tomder55
Feb 15, 2022, 02:45 PM
John Mearsheimer is a Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago His essay from 2014 in Foreign Affairs magazine, entitled “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin”
Why the West is to Blame for the Ukraine Crisis | Foreign Affairs (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault)
This is a subscription .So I will summarize
The story begins with the Clintoon Administration’s NATO enlargement in the 1990’s, an expansion of more territory than French, German and Italian land mass combined. Mearsheimer cites George Kennan, an architect of the US post-war policy of Soviet containment, on NATO’s enlargement in 1998: “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it’s a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else”.
Ten years later in 2008, NATO leaders announced that Georgia and Ukraine would become members of NATO. The Russians made clear at the time that red lines had been crossed, which the US and Europeans mostly ignored.
In 2013, Carl Gershman, the president of the 'National Endowment For Democracy' working in the Ukraine to draw it into the Western orbit wrote in the Washington Post, “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin represents. Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may find himself on the losing end not just abroad but within Russia itself.”
Former Soviet states stand up to Russia. Will the U.S.? - The Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/former-soviet-states-stand-up-to-russia-will-the-us/2013/09/26/b5ad2be4-246a-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852_story.html)
In other words Putin's political future and life probably depends on preventing NATO expansion into the Ukraine .
When the Ukraine abandoned its nuclear weapons 30 years ago, the Budapest Memorandum offered Ukraine security assurances against the future use of force by the US, UK and Russia. But the Memorandum only required signatories to raise any issues with the UN Security Council; it was not a defense treaty and the US has stated in the past that it is not legally binding.
Since the 1990’s, there has been a battle between Liberalism and Realism in Western foreign policy circles on the Ukraine. Depending upon what happens now to the Ukraine, which the West has made clear it will not defend militarily , the Realists might turn out to be right. That’s why Mearsheimer concluded in his essay that some sort of “Finlandization” of the Ukraine would be a better outcome for all sides.
The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This would not mean that a future Ukrainian government would have to be pro-Russian or anti-NATO. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western camp.
To achieve this end, the United States and its allies should publicly rule out NATO’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine. The West should also help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded jointly by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, Russia, and the United States—a proposal that Moscow should welcome, given its interest in having a prosperous and stable Ukraine on its western flank. And the West should considerably limit its social-engineering efforts inside Ukraine. It is time to put an end to Western support for another Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, U.S. and European leaders should encourage Ukraine to respect minority rights, especially the language rights of its Russian speakers.
Some may argue that changing policy toward Ukraine at this late date would seriously damage U.S. credibility around the world. There would undoubtedly be certain costs, but the costs of continuing a misguided strategy would be much greater.
Why the West is to Blame for the Ukraine Crisis | Foreign Affairs (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault)
This is a subscription .So I will summarize
The story begins with the Clintoon Administration’s NATO enlargement in the 1990’s, an expansion of more territory than French, German and Italian land mass combined. Mearsheimer cites George Kennan, an architect of the US post-war policy of Soviet containment, on NATO’s enlargement in 1998: “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it’s a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else”.
Ten years later in 2008, NATO leaders announced that Georgia and Ukraine would become members of NATO. The Russians made clear at the time that red lines had been crossed, which the US and Europeans mostly ignored.
In 2013, Carl Gershman, the president of the 'National Endowment For Democracy' working in the Ukraine to draw it into the Western orbit wrote in the Washington Post, “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin represents. Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may find himself on the losing end not just abroad but within Russia itself.”
Former Soviet states stand up to Russia. Will the U.S.? - The Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/former-soviet-states-stand-up-to-russia-will-the-us/2013/09/26/b5ad2be4-246a-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852_story.html)
In other words Putin's political future and life probably depends on preventing NATO expansion into the Ukraine .
When the Ukraine abandoned its nuclear weapons 30 years ago, the Budapest Memorandum offered Ukraine security assurances against the future use of force by the US, UK and Russia. But the Memorandum only required signatories to raise any issues with the UN Security Council; it was not a defense treaty and the US has stated in the past that it is not legally binding.
Since the 1990’s, there has been a battle between Liberalism and Realism in Western foreign policy circles on the Ukraine. Depending upon what happens now to the Ukraine, which the West has made clear it will not defend militarily , the Realists might turn out to be right. That’s why Mearsheimer concluded in his essay that some sort of “Finlandization” of the Ukraine would be a better outcome for all sides.
The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This would not mean that a future Ukrainian government would have to be pro-Russian or anti-NATO. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western camp.
To achieve this end, the United States and its allies should publicly rule out NATO’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine. The West should also help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded jointly by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, Russia, and the United States—a proposal that Moscow should welcome, given its interest in having a prosperous and stable Ukraine on its western flank. And the West should considerably limit its social-engineering efforts inside Ukraine. It is time to put an end to Western support for another Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, U.S. and European leaders should encourage Ukraine to respect minority rights, especially the language rights of its Russian speakers.
Some may argue that changing policy toward Ukraine at this late date would seriously damage U.S. credibility around the world. There would undoubtedly be certain costs, but the costs of continuing a misguided strategy would be much greater.