"accepted assumptions about market efficiency mean that it is the information content of disclosure, and not the form of the disclosure, that is valued by the market. Therefore, it should not matter whether information is disclosed within the notes to the financial statements, or in the financial statements themselves."
If the above statement is true, then why would managers care if something - such as lease liability - is disclosed only in the notes, or included within the liabilities disclosed within balance sheet? Discuss this issue drawing on capital markets theory, agency theory and behavioural perspectives.

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The answers are 42, Titan, and Fully Synthetic oil in that order.

While smoothy's answer would doubtlessly be accepted as accurate by most current mainstream texts in the Western Hemisphere, it should be pointed out that there exists a school of thought---one gaining significant traction in the community of theorists---that any one of Saturn's three largest moons (by mass) would be deemed an acceptable answer to the second question*.

*(unless the corporate entity has made an election under Section 7312 of the Uniform Accounting Code to treat all meal, travel, and entertainment expenditures benefiting no fewer than 17.5% of the members of the class of exempted executives, as defined under subsection (A)(iii) therein, as deferred capital credits to be recognized over the lesser of (a) three years; (b) seven miles from Timbuktu; or (c) four quarts of chocolate-chip & mint ice cream.)

And even after all the studying I did for my MBA, CPA, CPFC, etc. I still picked (c) as the best answer. Great reply, possibly believed by some.

To answer the implicit question; managers don't care, stakeholders care. Some liabilities are future events and so can only be identified by way of note and legistators and regulators thought it a good idea that no liability be undisclosed