no longer walk, was paralyzed from the waist down, and the males were still crowding around her. I had to put her out of her misery. If there was criminal court for hamsters, I would have hauled there a$$es in. Of course, they were already in jail...



Good points, all. But you are talking about differences in our ability to communicate with words, to use abstract concepts, and our cognitive abilities. I readily grant that we are far better at those. But I think morality itself is deeper seated and a separate thing. Yes we humans can TALK about morality and (mostly unsuccessfully) appeal to people's moral sensibility. But the moral impulse was already there and, like other animals, we depart from it quite often, depending on circumstance. The argument over the difference between "murder" and "killing" is a case in point. These fine arguments are mere rationalization for doing what we know is wrong. When we find it useful to kill, we find a way to justify it. Animals just don't think about it as much. But our behavior and theirs is fundamentally the same.



Hmm.. An awful lot of people shout at computers. :)

But seriously, you keep coming back to how we view things, not how they are.

Here's how they are: If a human murders, we have a trial and put him to death or jail him indefinitely. If a dog kills, we put it down after a certain amount of due process (because it belongs to someone). If a tiger kills a human, it too is put down. If a robot killed a human, I'm sure it would be destroyed unless it was a military robot, in which case we'd make another thousand of them. So how is that functionally different? If something is sufficiently dangerous we kill it. What's different is how we talk about it.

https://www.askmehelpdesk.com/images...s/rolleyes.gif
:rolleyes:
I find your experiments fascinating but sometimes gruesome. :rolleyes:

I agree that "morality itself is deeper seated and a separate thing" and "the moral impulse was already there". (Where? ):eek:

I do keep coming back to how we view things but I don't think humanity is all that misguided. The success of science is evidence of our insight into reality. In fact the onus is on the sceptic or cynic to explain why, for example, the UN Declaration of Human Rights contains no more than convenient fictions.

The essential difference between us and animals or robots is that unlike them we kill (when we are reasonable) if we regard it as the lesser of two evils. (We may be mistaken but we're not infallible). And in some instances we may choose to be killed rather than kill. Robots could certainly be programmed to do so but animals would not do so because of a moral principle.

The main point is that in our case the buck stops with each of us individually... and that needs explanation...

[asking]

If the mind has a physical basis it cannot control itself or be capable of self-determination.

I think this statement is far from self evident.

The self must be an illusion if our thoughts and choices emerge from the brain because the self is an intangible entity. Where would the self be located if it had a physical basis?

Maybe the self is a kind of illusion, or at least simply a framework for how we behave.
The self need not be located in a single place. Do you mean the "self" is located in a particular place in the brain? That would surprise me.

Where is the control-centre in the brain?

This question assumes a hierarchical organization of the body, as well as the brain, with a single "master" in charge of everything. There is no evidence that the body works that way. Consider this: every "master switch" is also a "weak link."

If all your thoughts are produced by the brain those that are not predetermined must be indeterminate, i.e. fortuitous. There is certainly no scope for freedom of choice because such a choice would transcend physical laws.

I can't prove that any of this is wrong. But I don't think you can prove that any of it is true either. Can you support this statement?

Robots make choices and decisions because they are programmed to do so.

The more sophisticated the robot, the more sophisticated and nuanced its decisions appear to be. Can a robot pass a turing test? Not yet. But the decisions that humans make are not self evidently NOT flexibly programmed, allowing for innumerable alternatives. When you get out of bed in the morning, how many choices do you really allow yourself? We are creatures of habit, which, I'm thinking maybe, is another way of saying we are semi-programmed for most of what we do day to day.

Similarly a dog is conditioned by its training to behave in certain ways but if it makes a decision to act differently we don't regard it as morally defective.

First, a dog is not trained to love its owner and defend him against enemies. They do that of their own volition, although that's partly programmed. The dog is trained to respect its owner and to do less natural things like shake hands.

Second, again, WE may not regard the dog as morally defective. Although I've often heard "baaaad dog" which suggests you are mistaken. Either way, that's just our subjective opinion, a judgment based on what? The behavior of the dog is the same regardless of what label we decide to put on it.

Why are we unique in this respect?

I'm sorry. In what respect?

[Athos]

I think this statement is far from self evident.




Maybe the self is a kind of illusion, or at least simply a framework for how we behave.
The self need not be located in a single place. Do you mean the "self" is located in a particular place in the brain? That would surprise me.



This question assumes a hierarchical organization of the body, as well as the brain, with a single "master" in charge of everything. There is no evidence that the body works that way. Consider this: every "master switch" is also a "weak link."



I can't prove that any of this is wrong. But I don't think you can prove that any of it is true either. Can you support this statement?



The more sophisticated the robot, the more sophisticated and nuanced its decisions appear to be. Can a robot pass a turing test? Not yet. But the decisions that humans make are not self evidently NOT flexibly programmed, allowing for innumerable alternatives. When you get out of bed in the morning, how many choices do you really allow yourself? We are creatures of habit, which, I'm thinking maybe, is another way of saying we are semi-programmed for most of what we do day to day.



First, a dog is not trained to love its owner and defend him against enemies. They do that of their own volition, although that's partly programmed. The dog is trained to respect its owner and to do less natural things like shake hands.

Second, again, WE may not regard the dog as morally defective. Although I've often heard "baaaad dog" which suggests you are mistaken. Either way, that's just our subjective opinion, a judgment based on what? The behavior of the dog is the same regardless of what label we decide to put on it.


I'm sorry. In what respect?

Asking and Tonyrey - It is a pleasure to see such two fine minds at work.