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Senior Member
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Feb 27, 2012, 06:03 PM
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Originally Posted by nicholasjm
I wanted to throw in a quick definition of "supervenience" as I'm understanding the term.
Fact 1: I'm writing in an internet forum.
Fact 2: I'm using a computer.
Fact 2 is supervenient upon Fact 1. That is, 2 follows directly from 1; it's logically necessary that I am using a computer if I'm writing in an internet forum.
So physicalists believe that mental activity is supervenient upon brain activity, in the sense that one follows directly from the other. Two identical brains will have identical mental activity.
Whereas property dualists believe the opposite. Identical brains can support entirely different mental activity. I'm wondering what the reason is that property dualism gives for this.
I was thinking it might have something to do with free will. Whereas materialists would tend to assert that free will is an illusion, and that we obey strict laws like we were a chain of dominoes.
But that's what I was wondering if you could offer some perspective on, Tut. What the reasoning is that leads a property dualist to say that identical brains could produce distinct mental activity.
Also, what do you mean when you say 'over and above'? Physicalists reject PD because it's like a mind-over-matter attitude on awareness? I don't quite get what you mean, that's just my best interpretation. Mind explaining some more?
Here's a clickable version of the link I posted earlier. Pryor brings up supervenience only to show that property dualism is opposed to the idea.
Philosophy 156: Supervenience
Hi Nicholas,
I think you example of having the internet running while using your computer is an example of supervenience.
I also agree that physicalist would argue that the mind is supervenient on the brain.
Yes, from the property dualist point of view consciousness is not identical to any physical property.
As for my 'over and above' explanation for property dualism. Perhaps an analogy would help here.
A physicalist would argue that a clock is made up of molecules. That is what it's ultimate reducibility amounts to. The physicalist wants to know why the property dualist wants to talk about clocks in terms of cogs wheels and 'rectanguarness' of the hands. Nothing wrong with this except the property dualist wants to talk about these things as existing 'over and above' the molecules that make up the clock.
Tut
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New Member
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Feb 27, 2012, 08:13 PM
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I would understand 'separate', but why 'over and above'? I mean, what's the meaning of the phrase as a whole, and its constituent parts. Are we talking about something like plato's forms? Where the material world we're seeing is not the most-real world, but each object aspires to an ideal form that actually exists in some ethereal realm..
I'm thinking about Bundle Theory. I'm intrigued by this idea because it points out that we only ever talk about anything in terms of its various attributes. There's no inherent substance to anything.
But that doesn't mean those attributes are 'over and above' the object itself. Rather, there's no sense in which it's possible to talk about an object itself.
You're never actually talking about a clock; you're only ever talking about the rectangularness of its hands, or the circularness of its face, or the speed and period of its pendulum swing. Whenever you try to talk about the clock, you must do so by referencing its various properties.
But that's because of the way the mind works. It's not saying something about the objects themselves.
I'm still wondering what the property dualist's defense of that 'over and above' position is. So those are my two questions in this reply. Could you explain the meaning of 'over and above' again please? And would you mind clarifying what the reasoning is that leads a PDist to assert over-and-aboveness?
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Senior Member
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Feb 28, 2012, 02:28 PM
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Originally Posted by nicholasjm
I would understand 'separate', but why 'over and above'? I mean, what's the meaning of the phrase as a whole, and its constituent parts. Are we talking about something like plato's forms? Where the material world we're seeing is not the most-real world, but each object aspires to an ideal form that actually exists in some ethereal realm...?
I'm thinking about Bundle Theory. I'm intrigued by this idea because it points out that we only ever talk about anything in terms of its various attributes. There's no inherent substance to anything.
But that doesn't mean those attributes are 'over and above' the object itself. Rather, there's no sense in which it's possible to talk about an object itself.
You're never actually talking about a clock; you're only ever talking about the rectangularness of its hands, or the circularness of its face, or the speed and period of its pendulum swing. Whenever you try to talk about the clock, you must do so by referencing its various properties.
But that's because of the way the mind works. It's not saying something about the objects themselves.
I'm still wondering what the property dualist's defense of that 'over and above' position is. So those are my two questions in this reply. Could you explain the meaning of 'over and above' again please? And would you mind clarifying what the the reasoning is that leads a PDist to assert over-and-aboveness?
Hi nicholas,
A property can be looked at as something attributed to an object. Redness can be attributed to an apple, lipstick, a fence. Redness can be shared by many different red things. But is it something that can exist in its own right, as per Platonic forms? I don't think the property dualist is saying this. I think they are saying that redness can only ever be found in particular red things, apples, fences, etc.
If redness had a life of its own so to speak then it would be a Platonic form. In terms of dualism it would be like substance dualism. Two different substances.
Rather than looking at humans in terms of a bundle of experiences, property dualism appears to have given rise to the idea that it is possible to have two identical human beings. One human being that is conscious in the normal sense of the word and the other identical human being with no consciousness at all. In other words, a philosophical zombie.
What we end up with is a human being that has experience and another who has no experience at all but acts exactly like any other human being.
Anyway, that's how I see it.
Tut
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New Member
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Feb 28, 2012, 07:54 PM
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Right.
Do you have any idea how they come to that conclusion? What's the backup, or motivation?
I was thinking free will might be the reason for the reservation? That is, a property dualist wouldn't want to assert mental events are supervenient upon physical events because if physical events are strictly determined then there could be no freedom.
But that doesn't jive with the philosophical zombie deal. Certainly a person that has no consciousness is not going to be making choices. So that doesn't incorporate this other aspect of the property dualist argument, where they say it's possible for a brain to have no mind in it at all.
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Senior Member
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Feb 29, 2012, 06:41 PM
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Originally Posted by nicholasjm
Right.
Do you have any idea how they come to that conclusion? What's the backup, or motivation?
I was thinking free will might be the reason for the reservation? That is, a property dualist wouldn't want to assert mental events are supervenient upon physical events because if physical events are strictly determined then there could be no freedom.
But that doesn't jive with the philosophical zombie deal. Certainly a person that has no consciousness is not going to be making choices. So that doesn't incorporate this other aspect of the property dualist argument, where they say it's possible for a brain to have no mind in it at all.
Hi Nicholas
Yes I think free will comes into it. As far as the philosophical zombie is concerned, Chalmers doesn't think that zombies actually exist he says they are only metaphysically possible. There is no logical reason why God couldn't have created a world exactly like ours; minus consciousness.
Because a philosophical zombie lacks conscious experience you could also argue he has no soul. It probably follows that he also lacks free will.
If you told a philosophical zombie that he has no soul he would act hurt and offended but in reality he can't be hurt or offended. He only acts that way.
THe philolosophical zombie was invented to try and demonstrate that if philosophical zombies were logically possible then it might prove physicalism false.
Tut
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New Member
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Feb 29, 2012, 07:06 PM
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Gotcha... because according to physicalism, consciousness is supervenient upon brain activity. Logically necessitated by brain activity. So if you could have a brain with no mind, then that would mean that mental activity is not supervenient.
But of course we can't know whether it's possible for a brain to be functioning normally and also be unaware, so it's a moot point. Physicalism might still be the most proper view. This is like medieval speculation about outer space. Wild guesswork. We don't really have the ability to say anything meaningful about consciousness using philosophy.
Philosophy is good for informing our pursuit and use of knowledge (metaphysics, epistemology and ethics). It doesn't help us obtain knowledge in the first place.
I'm still wondering why property dualism argues phenomenal activity is "over and above" physical events, instead of just separate, distinct?
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Senior Member
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Mar 1, 2012, 09:21 PM
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Originally Posted by nicholasjm
Gotcha... because according to physicalism, consciousness is supervenient upon brain activity. Logically necessitated by brain activity. So if you could have a brain with no mind, then that would mean that mental activity is not supervenient.
But of course we can't know whether it's possible for a brain to be functioning normally and also be unaware, so it's a moot point. Physicalism might still be the most proper view. This is like medieval speculation about outer space. Wild guesswork. We don't really have the ability to say anything meaningful about consciousness using philosophy.
Philosophy is good for informing our pursuit and use of knowledge (metaphysics, epistemology and ethics). It doesn't help us obtain knowledge in the first place.
I'm still wondering why property dualism argues phenomenal activity is "over and above" physical events, instead of just separate, distinct?
Hi Nicholas,
This will probably do a better job of explaining property dualism.
Property Dualism - College Essays - Philpaper
I guess in the end there is no suitable definition for consciousness because no one really knows what consciousness actually is.
Tut
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New Member
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Aug 12, 2012, 12:09 AM
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It doesn't mean anything...
Were human, our existence is random and our lives are pointless. We are only an advanced breed of ape on a dying planet that belongs to a small galaxy with a medium-small sized star. If a black hole wiped us out it would effect nothing
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New Member
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Aug 16, 2012, 09:07 PM
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Well, I suppose when I am "feeling especially human"-
I feel emotions, complex senses and logical and instinctual.
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