What does it mean to be human? (philosophical approach)

There a lot of philosophers that broached this subject. Different explanations about what it means to be human have varied from the most pointless object to think about, to the most important concept of human thought, and everything in between. Suffice to say that as humans we have a responsibility to maintain a moral and economic equality for the purpose of continuing our lineage through protecting innocent children and people from avoidable hardships at all cost... Or **** it let the world burn?

Hello r:

Your question presupposes that there IS a meaning to being human - as opposed to, say, what it means to be an ant. From my point of view, you can't figure out what it means to be human, separate from figuring out what it means to be an ant.

excon

Hi Rosescore,

If you ask, " what it is like to be human?" rather than, "what does it mean to be human?" then you would be talking philosophy of mind.

Thomas Nagel first introduced the idea thirty years ago and it still won't go away. Nagel proposed an unusual way of looking at the old problem of consciousness. In his famous paper, "What is it like to be a Bat?" Nagel claims that consciousness has a unique subjective character about it. In other words, a unique what it is like aspect to it,

For Nagel there is nothing like what it is to be a bat. In exactly the same way there is nothing like what it is for me to be you and you to be me.We are uniquely ourselves.

Naturally enough Nagel is a dualist. That is, he believes that are two distinct entities when it comes to humans. They have a physical body and a non- physical consciousness. Philosophers who are non-dualistic when it comes to consciousness would strongly disagree with Nagel.

Regards

Tut

Can you give an example of a philosophers

Descartes was the first philosopher to separate mind and body. He believed that mind was a thinking substance and body( including the physical world) is an extended substance. I discussed Descartes in a recent post, "I think therefore I am" Really? I discussed Descartes in relation to what I saw as very difficult question to answer ( well, difficult for me anyway). My answer was somewhat 'over the top', but ignoring that you will get an idea of what Descartes was on about if you go back and find that post.

There are a number of approaches that can be used, but I think it can be looked at in terms of substance dualism versus property dualism. Substance dualism supports Descartes position that mind and body are two different substances. Because the mind is a non-physical property of humans this makes humans unique in terms of ' what is it like?' experiences. In other words, we have 'something extra' that all other living things don't. Some people also refer to this as a soul. This 'something extra' is quite recognizable to us in our everyday experiences For example, 'what is it like?' -to experience a beautiful sunset or 'what is it like?'- to feel sad when looking at the news on T.V.

Opposed to this idea are the property dualists. They say the world only consists of one type of substance; physical things to be exact. When we talk about a mind and a body we are not talking about two different things. In reality we are talking about a physical substance consisting of two different physical properties. It is only an illusion to think that the mind is non-physical. So called non- physical events such as beliefs, emotions, desires etc are really just physical events happening in the brain; neurons firing in a particular fashion.

This is also a reductionist explanation of the mind and is typically found in the sciences such as psychology.

I hopes this helps.

Regards

Tut

TUT317:

I got totally the opposite view from Nagel's essay when I read it initially. I must have misunderstood. I'd like to understand better.

If Nagel is a substance dualist, wouldn't he argue that your soul/mind/whatever would have a totally different subjective experience if it entered a bat's body?

Whereas I would expect a property dualist to argue there's nothing it's like to be a bat, because there's no way for one being to ever become another...

...Because there's nothing that it is to be a being. To know what it's like to be a bat, you'd have to stop being yourself and become a bat. You could never know, because you would have to stop being a thing that could know, beforehand.

Hi Nicholasjm

Upon rereading my original post I discovered an error. I have mistakenly attributed property dualism for physicalism.

What I should have said is, "Opposed to to that view are the physicalists" ( not substance dualists).

I'm not sure if that changes your position. What we actually have for the purpose of this discussion is physicalism versus substance dualism.

Sorry about the clumsy error. I should proofread my posts.

Tut

I actually liked your previous answer even better. I thought it was a lot more informative.

I had no idea there were two different types of dualism, so I was confused when I saw you contrasting one dualism with another. I would have expected something a lot more like what I saw in your more recent reply, dualism versus physicalism.

For other people who are as ill-informed as I was before I read your initial response:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_dualism#Substance_dualism

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism

Hi again Nicholas,

Yes, I think it is better to look at this problem in terms of dualism versus physicalism. Once we get a handle on this then I think we can expand into various types of dualism.

Substance dualism is a good starting point because it is easily recognisable. In exactly the same way physicalism ( science ,psychology) is also easily recognisable.

Substance dualism has proven unsatisfactory to some people because it shows there are two distinct substances; mental and physical stuff. The problem is that physical things can be explain in terms of three dimensions (science) while mental things don't lend itself to these types of explanations. Obviously it makes no sense to ask,"How long or wide is a thought?". What makes it even more difficult is that it is obvious the mental and physical interact with each other.

This disatisfaction has lead to the development of many dualist theories in order to overcome the problem. The important difference between substance dualism and property dualism is that property dualism claims the mental connot exist separate from the body.

Following on from this you were saying that with property dualism there is no way one thing can be another. Taken at face value it would seem that it can, but you might like to expand further on this.

The other question seems to be centred on question of Nagel's poition in relation to dualism. Is Nagel a property dualist or is he a substance dualist? He is probably some type of property dualist, but you could probably also argue both ways.

Nagel being a substance dualist would make it easier to answer you question. "If Nagel is a substance dualist wouldn't he argue that your soul/mind or what ever would have a totally different subjective experience if it entered a bat's body"

THe answer is probably yes, except for one important point. If I am the reincarnation of King Geroge the fifth then I have absolutely no way of experiencing things King George the fifth experienced at this moment in time. There also appears no way I can claim that I am somehow able to compare my experience to Kinge George. I would think it is a comparison of experiences that is the problem here.

Our soul/mind may well have a different subjective experience once it entered a bat's body, but we have no way of making a comparison. If this is true then we are forced to conclude there is no possible way we can know what it is like to be a bat. Being a bat or a human demonstrates from Nagel's point of vew that subjective experience is unique regardless of where it resides.

Tut